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International Treaties on WMD

International Treaties on WMD. Session 16 YSU Weapons of Mass Destruction Course. How Good Are Treaties?. Treaties may not be worth the paper upon which they were written without a commitment to enforce (verification), a relenting of individualist interests and an understanding of purpose.

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International Treaties on WMD

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  1. International Treaties on WMD Session 16 YSU Weapons of Mass Destruction Course

  2. How Good Are Treaties? Treaties may not be worth the paper upon which they were written without a commitment to enforce (verification), a relenting of individualist interests and an understanding of purpose.

  3. Geneva Protocol • 1925, June 17 - Signed • 1928, February 8 - Effective • Whereas the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices, has been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world

  4. Problem With Geneva • Did not call for the elimination of bacteriological or chemical weapons • Only called for a “no first use” policy • Allowed use of CW within borders for civil unrest • US ratified it in 1975

  5. The Geneva We Know • Address treatment of prisoners • Means of engagement • Defined “civilians” • Protects civilians • Protects environment

  6. Chemical Weapons Convention • No rush to treaties during cold war • Verification issues • Growing trust U.S./Soviet Union • Talks did not begin until after BTWC

  7. Chemical Weapons Convention • Completed in ’92, open in ’93 • Placed “in-force”in 1997 • U.S. deposited ratification on 4-25-1997

  8. Major Issues • The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

  9. Major Issues • Many felt that the CWC infringed upon 4th Amendment rights • Similar constitutional provisions existed in other countries. • Article 7 of the CWC states that each Party to the Treaty shall implement its provisions “in accordance with its constitutional obligations with regards to searches and seizures.”

  10. Chemical Industry • Did not support Geneva • Supported CWC • Why? What Changed? • Still concerned about patents

  11. Other Problems • Provisions and challenges? • Prohibits development • Prohibits production • Prohibits acquisition • Prohibits retention or stockpiling • Prohibits transfer • Prohibits use

  12. Provides For • Control of Agent and Precursors • Schedule 1 • Actual agent • <1 ton in any country (all chems) • Research facilities <10kg • Schedule 2 • Less toxic but still poisonous or precursor • Schedule 3 • Legitimate use chems • Precursors for schedule 1 or 2

  13. Enforced by • OPCW in The Hague, Netherlands • Challenge inspections (12 hour notice) • Reporting • Destruction • Security • Post-war responsibilities • Proliferation signatures

  14. BTWC of 1972 • Bio first mentioned in the Geneva Protocol. • 1969 – Nixon unilaterally renounced the U.S. BW and CW offensive programs. • Group of 18 Nations debated that a treaty should be in force.

  15. Provisions • Limits bio to peaceful ends only • 9 months to destroy BW • No “help” for others • Tells countries to “get along” • Requires good faith bargaining

  16. Problems • No explicit order banning bioweapons • No means of compliance checks • Developed during Cold War • Dual-nature use • Protection of Biotech

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