A Standard of Judgement

1. A Standard of Judgement Michael Smith Princeton University Lecture 1: From the human condition to a standard of judgement Lecture 2: From a standard of judgement to moral rationalism Lecture 3: The best form of moral rationalism Lecture 4: Moral reasons vs non-moral reasons Lecture 5: A normative theory of blame Lecture 6: Loose ends Bonus discussion section: Defeat by nature in “Force Majeure” “Here is the beginning of philosophy: a recognition of the conflicts between men, a search for their cause, a condemnation of mere opinion...and the discovery of a standard of judgement” Epictetus, Discourses III:11

5. Miguel Orellana Benado University of Chile Michael Smith R. Jay Wallace Princeton Berkeley WORST EVER LOCKE LECTURER

11. We know from the armchair: • that we think and therefore exist; • that so too does a temporal order; • that so too does a spatial order; • that we are located within that spatio-temporal order as the ground of the capacity to think, and that others may be so located too • that elements within that spatio-temporal order bear causal relations to each other, some of which are under our control, and hence that we are even more fundamentally the ground of the capacity to gain knowledge of the world and to realize our desires in it; • that this presupposes that we are also the ground of the capacities to will and to be instrumentally rational to some extent—in a phrase, we are agents; • that because we are agents, and because agent is a goodness-fixing kind, there is a privileged standard of judgement that applies to all agents, human and non-human, and hence that various evaluative and deontic claims are true

12. We know from the armchair: • that we think and therefore exist; • that so too does a temporal order; • that so too does a spatial order; • that we are located within that spatio-temporal order as the ground of the capacity to think, and that others may be so located too • that elements within that spatio-temporal order bear causal relations to each other, some of which are under our control, and hence that we are even more fundamentally the ground of the capacity to gain knowledge of the world and to realize our desires in it; • that this presupposes that we are also the ground of the capacities to will and to be instrumentally rational to some extent—in a phrase, we are agents; • that because we are agents, and because agent is a goodness-fixing kind, there is a privileged standard of judgement that applies to all agents, human and non-human, and hence that various evaluative and deontic claims are true

13. We know from the armchair: • that we think and therefore exist; • that so too does a temporal order; • that so too does a spatial order; • that we are located within that spatio-temporal order as the ground of the capacity to think, and that others may be so located too • that elements within that spatio-temporal order bear causal relations to each other, some of which are under our control, and hence that we are even more fundamentally the ground of the capacity to gain knowledge of the world and to realize our desires in it; • that this presupposes that we are also the ground of the capacities to will and to be instrumentally rational to some extent—in a phrase, we are agents; • that because we are agents, and because agent is a goodness-fixing kind, there is a privileged standard of judgement that applies to all agents, human and non-human, and hence that various evaluative and deontic claims are true

14. We know from the armchair: • that we think and therefore exist; • that so too does a temporal order; • that so too does a spatial order; • that we are located within that spatio-temporal order as the ground of the capacity to think, and that others may be so located too • that elements within that spatio-temporal order bear causal relations to each other, some of which are under our control, and hence that we are even more fundamentally the ground of the capacity to gain knowledge of the world and to realize our desires in it; • that this presupposes that we are also the ground of the capacities to will and to be instrumentally rational to some extent—in a phrase, we are agents; • that because we are agents, and because agent is a goodness-fixing kind, there is a privileged standard of judgement that applies to all agents, human and non-human, and hence that various evaluative and deontic claims are true

15. We know from the armchair: • that we think and therefore exist; • that so too does a temporal order; • that so too does a spatial order; • that we are located within that spatio-temporal order as the ground of the capacity to think, and that others may be so located too • that elements within that spatio-temporal order bear causal relations to each other, some of which are under our control, and hence that we are even more fundamentally the ground of the capacity to gain knowledge of the world and to realize our desires in it;; • that this presupposes that we are also the ground of the capacities to will and to be instrumentally rational to some extent—in a phrase, we are agents; • that because we are agents, and because agent is a goodness-fixing kind, there is a privileged standard of judgement that applies to all agents, human and non-human, and hence that various evaluative and deontic claims are true

16. means-ends belief  bodily movement = action desire for an end

17. means-ends belief ( willing)  bodily movement = action desire for an end

18. means-ends belief  ( willing)  bodily movement = action desire for an end

19. We know from the armchair: • that we think and therefore exist; • that so too does a temporal order; • that so too does a spatial order; • that we are located within that spatio-temporal order as the ground of the capacity to think, and that others may be so located too • that elements within that spatio-temporal order bear causal relations to each other, some of which are under our control, and hence that we are even more fundamentally the ground of the capacity to gain knowledge of the world and to realize our desires in it;; • that this presupposes that we are also the ground of the capacities to will and to be instrumentally rational to some extent—in a phrase, we are agents; • that because we are agents, and because agent is a goodness-fixing kind, there is a privileged standard of judgement that applies to all agents, human and non-human, and hence that various evaluative and deontic claims are true

