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INTRODUCTION. A new phase for the world economyThe need for a redeployment of basic toolsThe diffusion of innovation-led strategies: the need for an assessment. THE LECTURE: THREE STEPS. In search of a new framework for the national / international macro economyThe growth regime of China: more d
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1. HOW DOES THE GROWTH AND INNOVATION STRATEGY OF CHINA AFFECT THE WORLD ECONOMY? Robert Boyer
Presentation prepared for DIIS seminar
Copenhagen, January 18th, 2010
2. INTRODUCTION A new phase for the world economy
The need for a redeployment of basic tools
The diffusion of innovation-led strategies: the need for an assessment
3. THE LECTURE: THREE STEPS In search of a new framework for the national / international macro economy
The growth regime of China: more domestic competition than export led.
The future growth regime : can it be endogenous innovation led?
4. IN SEARCH OF A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR THE NATIONAL / INTERNATIONAL MACROECONOMY
5. The 90s : the United States, Japan and China and the stability of the world economy The Americans: the consumers of last resort
The Japanese: the savers of last resort
The Chinese: the manufacturers of the world
6. Figure 1 -Can two vicious circles make a world virtuous configuration?
7. The 2000s : Still another configuration for the world economy The Americans: the consumers of last resortand beneficiary of world excess of saving
The Japanese: a recovery in response to the dynamism of Chinese imports of equipment goods and high-tech components
The Chinese: the manufacturers and the savers of the world
8. Figure 2 Towards a duopoly at the world level?
9. Macroeconomics becomes global: farewell to closed economy models From a closed economy model to the interaction of two national economies: the US and China
A lasting overcapacity in manufacturing in China, hence a pressure towards price wars
An upward drift of the relative prices of oils and raw materials
10. A possible explanation of the Alan Greenspan puzzle Not any increase in long term interest rates in the US: the consequence of the excess savings of Asia
The moderation of core inflation: the definite impact of Chinese overcapacity in commodities
The surge of consumption prices: the under capacity in the production of raw materials
These are direct consequences of the America / Asia (China) duopoly
11. A contrario, a drastic challenge of neoricardian international trade theory The mobility of frontier technologies towards China
The quasi unlimited supply of labor in China
The size of the potential Chinese market
12. The role of increasing returns to scale
Consequently, the emergence of the hypothesis that manufacturing world prices are Chinese prices
14. Figure 3 Unit production costs in China and the rest of the world
15. CHINESE GROWTH : A DOMESTIC COMPETITION LEDMORE THAN A TYPICAL EXPORT LED REGIME
16. 1. The Chinese institutional forms in historical perspective Introducing progressively market incentives into a rather centralized economic system
- Increasing the production for the market before down sizing the nationalized sector
17. Figure 4 - The example of the steel industry
18. - A quasi minimalist public spending Figure 5 - the two phases of State public spending
19. A pragmatic and sequential extension of local successful experiments
A large decentralization of public policy
20. A crucial step: the decentralization of decisions at the provincial level
- The example of public spending
Figure 6 - The long term evolution
21. Figure 7 - an international comparison
- The structure of a quasi federal state?
22. The foundations of local state corporatism (Oi 1992)
a core hypothesis to understand the specificities of Chinese growth
23. 2. The macroeconomic growth regime: domestic competition led Basically, a series of pro growth socio-political alliances
Capital accumulation is the major tool for sustaining this alliance
24. Figure 8 - Macroeconomic Structure of the Chinese Economy
25. A built in propensity to overcapacity and excess in credit financing on top of retained profits.
Hence a domestically generated fierce competition in order to capture increasing returns to scale
An implicit society wide compromise: enjoy the dividend of growth in counterpart of the ruling of the Communist Party
26. The dynamism of exports: the logical outcome an unbalanced distribution of income
28. 3. Some quite unorthodox features of this institutional architecture and growth regime Guanxi and Communist Party as a multilevel coordination processes, quite imperfect substitutes for legal, formal rules
Corruption: converting formally collectivist institutions into capitalist ones. It is not necessarily an obstacle to development!
29. A genuine mixed economy: the false opposition between private and public firms, since they are densely connected
The diversity and fuzziness of property rights help in the evolutionary process of catching up
30. The multinationals are part of this pro growth alliance and contribute to over accumulation
Foreign relations are more governed by the appropriation of frontier technologies than mercantilist objectives!
