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National Personnel Recovery Architecture Study Final Report Briefing

National Personnel Recovery Architecture Study Final Report Briefing. World Wide Personnel Recovery Conference 31 August 2004. Institute for Defense Analyses. Congressional tasking for the NPRA Study.

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National Personnel Recovery Architecture Study Final Report Briefing

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  1. National Personnel Recovery Architecture StudyFinal Report Briefing World Wide Personnel Recovery Conference 31 August 2004 Institute for Defense Analyses

  2. Congressional tasking for the NPRA Study “…conduct a government wide interagency needs assessment in order to define the components of a fully integrated national personnel recovery architecture. The assessment should include a consideration of service personnel, civilians and contract personnel, and examine the possible consolidation of training programs. The study should recommend a coordinated national goal for personnel recovery, roles and responsibilities of each department, agency or office…DPMO lead”

  3. NPRA Study Objectives • Define the national personnel recovery architecture components and baseline (interagency; non-DoD and DoD) • Develop a strategic vision for interagency PR • Identify shortfalls and gaps • Propose and evaluate enhancements needed in order to achieve the strategic vision • June 2004- September 2005 – Focus on NPRA implementation

  4. Study Scope Limited To • Presently planned force structure of all agencies/departments • Improved coordination, synergy, and leveraging among US Government Departments and Agencies • Overseas Personnel Recovery • Military, civilian and contractor personnel on official duty

  5. NPRA Assessment Methodology Architecture Components Execute the Mission Plan and Prepare Plan and Prepare Force Elements Force Elements • Strategic Direct and Guide Operational • Isolated Personnel • Isolated Personnel • Tactical • Recovery Forces • Doctrine • Recovery Forces • • Doctrine • Report Commanders and Staff • Commanders and Staff Mission • • • Mission • Locate Requirements • Requirements • Support I • Recover m • Return/ p Repatriate l Compare e Identify m Gaps e n D • octrine t Assess & O • rganization Assess & T • raining Recommend Desired Desired Recommend • Materiel Changes Strategic Vision Strategic Vision Changes L • eader Dev. P • ersonnel End States End States F • acilities

  6. Proposed Definition of PR Personnel Recovery – is the sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to prepare and execute the recovery of U.S. military, government civilians, and government contractors, who become isolated from friendly control while participating in U.S. sponsored activities abroad, and of other persons as designated by the President. Expanded Scope with an Overseas Mission Focus

  7. Personnel Recovery Related Capabilities • Current capability is compartmented rather than integrated • National Architecture should benefit from synergy among agency capabilities

  8. Two General Situations for PR • Combatant Commander (COCOM) in charge – Combat theaters such as Afghanistan and Iraq, where there was no U.S. Mission, PR was a military responsibility • The PR Commander and staff (e.g., JSRC, RCC) have the authority and capability to execute PR without real-time coordination above the JTF • Chief of Mission (CoM) in charge – Countries where there is a U.S. Mission, but there are no U.S. PR forces. PR responsibilities of the host nation and the U.S. Mission are fragmented. • CoM and the host nation have responsibilities, but generally no standing capability causing time delays. • PR coordination process is complex involving multiple players depending on the situation • When a PR incident occurs, coordination and response is time-sensitive, but instead are likely to be ad hoc, causing excessive delays • Isolated Personnel are likely to be captured or killed if prior coordination is not affected and response is not exercised.

  9. CoM in Charge • Outline • Baseline • Shortfalls (compared to vision) • Solutions • Recommendations … and respective costs of improvements Organized according to the DOTMLPF construct

  10. Chief of Mission NSC Staff, DoS Deputy Chief of Mission FBI, DoS, JUSMAG, or RA person designated as a lead for PR FBI Legal Attaché State Department including FEST Defense Department Office Of Regional Affairs Defense Attaché Office • Reporting • Negotiations • NSPD-12 Activity • Law Enforcement • Investigation • Operations • Analysis • Legal Support (findings) American Citizens’ Services • Family Contact/Support • Repatriation Joint US Military Assistance Group • Support JPRA (Repatriation) Regional Security Office HN Counterpart Public Affairs Office, Political Office Host Nation Counterpart • Joint Task Force/MILGRP • Terms of Reference • Intelligence, SA • Recovery Operations Medical Office Gen Service Office • Administrative Support HN Counterpart HN Counterpart Baseline Organization for PR when CoM is in charge

  11. CoM in Charge – Shortfalls • No interagency policy, doctrine, or procedures for PR (D) • DoS focus on security and evacuation; no mention of PR (D) • Host Nation understanding, cooperation, capabilities, interoperability are critical, but usually lacking (O) • Crisis Management Support Center, Political Military Action Team, Foreign Emergency Support Team, and Emergency Action Committee not organized to respond to PR incidents in time-sensitive manner (O) • Limited number of people have received PR training (personnel at risk, management/staff, or recovery force) (T, P) • Limited awareness or use of DoD tools or aids outside of DoD (M) • Limited awareness of PR at senior leader levels (L) • Numerous contractor coverage limitations (D, P) • No focused PR training, exercises, or facilities outside DoD (F)

  12. CoM in Charge – Solutions • NSPD required in order to • Establish National Policy and NSC oversight (D) • Create an organizational infrastructure to support PR (O) • DoS focal point office; country team PR coordination cells • Identify and fund PR training and equipment requirements (T, M) • Ensure Joint Pub 3-50 addresses interagency issues (D) • Standardize PR policy and support with regard to government civilians and contractors (D, P) • Top-down planning emphasis, i.e., include PR in DoS Strategic Plan, Mission Performance Plans, Emergency Action Plans, evacuation, and Cooperative Security Plans (D) • Improve PR training • Develop senior leader and staff planning and isolated person PR courses at NFATC and NDU (JPRA assist) (T, L) • Expand PR training provided by JPRA and CRCs (T) • Conduct PR exercises in high threat countries to improve readiness (T) • Establish interagency materiel development process to pool resources (M)

