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Transnational Politics

Transnational Politics. Drug trafficking: The power of network analysis. Today. Columbian drug cartels: a myth? The ‘kingpins’ and ‘drug lords’: How to frame and mobilize for a ‘war on drugs’

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Transnational Politics

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  1. Transnational Politics Drug trafficking: The power of network analysis

  2. Today • Columbian drug cartels: a myth? • The ‘kingpins’ and ‘drug lords’: How to frame and mobilize for a ‘war on drugs’ • What can the study of NGOs and TANs (Keck/Sikkink) contribute to our understanding of drug trafficking? • Readings: • From the bottom-up: Michael Kenney, ‘The Architecture of Drug Trafficking: network Forms of Organization in the Colombian Cocaine Trade’ • From the top-down: World Drug Report, 2007 Hans Peter Schmitz

  3. The Cartel: a myth? • Key argument: Not vertically organized ‘cartels,’ but small, independent and networked suppliers dominate the drug trade. • Myth of powerful, coordinated price-fixing and strategic planning. • Method: Interviews with law enforcement/traffickers. Hans Peter Schmitz

  4. Four sections • Kenney, p. 236 • First section: Literature on criminal networks • Organizational/social network analysis • Second section: Empirical example of the Columbian case • Wheel and chain networks • Third section: Rules of drug trafficking • Routines and experience • Fourth section: Individual participation in the networks Hans Peter Schmitz

  5. 1. Theory: Network analysis • Shared norms and customs. • Fluid networks based on kinship, not hierarchy or formal organization (see Keck/Sikkink). • Social network analysis. • Focus on individuals’ relational ties. • Leads to more transnational ties across societies. • Increased connectivity: decreased costs of communication. • Organizational network analysis. • Focus on groups and cooperation across organizations. Hans Peter Schmitz

  6. Individuals and groups • Compare Kenney to Keck/Sikkink: • Social network analysis: explains why individuals participate in networks (shared norms; K/S: who is part of a TAN?). • Organizational network analysis: explains how groups cooperate (K/S: how does a TAN produce a campaign?) Hans Peter Schmitz

  7. 2. Empirical case: Columbian networks The dilemma (241): Information-sharing is necessary, but increases the risk of exposure (to competitors and law enforcement). • Why networks do better (than hierarchies and markets) in addressing this dilemma: • Better than hierarchies: looser structure, decentralized decision-making, better chances of survival. • Better than markets: more enforcement power and control based on family and other ties. Hans Peter Schmitz

  8. What integrates networks? Shared experiences, communication, and trust (242): TANs: principles such as human rights. Illicit networks: Economic gain, social ties. Inter-group networks: producers > processors > exporters > distributors > money launders > etc. Inter-personal networks: create trust and reciprocity, lower chances of ‘free-riding,’ sharing of knowledge. Hans Peter Schmitz

  9. Wheel and chain networks • Organizational analysis • Wheel (hub, star) networks, 243: A core group has superior capabilities and control. Mode: contract out services. • Advantage: better coordination and more power to corrupt officials. • Disadvantage: vulnerable to ‘head hunting’ • Chain networks, 244: No core group and coordination from a center. • Advantage: greater insulation of individual groups. • Disadvantage: less powerful and less capable to deal with internal dissent. Hans Peter Schmitz

  10. 3. The Rules of Drug Trafficking • p. 249: How do ‘flat’ networks actually work? • Illicit networks, just like TANs, frequently operate in hostile environments. • Rules are significant tools to regulate behavior, but rarely written down. • Inter-subjective understandings (compare to def. of norms) • Information politics (K/S): Expertise matters. • Symbolic politics (K/S): Without written rules, symbols, stories, and social interaction dominate networks. Hans Peter Schmitz

  11. 4. Individual participation Secrecy requires steady supply of new participants. • How individuals get involved: • Based on family or other social ties. • Gradual inclusion based on reciprocity and trust. • Based on experience in trafficking in a non-drug related field. • How to get out (p. 255) • Retirement. • Involuntary expulsion. • Arrest and death. Hans Peter Schmitz

  12. Conclusions: An answer? If the ‘kingpin’ strategy has failed, what is Kenney’s recommendations in dealing with illicit drugs as a transnational problem? If Kenney’s analysis is correct, what does this mean for U.S. foreign and domestic drug policies? Looking ahead to the presentations: • Supply vs. demand-driven approaches to illicit drugs. • Pros and cons of legalization. Hans Peter Schmitz

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