by Pal TAMAS [Institute of Sociology, HAS Budapest]

1. DEPENDENT ELITES IN POST-SOCIALISM: ARE LAND-BASED POST-COLONIAL SYSTEMS SO DIFFERENT FROM THE TRANSCONTINENTAL ONES? by Pal TAMAS [Institute of Sociology, HAS Budapest]

2. STRUCTURE OF THE PAPER • STATE PROBLEMS. DESTINIES AND POLICIES • THE MODEL DEBATE [LA] • EURASIAN ELITE’S AUTONOMIES IN THE 2000ES.

3. DEPENDENT ELITES- WEAK STATES dependent elites = political class with shortage internal, country based legitimacy [in weak states] Weak states- min-max - unable to control its territory - limited „violence management” -limited tax collection and financial control mechanisms -military insecurity Cases: Belorus- stong dependency, but relatively strong, Ukraine- dependent, but weaker state, Georgia, Moldova- strong dependency, very weak state

4. FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS • Who does generate Post-Soviet underdevelopment? • What are the tools of a low cost „energy imperialism” in comparison with the classical „imperialism of free trade” [Ru-EU?] in this region? • How do networks, webs, or circuits of foreign origin divide the new political class? • Are members of the Post-Soviet intelligentsia still modernization zealots?

5. POSTCOLONIAL TERRITORIES • The postcolonies can be divided into settler, nonsettler, and mixed. • Settler postcolonies include countries that are dominated by European settlers with only sparse native populations (e.g., Australia) • Nonsettler postcolonies are characterized by large native populations and only a small number of Europeans (e.g., India). • Mixed postcolonies refer to countries with both sizable native and European populations (e.g., South Africa and Kenya) POST-SOVIET ANALOGIES SETTLERS- Belorus? Ukraine? NON-SETTLERS- Georgia, Uzbekistan MIXED- Moldova, Kazahstan

6. POST-SOVIET STATE BUILDING- DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVES I Soft state (Myrdal) • Lack of social discipline: general inclination to resist public controls / rules • both officials and citizens • Why? • traditional authority structures destroyed by colonialism • ‘habit’ to oppose colonial authorities • soft state = non state

7. POST-SOVIET STATE BUILDING- DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVES II Overdeveloped state (Alavi) • State not grown from its social, political, economic structure • but imposed from outside • to promote outsiders interests • by controlling and subordinating the indigenous • This state was inherited after colonialism, an instrument: • to controll and subordinate the people • to promote the interests of the successors of the colonizers

8. POST-SOVIET STATE BUILDING- DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVES III Weak state (Migdal) • low capacity of state to penetrate society • regulate social relationships • extract and use resources • Why? • state versus other sources of social control: • organizations / actors • which can be precolonial, colonial or postcolonial • but do originate from society and are rooted and therefore strong • no state autonomy from these powers

9. POST-SOVIET STATE BUILDING- DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVES IV Predatory State • State as engine of predation • without providing collective goods in return • Matter of degree, depending on relative bargaining power • social groups that control resources • state structure (democracy, etc.) • strategies: • increase patrimonial power • smash alternative sources of power

10. DEVELOPMENT PARADOXES- ELITE STRATEGIES Development malaise of the 90ies: 2x2 matrix and look at internal and external factors. ·Domestic-Destiny [structural characteristics] ·Domestic-Policy ·External-Destiny ·External-Policy

11. THE MODEL DEBATE PRECONDITION OF THE SUCCESS- PRACTICAL MODELS NOT FOR COPIES, BUT FOR COMPARISONS THE POST-SOVIETS: • are not ready-made nation states • are not natural resource exporters • not FDI heavens • very weak internal cohesion in their societies • in the shadow of a regional power without a really interested strong competitor from outside

12. AVAILABLE MODELS FOR POLICY DEVELOPMENTS Applied, but inadequate: RU, EU Disscussed, but nor really applied: Visegrad 4 [and now in their political crises?] Not discussed, but applicable: Latin America

13. LA STATE MODELS- CARDOSO I

14. LA STATE MODELS- CARDOSO II

15. LA STATE MODELS- CARDOSO III

16. LA STATE MODELS- O’DONNELL I

17. LA STATE MODELS- O’DONNELL II

18. LA STATE MODELS- O’DONNELL III

19. LA AS A METAPHOR IN THE POST-SOVIET SPACE Superficial analogies as starting points for model building: Belorus- Mexico in the 50-60ies Ukraine of Juchenko- Argentina of Peron Georgia- Nicaragua of the 80ies Moldova – post-civil war Central American states [Salvador, Honduras]

20. state attributes and distributions Pop. Size Hierarchy Urban Industries plus Commerce, Finance Hinterland Productivity Dynamics from Structural Cohesion Unit Formation (e.g. polities) Demography/Resources Conflicts CO-EVOLUTION OF POST SOVIET STATES AND SOCIETAL NETWORKS SOCIETAL Networks Routes, Capacities Velocities and Magnitudes of trade Organizational transformation of nodes STATES MARKETS from factions & coalitions from structurally cohesive to sovereignty - emergent k-components - emergent Spatiopolitical unitsNetwork units (overlap) Interference and attempts at regulation Sources of boundary conflicts

21. Economic institutions and economic performance (1)

22. Economic institutions and economic performance (2)

23. CONCLUSIONS I 1. „Core” metropolitan interests. Ukraine, Belorus in the RU-EU energy interface, Georgia- Larger Middle East”s Rim, Moldova- only local-small borderland interests 2.Selective adaptation of „informal techniques of free trade” in each periphery 3.New cultures of „official mind” [Robinson-Gallagher] and minimalistic programs in public goods deliveries.

24. CONCLUSIONS II 4. reversibility/irreversibility of imperial impact and the autochthonous local histories 5. New dependencies of the core on peripherical elites. The Israeli-US Syndrom in Eurasia [relative autonomy of Lukashenko and even Transdnistria]