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PRIVATE INFLUENCE PRECEDING PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT

PRIVATE INFLUENCE PRECEDING PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT. Strategies for legitimizing preliminary partnership arrangements in urban housing planning in Norway and Finland. Raine Mäntysalo Centre for Urban and Regional Studies (YTK). Inger- Lise Saglie

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PRIVATE INFLUENCE PRECEDING PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT

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  1. PRIVATE INFLUENCE PRECEDING PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT Strategies for legitimizing preliminary partnership arrangements in urban housing planning in Norway and Finland Raine Mäntysalo Centre for Urban and Regional Studies (YTK) Inger- Lise Saglie Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research (NIBR) Norwegian University of Life Science

  2. Research project • DEMOSREG programme - Norwegian Research Council • Authors: • Raine Mäntysalo YTK • Inger-lise Saglie NIBR/UMB • Other participants: • Eva Falleth NIBR • Gro Sandkjær Hanssen NIBR • Annika Agger RUC • Göran Cars KTH

  3. What’s the problem? • NPM : New forms of governance • Policy tools: Public-private partnerships • Critique: • Limited transparency • Weak role of local government • Domination of market criteria

  4. Planning process • Negotiate: Early preliminary agreement between public authorities and market actors - private law justifies some degree of secrecy • Publicise: Invite public participation • Defence of preliminary agreement? • Token public participation - reduced to opposition to already agreed-upon solutions?

  5. Finland: Land Use and Building ActSection 91 b Land use agreements • A local authority may enter into agreements on planning and implementing plans (land use agreement). However, land use agreements cannot be binding on the content of plans. • A land use agreement that is binding on the parties to the agreement can be made only after the draft plan or proposal has been publicized. This does not apply to agreements to initiate planning. • Land use agreements may be used to agree more comprehensively on the mutual rights and obligations of the parties to the agreement. • A land use agreement shall be publicized in conjunction with drawing up the plan.

  6. Norway: Planning law commission • ”In negotiations the interests of the parties involved are in focus, while the interests of the other participants are easily left out, at least in the most important stages in the negotiation process, contrary to the intentions of participation in this law.” (NOU 2001:7 p 100.)

  7. Tension • How do local planning authorities deal with the possible tension between early private agreements and public expectations of • openness • accountability • public participation • How are early agreements justified?

  8. Development of the argument • Description of the way early agreements are reached - general systemic level • Case study of one Norwegian and one Finnish housing planning project - investigating legitimizing strategies • Analytical framework: • Lukes’ three dimensions of power • Combined with input and output legitimacy theory • ”Testing” of the analytical capacity of the framework and its contribution to our understanding in the case study

  9. LukesPower: A Radical View 1974/2005 • Dimension I : • Authority rule in explicit planning conflict • Dimension II • Manipulation of planning information; keeping the conflict under surface • Dimension III • Structural influence of the planning condition: ”naturalized” inequalities

  10. LukesPower: A Radical View 1974/2005 • Dimension I : • Authority rule in explicit planning conflict • Dimension II • Manipulation of planning information; keeping the conflict under surface • Dimension III • Structural influence of the planning condition: ”naturalized” inequalities Ga A B Gb

  11. LukesPower: A Radical View 1974/2005 • Dimension I : • Authority rule in explicit planning conflict • Dimension II • Manipulation of planning information; keeping the conflict under surface • Dimension III • Structural influence of the planning condition: ”naturalized” inequalities Ga A B Gb

  12. LukesPower: A Radical View 1974/2005 • Dimension I : • Authority rule in explicit planning conflict • Dimension II • Manipulation of planning information; keeping the conflict under surface • Dimension III • Structural influence of the planning condition: ”naturalized” inequalities Ga A B Gb

  13. Democracy theory • Legitimate decisions- Justifications of the exercise of governing authority • Input legitimacy: ”government by people”- • Participation by all: Vote • Participation by those most affected - voice • Output legitimacy: capacity to solve problems that cannot be solved by the individual, the market or by voluntary cooperation – and thus require public involvement • Include resourceful actors

  14. Analytical framework:strategies of legitimation • Dimension I • Drawing on legitimate authority enjoyed by the partnership • Dimension II • Misrepresenting unauthorized power as legitimate authority. • Legitimizing biased input performance by directing attention to merits of the output, and vice versa • Dimension III • Being structurally influenced to collectively bypass the issue of legitimacy

  15. Norwegian case: ValentinlystTrondheim • High rise building on top of suburban shopping centre • Early agreement on high-rise tower administration - early political acceptance • Too high level of exploitation- lack of outdoor spaces according to local norms- ”bought – out- acceptance through financing upgrading of nearby green area. Preliminary agreement on this before public inspection - little public knowledge about this • Local organised opposition: 2000 signatories, lot of media attention • Acceptance of densification per se, but not as high rise - small housing preferred - visual disturbance in the landscape - already too many high rise buildings in the vicinity