  13. COCOM in Charge • Outline • Baseline • Shortfalls (compared to vision) • Solutions • Recommendations … and respective costs of improvements Organized according to the DOTMLPF construct

  14. COCOM in Charge – Shortfalls • No Joint PR doctrine exists; capabilities are Service-centric and do not address non-DoD interagency/coalition policies, concerns,or capabilities (D) • PR organizational infrastructure lacks cohesiveness and robustness • JPRA not truly joint and not resourced to provide liaison support to interagency community (O) • COCOM JSRCs (other than CENTCOM) are not adequately staffed • CENTCOM borrowed other COCOM personnel (O, P) • Insufficient personnel structure in Services (O, P) • PRAG and PRRC not efficiently organized(O) • Joint training seldom exercises PR; no dedicated PR exercise (T) • Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape training backlog increasing (T) • Requirements for materiel and development programs are managed individually, not integrated (M, O) • Contractor policies not standard across services, not enforced (D)

  15. COCOM in Charge – Solutions • Update Joint Personnel Recovery Doctrine Joint Pub 3-50 (D) • Revise/implement policies in accordance with the NSPD (D) • Expand the Joint Staff office for PR, expand DPMO PR Directorate to support Interagency, better integrate JPRA into JFCOM (O, P) • Reengineer PRAG and PRRC (O) • Expand PR joint training to include interagency and coalition (T) • Validate SERE training requirements, implement the Core Captivity Curriculum, and expand facilities to meet requirements (T, F) • Develop a Joint PR modernization plan for materiel (M) • Ensure that PR policy and support is enforced for DoD civilians and contractors (D, P)

  16. Key NPRA Recommendations • Need an NSPD to create the National architecture (D, O) • Define PR and the scope • Develop interagency organizational infrastructure • Provide adequate resources (funds and personnel) • Initiate a program with DoS to assess and enhance US Embassies’ readiness to respond at short notice to PR incidents (D, O, T) • Conduct periodic PR assessments in the embassies to improve planning and preparation • Leverage all available programs and resources • Improve host nation capability • The NPRA provides US government contractors the same PR coverage as provided to government personnel (D, P) • Develop Department and Agency policies and revise the Federal Acquisition Regulation • Revamp the approach to survival, evasion and resistance training (T) • Implement Core Captivity Curriculum • Increase JPRA throughput • Improve DoS training for non-DoD agencies • Review and certify private sector training capabilities

  17. NSPD Establishes an Interagency Definitionfor Personnel Recovery Personnel recovery is the sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to prepare and execute the recovery of U.S. military, government civilians, and government contractors, who become isolated from friendly control while participating in U.S. sponsored activities abroad, and of other persons as designated by the President.

  18. NSPD Establishes National Policy • Recover all U.S. military, government civilians, government contractors, and others designated by the President who are isolated from friendly control while participating in a government-sponsored activity and return them to a safe environment • Isolated personnel will adhere to the following guidelines: • Assist other Americans and do nothing that may harm a fellow American • Resist attempts by captors to exploit them and refuse special treatment • Refuse to make written, oral or videotaped statements harmful to the U.S. • Carefully plan actions realizing that decisions can impact the Government’s ability to affect recovery or release

  19. NSPD Underscores ResponsibilitiesTwo General Personnel Recovery Situations • Military operations in support of U.S. policy • Combatant Commander responsible for protecting U.S military, U.S. Government civilians, U.S. Government contractors and coalition partners • No on-going U.S. military operations • Chief of Mission responsible for monitoring the recovery of U.S. Government civilians and U.S. Government contractors • Actual recovery operations are normally the responsibility of the host nation • Likely to be a cooperative effort between U.S. Mission, host nation, and DoD

  20. NSPD Directives • Counter-terrorism and Security Group Policy Coordination Committee of NSC will coordinate PR policy and recommend PR response options to the President • DoD will develop PR policy for interagency coordination; NSC will coordinate policy with Departments and Agencies • All Departments/Agencies • Will participate in planning and executing PR missions consistent with respective capabilities • Shall establish a PR office or focal point • Will identify PR training and support requirements and PR capabilities and limitations • Instruction to Chief of Mission will emphasize deliberate, integrated PR planning to include the establishment of a PR cell in selected countries • DoS will plan in advance PR activities (education, training, and exercises) for high-risk countries • DoS will assist the host nation in meeting PR requirements

  21. Questions?Comments!Discussion…

  22. Back-up Slides

  23. CoM in Charge – Baseline • Host Nation sovereignty constraints and agreements (D) • US National Security Strategy, DoS/USAID Strategic Plan, Mission Performance Plans; the Warden System and F77 Report (D) • Emergency Action Planning process, Emergency Action Committee (D, O) • Crisis Mgt Support Center, FEST, Pol/Mil Action Team, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, FBI, Country Team organization, DoD support (O, P) • Security awareness training by National Foreign Affairs Training Center (NFATC); deployment training provided by CRCs and some departments/agencies (T) • Commercial and DoD developed PR equipment and aids (M) • Contractor support and related issues (D, P) • Facilities include NFATC, CONUS Replacement Center (F)

  24. COCOM in Charge – Baseline • Missing Persons Act, DoDD 2310.2, Code of Conduct are the basis for DoD policy and doctrine (D) • Planning and decision-making process well engrained (D,O) • DPMO, JFCOM, JPRA, PRAG, PRRC, Intelligence Community all engaged in PR activities (O) • SERE schools operating at full capacity (T) • Command/staff training provided (T) • Contractor support increasing, with related PR issues (D, P)

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