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Hungary and Suez

Hungary and Suez. Hungary. 27-28 June Nagy delivers his own ‘secret speech’ to party Central Committee which is a devastating critique of the Stalinist years Nagy becomes prime minister, as Moscow instructed, and he introduces a Hungarian version of the ‘New Course

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Hungary and Suez

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  1. Hungary and Suez

  2. Hungary • 27-28 June Nagy delivers his own ‘secret speech’ to party Central Committee which is a devastating critique of the Stalinist years • Nagy becomes prime minister, as Moscow instructed, and he introduces a Hungarian version of the ‘New Course • No radical reform of the model • Shift of priorities:- • to consumption rather than investment • to agriculture and services rather than industry • to a limited extent to private sector rather than state

  3. Rákosi vs. Nagy • February 1955 - Malenkov (Nagy’s protector) removed by Khrushchev from Soviet premiership • 4 March - Nagy was condemned for ‘Rightist deviation’ : failing to devote sufficient resources to investment • April 1955 – Nagy dismissed from CC • December 1955 – Nagy expelled from Party

  4. Domestic context • 1954 – Young Communist League establishes a discussion group called the Petőfi Circle • After February secret speech it becomes focal point of political criticism, including demands for return of Nagy to political life • March 1956 – Rákosi admits Rajk trial was staged • June - Petőfi Circle hold meetings calling for reburial of Rajk and restoration of Nagy government • June – series of strikes following brutal suppression of worker demonstrations in Poznań, Poland

  5. Domestic Build-Up • 6 October - Domestic pressure from the Petőfi Circle and international pressure from Tito results in reburial of Rajk • This turns into a massive demonstration against the regime • 13 October – Nagy re-admitted to party • 15 October – Kádár and Gerő visit Belgrade

  6. 23rd October • 22 October, students at Budapest Technical University, supported by Petőfi Circle, call for demonstration on 23rd calling for withdrawal of Soviet troops and a new Nagy government • 23 Oct - Gerő arrives back from Belgrade and denounces demonstrators in a radio broadcast • Demonstrators mass outside Radio Station demanding the right to reply • Stalin statue is torn down • The demonstrators are shot at

  7. 24-30 October • 24 Oct - Soviet tanks role into city • 4 days of bitter fighting ensue • 25 Oct - Mikoyan and Suslov sent to Bp. They order replacement of Gerő by Kádár as Party Sec • 28 Oct – Nagy calls for ceasefire, and refers to the fighters as a democratic movement rather than counter-revolutionaries • 30 Oct – Nagy forms an administration which brings back politicians and parties from 1947 • 30 Oct – Moscow signals readiness to sanction Hungary leaving Warsaw Pact

  8. Tito and Khrushchev • 24 Oct - Soviet tanks role into city • 4 days of bitter fighting ensue • 25 Oct - Mikoyan and Suslov sent to Bp. They order replacement of Gerő by Kádár as Party Sec • 28 Oct – Nagy calls for ceasefire, and refers to the fighters as a democratic movement rather than counter-revolutionaries • 30 Oct – Nagy forms an administration which brings back politicians and parties from 1947 • 30 Oct – Moscow signals readiness to sanction Hungary leaving Warsaw Pact

  9. Early November • 2 Nov – Nagy forms new government almost exactly reflecting composition of 1945 elections • 2 Nov- Soviet troop movements • 3 Nov – Soviet troops begin to invade again • 4 Nov – Nagy makes broadcast to world • 4 Nov - Kádár announces formation of workers and peasants government • 7 Nov- Kádár reached parliament building in Soviet armoured car

  10. Later November • 14 Nov Central Workers' Council of Greater Budapest formed and agrees to negotiate • Kádár initially conciliatory • 22 Nov – following pressure from Khrushchev, factory councils banned from discussing political issues • 26 Nov – dismissed as counter-revolutionary

  11. US Response: RFE • Radio Free Europe constantly broadcast messages encouraging Hungarians to fight the communists and suggesting that western intervention was imminent • Unlike its Polish desk which was cautious and supported the reform communism of Gomułka • The Hungarian desk did not support Nagy, seeing him as just another communist and hence unworthy of support