  16. Finnish case: Sundsberg • An historical farmland area in the municipality of Kirkkonummi, 25 km west from Helsinki • Well connected to the major car traffic arteries of the Helsinki city region, an existing housing area with key services is nearby, and the location of the area on the south bank of Espoonlahti bay facing the Baltic Sea is attractive • In 1997 the local government and the developer (land-owner) made a land use agreement: 100 hectares, allowed maximum floorspace 130 000 m2 • Master plan 1999 • New specifications to the land use agreement in 2000, concerning the procedure of detailed planning for the area and the reservation of necessary parts of the area for public services • Later addition of the Espoonlahti bay area to the Natura 2000 nature protection programme • Major opposition by local environment association at the detailed planning stage: • Width of the green belt facing the Natura area in relation to the agreed floorspace • Lack of information on the land-use agreement • Local government’s attempt to drop the association from the list of ’interested parties’ against the municipal planner’s advice

  17. Dimension I: Authority • Input legitimacy: • Refer to the democratic representativeness of the partnership: V+S: Final decision by elected politicians • Refer to prior and higher level democratic decisions that are implemented in the project- V+S: Conformance with higher level plan

  18. Dimension I: Authority • Output legitimacy: • Refer to the common benefits of the project outcome and to the professional and economic capacities within the partnership to produce them • V: Housing supply, aesthetic improvement, upgrading of football field • S: Apartment for needy at convenient price, happy new residents, new residents bring additional income

  19. Dimension II:Misrepresented authority & misguided legitimacy • Input legitimacy: • Exaggerate the democratic representativeness of the partnership • Give a false impression of the project’s subordination to prior and higher-level democratic decisions V: False impression that high rise is a necessary means to implement densification policy • Hide the partnerships decisive role in framing the planning agenda: V+S: Vagueness and mystification of the existence and content of the development/land use agreement • Hide the rights and possibilities of participation afforded by the planning system: S: Exclusion of local environmental association form the list of interested parties in the Participation and Assessment Scheme

  20. Dimension II:Misrepresented authority & misguided legitimacy (continued) • Output legitimacy • Give a false impression of benefits of the project outcome and the professional and economic capacities within the partnership to produce it. • V: Misleading attractive sketches • V & S: Misrepresented ”gifts” to the residents (V: football field/S: kindergarden) • Direct the stakeholders attention from the democratic biases in the planning process to the common good to be produced

  21. Dimension III: Structural influence • Input legimitacy: • A collectively narrow view of rights and possibilities in planning participation: • Reductions on participation at the project planning level in the planning system • V: Designation of management of participation to an unwilling party (developer) • V+S: instruments of ”private plan” and ”land use agreement” afford a privileged position to the private developer • V+S: This possibility afforded in the planning laws

  22. Dimension III: Structural influence • Output legitimacy • Habituation into the neoliberal political culture and the governance approach (NPM) • Habituation into project-based and implementation-oriented planning with related adjustments in the planning system • V: Habituation into lack of alternative solutions, giving in to the developer’s proposal • S: A long standing policy of developer-led and land use agreement –oriented planning • V&S: the dependency of the local governments on private investments in housing planning and development

  23. Conclusion • Planning activities strained by realism of securing investments and tax income, on which the municipality depends - has to be represented through the ideals of public participation • Prevents honesty on the true condition - without honesty - no meaningful public participation

  24. PRIVATE INFLUENCE PRECEDING PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT Strategies for legitimizing preliminary partnership arrangements in urban housing planning in Norway and Finland Lessons from a review procedure Raine Mäntysalo Centre for Urban and Regional Studies (YTK) Inger- Lise Saglie Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research (NIBR) Norwegian University of Life Science

  25. Journal: Planning Theory & Practice • PT&P provides an international focus for the development of theory and practice in spatial planning and a forum to promote the policy dimensions of space and place. • Published four times a year in conjunction with the Royal Town Planning Institute, London • Publishes original articles and review papers from both academics and practitioners with the aim of encouraging more effective, two-way communication between theory and practice. • The Editors invite robustly researched papers which raise issues at the leading edge of planning theory and practice, and welcome papers on controversial subjects. • Contributors in the early stages of their academic careers are encouraged, as are rejoinders to items previously published. • Authors are requested to draw out the wider significance of their particular contribution and to write in a clear style, accessible to a broad, international audience.

