We Can Test the Experience Machine

1. We Can Test the Experience Machine Dan Weijers Victoria University of Wellington June 2011

2. What Does X-Phi Do? • Lots of experimental philosophy is designed to test empirical premises like: ‘We would not plug in’ • “Philosophers working in… ‘experimental philosophy’ have begun… to collect data about folk intuitions” • Nahmias, E., et al. (2007). Surveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions about Free Will and Moral Responsibility, Philosophical Psychology, 18(5): 561. • But lots also just wants to understand how judgements about thought experiments are formed: • “[To] use the methods of experimental psychology to probe the way people make judgments that bear on debates in philosophy” • Nadelhoffer, T. & Nahmias, E. (2007). The Past and Future of Experimental Philosophy, Philosophical Explorations, 10(2): 123.

3. Applying X-Phi to Arguments • Typical argument: • If pleasure = g. good, then we’d plug in • We would not plug in • Therefore, pleasure ≠ g. good • Test P2 (if true, go to next step, if false, then claim the argument fails) • ACP: you did a faulty test: the wrong ‘we’ or procedural bias • Tweak supposedly irrelevant factor of thought experiment, test again, and compare results (if different in right way, claim that P1 is false because irrelevant factors unduly influence judgements) • ACP: You did a faulty test: the wrong ‘we’, or procedural bias, or added other irrelevant factors with your tweak

4. Smith: A Limit on what can be Tested • We can’t usefully test thought experiments with surveys when… • Respondents need to adopt the role of confronted agents… • i.e. when they have to predict what they would do if the scenario were real • Usually involves “confusion, incredulity, fear, etc.” • Smith, B. (2011). Can We Test the Experience Machine?, Ethical Perspectives, 18(1): 45. • Because participants’ judgements about what they would do would otherwise not be made from the correct frame of mind… leading to the possibility that • They might report what they think they should do or what the experimenter wants to hear instead of what they would actually do

5. Smith: Factors Compromising Tests • Our survey tests of thought experiments are less useful to the extent that: • Respondents need to adopt the role of confronted agents • When they “anticipate their own futures”, and/or • They “identify with the moral decisions of others” • Smith, B. (2011). Can We Test the Experience Machine?, Ethical Perspectives, 18(1): 46. • The survey suffers from methodological weaknesses • Sampling • Participant ineptitude • Procedural bias: prepping, wording, question order (Grice)

6. Smith: We Can’t Test the Inverted Experience Machine • “…the inverted experience machine, as well as other[s]… have a unique set of characteristics that make it impossible to gather the right subjects to test. Therefore, in practice, these thought experiments are impossible to test.” • Smith, B. (2011). Can We Test the Experience Machine?, Ethical Perspectives, 18(1): 37. (My emphasis)

7. Smith: Why We Can’t Test the Inverted Experience Machine • “…unique set of characteristics…”: • Requirement that participants adopt the role of confronted agents • When they “anticipate their own futures” – e.g. when asked ‘what would you do?’ • Requirement for being a partially confronted agent: When they “anticipate their own futures…, or attempt to identify with the moral decisions of others, to some extent” (Smith, 2011, p 46) • Setup makes it impossible for participants to adopt the role of confronted agents • Surveys “that address thought experiments about moral dilemmas” (Smith, 2011, p 44) – Infer: all options involve significant losses? • Participants opinion asked for via survey, rather than behaviour observed in actual case (Smith, 2011, p 39 + elsewhere)

8. Weijers: Why We Can Test the Inverted Experience Machine (1) • Requirement that participants adopt the role of confronted agents: • When they “anticipate their own futures” (Smith, 2011, p 46) – e.g. ask ‘what would you do?’ • This requirement is not met • ‘Anticipating their own futures’ is not a necessary aspect of the Inverted Experience Machine • E.g. What should a stranger choose in the Inverted Experience Machine case?

9. Weijers: Why We Can Test the Inverted Experience Machine (2) • Requirement for being a partially confronted agent: • When they “anticipate their own futures…, or attempt to identify with the moral decisions of others, to some extent” (Smith, 2011, p 46) • This requirement is faulty • Just because participants have to “attempt to identify with the moral decisions of others” does not always mean that they need to get (at all) emotional to give a useful response • In fact making rational (not emotional) decisions is what we expect of those making important decisions on behalf of others in lots of cases • E.g. policymakers – should uni be free?

10. Weijers: Why We Can Test the Inverted Experience Machine (3) • Amended requirement for being a partially confronted agent: • When they “anticipate their own futures…, or attempt to identify with the moral decisions of others, to some extent [in some cases]” • This requirement does not apply to some cases of testing the Inverted Experience Machine • When deciding if someone should stick with a machine life or go to reality we are better of putting emotions (“confusion, incredulity, fear, etc.”) behind us. • And, when trying to learn about what people think we should really value in a life, the same goes

11. Can Philosophers Usefully Discuss the Inverted Experience Machine? • It’s not clear where Smith stands on this • If we can’t test the IEM because we don’t get emotional, can philosophers make any use of it? • Did anyone feel “confusion, incredulity, and fear etc.” about the thought experiments? • If not, then (according to Smith’s framework) your judgement about it is useless • Maybe Smith doesn’t mind this result – I’m not sure

12. Summary • Smith 1: thought experiments that require confronted agent respondents cannot be usefully surveyed because the appropriate emotions don’t come up • Smith 2: Inverted Exp. Mach. requires confronted agent respondents • Smith 3: Therefore, Inverted Exp. Mach. cannot be usefully surveyed • Me: not all Inverted Exp. Mach.’s require confronted agent respondents • Me: if Smith 1 is correct, then all use of dilemmas in philosophy is a waste of time or at least less useful than is usually thought