  12. US Response: Govt • 24/10 “watch developments closely and keep quiet” • 26/10 US concern that there could be Soviet-NATO confrontation – Soviet leadership should be assured US had no intention of intervening militarily in Poland or Hungary • 27/10; 28/10 various speeches given making this point • 29/10 Moscow informed of this by US ambassador • 31/10 Eisenhower says same in nationwide TV broadcast • Till 31/10 US policy-makers did not realise Nagy shared some of the goals of the rebels

  13. ‘Active non-involvement’ • 1/11 No change in US policy even after Hungary leaves Warsaw Pact; no consideration of recognising neutrality • 2/11 US authorises food aid, but sends circular to US embassies hopeful that reformist tendencies will continue • 2/11 While Khrushchev and Malenkov are briefing Tito of their plans, US sends telegram to Tito:- • ‘The govt of US does not look with favour upon govts unfriendly to the SU on the borders of the SU’

  14. Suez: background • 1948 Israeli independence and defeat of Arab nations • 1952 cabal of young army officers backed by Muslim Brotherhood forces dissolute King Farouk of Egypt into exile • 1954 Gamal Abdel Nasser assumes control • Vision of pan-Arab movement led by Egypt that would expel the British from Middle East, efface Israel, and restore Islamic grandeur • Egypt begins sponsoring acts of violence against Israel from Gaza Strip

  15. Suez - Issues • Jan 1954 Nasser blocks Straits of Tīrān (at the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba) • British hostile to Nasser, as Farouk had been their puppet • French also concerned about is pan-Arab views as they were battling Islamic nationalists in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, whom Nasser supported • Israel wanted to stop incursions into its territory • BUT U.S. had a different agenda - play down Arab–Israeli dispute and alert all parties to danger of Communist penetration

  16. Suez • Sept 1955 Egypt acquires military equipment from Czechoslovakia (authorized by SU) • Israel begins contemplating military action • US & UK decide not to finance Egypt's construction of Aswan High Dam, • July 26, 1956, Nasser declares martial law in canal zone seizing control of the Suez Canal Company

  17. Intervention by ‘old empires’ • 21-24 Oct 1956 Brits, French & Israelis finalise plan in secret (and denied) meeting in Sèvres (suburb of Paris) • 29 Oct 1956, 10 Israeli brigades invade Egypt and advance toward canal, routing Egyptian forces • Britain & France demand Israeli & Egyptian troops withdraw from canal; announce they would intervene to enforce a cease-fire ordered by UN • 5-6 Nov British & French forces land at Port Said and Port Fuad and begin occupation of canal zone

  18. Reaction of new superpowers • Eisenhower opposed hostilities before the U.S. election lest he lose Jewish votes • Also ‘preoccupied’ with Hungary • US furious at this initiative of ‘old empires’ • 1 Nov sponsors UN resolution for cease-fire • Suspends financial support to UK • Public opinion in UK also massively against this latter-day imperialist adventure • 22 Dec UN evacuated British and French troops and impose peace-keeping troop which remain for 10 years • Jan 1957 Anthony Eden resigns as UK PM • March 1957 Israeli forces withdraw

  19. US-SU reactions • 29/10 US expressed concern that SU might support Nasser, and there were rumours that he was • Eisenhower convinced that the geography of the situation made it impossible • 2-4/11 US pre-occupied with Suez and blind to Nagy’s worsening position • 5/11 French ambassador told US thought SU would not intervene

  20. SU’s actions • 31/10 is first reaction (nothing for 2 days) • Calls for UN action • Removes military advisors to Sudan • Removes Ilyushin 28 bombers to Syria • 1/11 verbal attack on West, but only sympathy for Nasser • Soviet troops removed from Egypt to avoid possibility of direct contact with Israeli troops • Till 2/11 believed US in collusion with UK etc • 5/11 once Hungary under control and UN resolution for ceasefire accepted, SU issues threat of missile attack – rhetoric not military assistance • Ultimately Suez is propaganda victory for SU

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