  26. Journal: Planning Theory & Practice Senior Editor: • Heather Campbell - Professor, Department of Town and Regional Planning, University of Sheffield, UK Editors: • John Forester Professor, Cornell University, USA • Robert Upton  - Infrastructure Planning Commission (IPC), UK Selected members of the Editorial Board (total 41 members): • Peter Ache – Aalto University, Finland • David Booher -California State University, Sacramento,USA • Susan Fainstein -Harvard University, USA • Patsy Healey - Professor Emeritus, University of Newcastle, • Willem Salet - University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands • Leonie Sandercock - University of British Columbia, Canada • Niraj Verma - University of Buffalo, New York, USA

  27. Review procedure, 1st round:Resubmission with corrections Editor’s suggestions based on the three Reviewers’ comments Suggestion 1: • The discussion in the conceptual section could benefit from being more focused and less bitty. One reviewer also suggests simplification of the argument in the theoretical discussion for greater clarity. It is also suggested changes in the order of the text in order to improve linkages between theory and the case studies. Our responses: • We have focused the theoretical discussion and made it less bitty by moving the discussion on the limitation of Lukesian power analysis (the threat of paranoid fallacy) from the end of the paper and connected it to the presentation of theoretical framework. • In order to increase the clarity of the argumentation, we have removed the discussion on the dichotomy between power over and power to in connection to governance theory. We agree that it is an unnecessary side track • We have moved the description of the Norwegian and Finnish cases to a place after the introduction and before the theoretical discussion. Thereby the argumentation from theory to the empirical analysis proceeds more smoothly

  28. Review procedure: 1st round Suggestion 2: • In response to several of the challenges of the reviewers it would be useful to provide more justification of your conceptual and methodological approach prior to the case study description. The challenges and limitations of your conceptual and methodological approach could be acknowledged at this point. Our response: • We have moved the discussion on the conceptual and methodological challenges and limitations to the presentation of the theoretical framework. This theoretical discussion is immediately prior to the analysis of the cases in order to improve the linkage between the theoretical framework and the case study.

  29. Review procedure: 1st round Suggestion 3: • The suggestion of a comparative table of the case study would be useful, and clarification of context. Our response: • More contextual information about the situation of the municipalities has been added. We have chosen a text rather than a table, as there is already a number of tables in the article. Suggestion 4: • The conclusions need to be developed and made clear what is really new in the paper and how this contributes to conceptual and practical understanding. Our responses: • The conclusions have been revised to underline the new theoretical tools for analysing urban development processes, as well as its implications for planning practice. • We have restructured the paper as indicated above and the sub-headings are reviewed to ensure more coherence and flow.

  30. Review procedure: 2nd round Referee: 1 This paper has moved considerably from the initial draft and the ‘narrative’ of the two case-studies is much improved as a result.  The paper is close to being publishable, but there are some areas that still require further work: • First, having been flagged up at the start of the introduction, the Nordic dimension could have been explored in more detail throughout the paper.  I’d have expected to see more discussion of changes in approach to Nordic planning (neolib etc) in a conceptual section at the start of the paper and in the analysis/conclusions.  It could be argued that the Nordic dimension is the most interesting aspect of the paper e.g. what do the case-studies tell us about Nordic ‘consensus’ planning?  What do they tell us about transformations in Nordic planning? • Second, the author(s) could be more explicit about their intended contribution to knowledge, especially in the abstract and in the conclusions.  Ultimately the precise focus of the paper is unclear. • Third, my earlier point about the Foucault and the conceptualisation of power has been sidestepped rather than addressed.  The discussion of Foucault’s approach (p.34) should go in Section 4 to offer an integrated analytical framework which can then be applied, or it should not be mentioned at all. • Overall the paper is close to being publishable, but the author(s) could perhaps be pushed a little further on the Nordic question e.g. how typical are the case-studies?  The conclusion could say more about how conceptualisations of power might contribute to our understanding of the changing strategic context for planning decisions in countries such as Norway and Finland.  Bob Jessop’s concept of state strategic selectivity might be helpful in this regard (see Jessop B, 2002, The Future of the Capitalist State, Cambridge: Polity).

  31. Review procedure: 2nd round Referee: 2 Overall I do see that my recommendations on changes in the paper's structure have been applied.  The paper does indeed read much better now. But my (admittedly qualified) recommendation to set up a comparative table of the two case studies was not implemented.  You may have discussed this with PTP Editorial staff. I am looking forward to the paper's publication!  This will be a very nice contribution both to planning theory and planning regulation. Referee: 3I made only a few relatively detailed suggestions on the original paper that might improve the argument. The authors have taken these into account in the revised paper, which reads very well.

  32. Categories of argument

  33. Article: R. Mäntysalo & I-L Saglie,“Private influence preceding public involvement - Strategies for legitimizing preliminary partnership arrangements in urban housing planning in Norway and Finland”

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