Enclosed Structure Dangers A New Approach for Firefighter Life Safety

1. Enclosed Structure Dangers A New Approach for Firefighter Life Safety By Chief Gary Bowker Kansas EGH Advocate Information presented in this program was largely obtained from research conducted by Fire Captain William R. Mora (Ret) San Antonio Fire Department

2. Background • Fire Marshal with the City of Arkansas City • Retired Fire Marshal for City of Winfield • Retired Fire Chief with U.S. Air Force (McConnell AFB) • Past Fire Chief for Sumner County Dist. 10 • Lead Kansas Advocate for Everyone Goes Home Program • Associate Instructor with KU Fire & Rescue Training Institute • Certified as Fire Officer II, Inspector II, Instructor II, and Certified Fire & Explosion Investigator

3. Course Overview • The Firefighter LODD problem • Lessons learned about Enclosed Structures • The Firefighter Disorientation Sequence • Proposed Risk Management Solutions

4. This class meets 7 of the 16 Firefighter Life Safety Initiatives:1,2,3,4,8,9, & 11

5. The Problem… US Firefighter LODD’s continue to increase despite national efforts starting in 2004 with the introduction of the 16 Firefighter Life Safety Initiatives developed at the Firefighter Life Safety Summit .

6. LODD’s To Date:_____

7. US LODD’s Past Decade

8. Why???

9. Top 3 Killers of Firefighters • #1 Cardiac/Stress/Over-exertion (Approx 48%) • #2 Traffic Accidents…Responding to and returning from alarms…excessive speed, lack of seatbelt use, failure to stop at controlled intersections. (Approx 31%) • #3 Failure to know or react to hostile fire events .i.e., Approaching flashover or backdraft conditions, Collapse, Failure to understand changing fire conditions…smoke resulting in Firefighter Disorientation.(Approx 21%)

10. Top 3 Firefighter Killers 21% 48% 31%

11. Again….Why?

12. A culture change is needed… • Complacency • Competency • Cockiness

13. Things will not get better until there is a culture change…

17. Terminology • Open vs. Enclosed Structure: An enclosed structure is a structure where there is an absence of useable doors and windows of sufficient size and number to provide prompt ventilation and emergency evacuation…This include sbasements. • Enclosed structures are highly prone to produce life threatening hazards & are directly linked to LODD’s • These structures exist in tremendous numbers, in every community, and can be of any size, type, age, and occupancy. They can be occupied, unoccupied or vacant.

18. What type of structure do we fight most of our fires in?

19. Open Residential Structures…

20. Enclosed Structures can be any size, any age, or any occupancy… and they’re found in all communities

21. The Enclosed Structure is a specific and extremely dangerous type of structure and is killing firefighters at a disproportionate rate in multiple ways… • Floor/Roof Collapse • Falls through fire-weakened floors • Disorientation • Depletion of Air Supply • Flashover • Backdraft

22. 12/99 Worcester, MA 6 Firefighters Killed

23. Charleston 6/18/07

24. Why is this continuing to happen?

25. The problem… One common problem cited in firefighter fatality investigations is: Failure to Follow or Adopt Standard Operating Procedures/Guidelines

26. The Problem… The US Firefighter Disorientation Study published in 2003 (Mora) found that many of the SOP’s in use at the time of the LODD were actually ineffective, unsafe, or needed operational revision.

27. Terminology • Prolonged Zero Visibility: Heavy smoke conditions lasting longer than 15 minutes. • Why 15 Minutes? • Do you know your air consumption rate?

28. Lessons Learned Mora’s 2003 US Firefighter Disorientation Study spanned 22 years of LODD data from 1979-2001 & included 17 case studies. The study found: • Enclosed Structures are directly linked to Firefighter Disorientation • In 100% of the cases studied when a fast, aggressive interior attack was used at enclosed structures, firefighter disorientation occurred 100% of the time in which a LODD or serious F/F injuries were involved.

29. Lessons Learned • Mora’s 2nd Study-The Analysis of Structural Firefighter Fatality Database 2007 (1990-2006) found: • 444 LODD occurred; 176 were structure fires • 77% occurred in Enclosed Structures where a fast aggressive interior attack was utilized

30. The Disorientation Sequence

31. Why is this… being repeated?

32. A few of the lesson learned from Charleston: • Culture Change needed • Competency, complacency • Risk Assessment • Construction type dangers • Enclosed structure dangers • Code Enforcement • Preplanning • Utilize latest technology

33. Lessons Learned The fire service’s lack of knowledge about the extreme dangersposed by the enclosed structure and the disorientation sequence. • Add to this… the failure to recognize or react to the dangers of lightweight construction, pre-flashover & backdraft warning signs…Misinterpreting size-up • Failure to Manage the Risk…

34. Lessons Learned When the downed Firefighter is not quickly located serious injury or death results. • RIC on scene & ready? • Minimum of 90 seconds before RIC can enter… • Trapped firefighter usually not found until 3rd or 4th attempt. • Do you have adequate staffing on-scene? • Do you know your Air Consumption Rate?