20. We know from the armchair: • that we think and therefore exist; • that so too does a temporal order; • that so too does a spatial order; • that we are located within that spatio-temporal order as the ground of the capacity to think, and that others may be so located too • that elements within that spatio-temporal order bear causal relations to each other, some of which are under our control, and hence that we are even more fundamentally the ground of the capacity to gain knowledge of the world and to realize our desires in it;; • that this presupposes that we are also the ground of the capacities to will and to be instrumentally rational to some extent—in a phrase, we are agents; • that because we are agents, and because agent is a goodness-fixing kind, there is a privileged standard of judgement that applies to all agents, human and non-human, and hence that various evaluative and deontic claims are true

21. A Standard of Judgement Michael Smith Princeton University Lecture 1: From the human condition to a standard of judgement Lecture 2: From a standard of judgement to moral rationalism Lecture 3: The best form of moral rationalism Lecture 4: Moral reasons vs non-moral reasons Lecture 5: A normative theory of blame Lecture 6: Loose ends Bonus discussion section: Defeat by nature in “Force Majeure” “Here is the beginning of philosophy: a recognition of the conflicts between men, a search for their cause, a condemnation of mere opinion...and the discovery of a standard of judgement” Epictetus, Discourses III:11

22. A Standard of Judgement Michael Smith Princeton University Lecture 1: From the human condition to a standard of judgement Lecture 2: From a standard of judgement to moral rationalism Lecture 3: The best form of moral rationalism Lecture 4: Moral reasons vs non-moral reasons Lecture 5: A normative theory of blame Lecture 6: Loose ends Bonus discussion section: Defeat by nature in “Force Majeure” “Here is the beginning of philosophy: a recognition of the conflicts between men, a search for their cause, a condemnation of mere opinion...and the discovery of a standard of judgement” Epictetus, Discourses III:11

23. A Standard of Judgement Michael Smith Princeton University Lecture 1: From the human condition to a standard of judgement Lecture 2: From a standard of judgement to moral rationalism Lecture 3: The best form of moral rationalism Lecture 4: Moral reasons vs non-moral reasons Lecture 5: A normative theory of blame Lecture 6: Loose ends Bonus discussion section: Defeat by nature in “Force Majeure” “Here is the beginning of philosophy: a recognition of the conflicts between men, a search for their cause, a condemnation of mere opinion...and the discovery of a standard of judgement” Epictetus, Discourses III:11

24. A Standard of Judgement Michael Smith Princeton University Lecture 1: From the human condition to a standard of judgement Lecture 2: From a standard of judgement to moral rationalism Lecture 3: The best form of moral rationalism Lecture 4: Moral reasons vs non-moral reasons Lecture 5: A normative theory of blame Lecture 6: Loose ends Bonus discussion section: Defeat by nature in “Force Majeure” “Here is the beginning of philosophy: a recognition of the conflicts between men, a search for their cause, a condemnation of mere opinion...and the discovery of a standard of judgement” Epictetus, Discourses III:11

25. A Standard of Judgement Michael Smith Princeton University Lecture 1: From the human condition to a standard of judgement Lecture 2: From a standard of judgement to moral rationalism Lecture 3: The best form of moral rationalism Lecture 4: Moral reasons vs non-moral reasons Lecture 5: A normative theory of blame Lecture 6: Loose ends Bonus discussion section: Defeat by nature in “Force Majeure” “Here is the beginning of philosophy: a recognition of the conflicts between men, a search for their cause, a condemnation of mere opinion...and the discovery of a standard of judgement” Epictetus, Discourses III:11

26. A Standard of Judgement Michael Smith Princeton University Lecture 1: From the human condition to a standard of judgement Lecture 2: From a standard of judgement to moral rationalism Lecture 3: The best form of moral rationalism Lecture 4: Moral reasons vs non-moral reasons Lecture 5: A normative theory of blame Lecture 6: Loose ends Bonus discussion section: Defeat by nature in “Force Majeure” “Here is the beginning of philosophy: a recognition of the conflicts between men, a search for their cause, a condemnation of mere opinion...and the discovery of a standard of judgement” Epictetus, Discourses III:11