31. 4. Imbalances and contradictions of this socio-political regime A waste of capital due to over accumulation at the detriment of a general increase of standards of living
32. Figure 11 - A high but declining profit rate
33. A financial volatility and fragility in spite of an impressive restructuring of bad debts, constantly recreated by over accumulation
34. A typical bubble
35. The choice of the exchange rate regime imply large trade surplus, accumulation of reserves
An excessive liquidity, source of speculation, and inflation
... And it implies the risk of protectionist backlash
36. Figure 14 - The explosive Chinese trade surplus
37. The very success of China creates structural unbalances at the world level
...In the adjustment of saving and investment
...The run for appropriating natural resources
The geopolitical hegemony of the US
38. The progressive loss of control by the political authorities of a complex, contradictory and divided society and economy...
An evidence: on 2007-2008 a typical dilemma of Chinese economic policy:
- fighting inflation
- without killing the dynamism of growth
39. The social and domestic imbalances are acute
social inequalities,
dual citizenship,
housing, heath care, aging
fighting inflation
And the call for an harmonious society and endogenous innovation is not easy to implement
40. III. WILL THE FUTURE GROWTH REGIME OF CHINA BE INNOVATION LED?
41. An explicit recognition by public authorities about the design of a national system of innovation
The legacy of the past: a Soviet-type of SSI, with typical problems for linking basic research, innovation and economic activity
42. A continuous flow of organizational and institutional reforms
Building connections between research and industry
Opening to world technology
Various incentives for innovation at the firm level
43. A fast increase in the volume of RD but still a limited size in international perspective
44. A large pool of researchersBut low productivity in terms in patenting
45. Presently, a clear external dependency for high tech products and technologies
46. A high import content of high tech Chinese export
47. A productivity revolution in the manufacturing sector due to the import of technological frontier investment goods
48. How much national is the Chinese System of Innovation?
A significant dependence with respect to the flow of technologies within multinationals
49. The contribution of Chinese firms to high tech net exports is negative
But a clever use of international collaborative research
50. and a significant pool of Chinese students and researchers abroad
51. The Chinese domestic firms are catching up rather slowly with respect to foreign multinationals with plants in China
52. A clear regional concentration of innovations, high tech industries and exports
More a series of local clusters
Frequently with international connections
Than a really national system
53. The existence of two innovation styles and growth regimes
Chinese firms specialize in specific sectors (metal product, machinery, transport equipment) linked to domestic demand
54. For the time being, the domestic effort in RD does not seem to show out in the performance of Chinese firms
An conversely, the spillover from FDI is still modest
55. Provisional conclusions :
An original far sighted strategy for promoting long term growthbut
A growing importance of the innovations made and captured by foreign multinationals
The quite problematic success of an endogenous and indigenous innovation process in the present decade
56. CONCLUSION C1 China displays a rather unique institutional configuration: a series of local meso-corporatisms in competition under the tentative control by the central state.
C2 The speed and resilience of Chinese economic growth is largely the outcome of a competition led accumulation regime.
Among provinces, localities, large cities
Among various types of firms
On the world market
57. C3 A large fraction of Chinese trade surplus and international frictions originates in such an unbalanced domestic growth
Permanent trend towards overcapacity
Unbalanced income distribution at the detriment of wage-earners and welfare
Difficult management of credit and money
C4 The impressive productivity performance of domestic Chinese firms still comes from the rapid adoption of frontier technologies but not yet from the emerging of an endogenous national system of innovation
58. C5 The quick and seemingly successful response to the world crisis by the Chinese authorities is actually deepening the previous growth model
Significant autonomy of fiscal policy
Control of exchange rate
Massive stimulation of infrastructures and productive investment at the local level
59. Table 8 The public spending program 2008-2010 by sectors
60. C6 Paradoxically, these quite remarkable short term achievements of economic policy might be quite detrimental to the long run viability of the present growth regime
Unprecedented overcapacity
A creeping protectionism from the rest of the world
Recurring speculative bubbles
Permanent recreation of bad loans.
61. Figure 21 The widening gap between consumption and investment (% of GDP)
62. C7 A domestic demand led regime will take at least one decade to be implemented, and the emergence of a strong and autonomous innovation system will still take another decade.
63. Thank you for your attention Robert BOYERCEPREMAP (Paris), GREDEG (Sophia-Antipolis).140, Rue du Chevaleret 75013 PARIS, France
Invited Professor at CBP,
Copenhagen Business School
e-mail: robert.boyer@ens.fr
website : http://www.jourdan.ens.fr/~boyer/