35. Proposed Risk Management Solutions • Firefighters must be warned about the extreme dangers enclosed structures present and that an aggressive interior attack immediately upon arrival may be ineffective and unsafe in many cases. • SOP/SOG’s must be re-written adopting new tactics and strategies for enclosed structures, lightweight construction, & basement fires, etc.

36. Solutions • The SOP/SOG must call for the utilization of a Cautious Interior Assessment (CIA) instead of the traditional quick hit. • Quick Access Pre-Fire Plans must be developed for high-risk structures • Officers must routinely integrate risk management into operations

37. Officers must Integrate Risk Management by: • Using sound officer judgment at every structure fire to include: • Conduct Risk vs. Benefit Analysis • SOG/SOP’s must include a Defensive Fire Attack policy on structures that are fully involved, or where there is nothing left to save. Similarly, a primary search is not initiated. • This policy must include abandoned, vacant, or dilapidated structures that are either partially or well involved.

39. Risk Management Techniques • Routinely assign Incident Scene Safety Officer at all enclosed structures • Determine if basement is involved • Utilize Thermal Imager • Cut inspection holes in floor if needed • Communicate information to crews • Attack fire from safe positions • Conduct Cautious Interior Assessment (CIA) at enclosed structures

40. Cautious Interior Assessment • The CIA is a process whereby: • First arriving engine company enters the structure with: a. Thermal Imager b. Charged handline (w/ an established water supply) c. Backup crew To look into the structure and locate the seat of the fire.

41. Cautious Interior Assessment 2. After the seat of the fire is located the officer makes the decision to: a. Make an aggressive interior attack and call for additional resources, or b. Make a Short Interior Attack (SIA) or c. Go Defensive

42. Short Interior Attack • An SIA involves advancing handlines to the seat of the fire via the shortest distance possible by using existing windows, doors, or by breaching techniques.

43. Benefits of the SIA • Increases Firefighter Safety by minimizing the distance between the outside and the seat of the fire. • It maximizes Firefighter’s Air Supply • Prevents handline separation & disorientation • Helps avoid exposure to flashover/backdraft and collapse conditions.

44. More Solutions…. • A Disorientation course must be provided to all firefighters • Officers must be able to quickly identify an enclosed structure upon arrival and implement an Enclosed Structure SOP

45. More Solutions… • Fire Departments must be advised that live fire training in acquired structures that are enclosed must be avoided. • FD Inspections must insure the operational status of sprinkler and other suppression and detection systems in enclosed buildings.

46. More Solutions… • Fire Departments should develop a list of Enclosed Structures in their communities with the addresses • This information should then be provided to the dispatch center for immediate dissemination in the event of an alarm that address via CAD to Mobile Data Terminals in responding fire apparatus or via radio traffic.

47. Not for a piece of property… Firefighters traditionally serve our communities exceedingly well and save lives and structures that can be saved. However, firefighters can no longer needlessly place their lives in extreme danger for a piece of property.

48. Closing Thoughts… The firefighters who have died in enclosed structures over the past decades did precisely what they were trained, ordered, and expected to do…they implemented widely accepted tactics and strategies that have worked for them throughout their careers… However, as long as we continue to fight fires in enclosed structures the traditional way, with complete confidence, by the book, from the unburned side, using a fast and aggressive interior attack…we will continue to die.

49. The Times They are a Changin’… If your department routinely implements a fast & aggressive interior attack without following a risk management statement and is not aware of the dangers associated with enclosed, abandoned, vacant, or dilapidated structures or maintained structures that cannot be saved, your firefighters run a high risk of serious injury or fatality. In the future, the high percentage of firefighter LODD’s will only be reduced if local, progressive leadership institutes tactical changes more appropriate to managing today’s risk.

50. It takes a Tactical & Cultural Change to Prevent LODDs “What were trying to do is change the culture of the fire service. It’s no longer acceptable to put your life on the line for a piece of property. Yes, we’re going to save lives and we’re going to put our lives on the line to save someone else. But stop and think what your doing before you go into a burning building” David Paulison, Former USFA Administrator “To prevent the tragic loss of firefighters the safety culture must change. In this effort, Firefighters must understand that they are not required to sacrifice their lives to save any structure, regardless the type of occupancy encountered including residences, churches, restaurants, and even high rise buildings.” Captain William Mora (Ret) San Antonio Fire Department