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“Cutting Costs or Cutting Our Throats?”

Insider Threats Current Events: The Critical Infrastructure Security Perspective. Mark D. Troutman, Ph.D. Associate Director Center for Infrastructure Protection/Homeland Security George Mason University Paul B. Losiewicz, Ph.D. Senior Scientific Advisor

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“Cutting Costs or Cutting Our Throats?”

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  1. Insider Threats Current Events:The Critical Infrastructure Security Perspective Mark D. Troutman, Ph.D. Associate Director Center for Infrastructure Protection/Homeland Security George Mason University Paul B. Losiewicz, Ph.D. Senior Scientific Advisor Cyber Security and Information Systems Analysis Center 15 August 2013 “Cutting Costs or Cutting Our Throats?”

  2. Overview • Recent Events • Technology Increases Risk from Insider Threat • Government Resource Constraints • Costs Incurred by Lack of Due Diligence • Implications and Policy Responses

  3. Recent Events • Recent incidents of Pvt Manning and Edward Snowden highlight risk of “insider threat.” • Snowden had classified access due to his status as a contractor, as well as advanced computer training.1 • Employed by Booz-Allen Hamilton under contract to NSA. Previous CIA experience and an incomplete military career (left before completing Special Forces training). • There were some questions about facts relating to his background check but Snowden was hired and granted clearance with access anyway. 2 • Subsequent statements indicate Snowden sought employment in order to gain access with the intent of making public practices with which he disagreed.3 • Summary: Government agency depended on contract employee for specific skills and access, but screening failed to raise red flags regarding individual's background and motivations

  4. Technology Increases Risk from Insider Threat • Computing capacity continues to increase while embedded systems proliferate. • Operating systems gain efficiency and capability with more sensors and distributed controls linked to other operating systems. • Infrastructure is capital intensive and expensive to operate. Efficient and cost minimizing approaches have great emphasis. SCADA systems have evolved to meet this need. • Combination of greater computing power and reach afforded by linked information systems affords greater span of influence; asymmetric threats increase. • Greater span of control allows fewer personnel to monitor a greater range of control systems – with lower personnel cost. Personnel costs are the highest business costs. • Similar dynamic holds in intellectual property and knowledge management systems. Less expensive cloud storage allows for more information to be available to more collaborative processes by small to mid-size businesses

  5. Government Resource Constraints • Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA 2011) attempted deficit reduction through constraints on discretionary spending. Defense budget and associated security functions sustained largest share of reductions. • DoD budget sustained $487B of cuts by end of Secretary Gates’ tenure (2011). BCA 2011 identified an additional $500B over 10 years; total could reach $1T.4 • DoD costs for uniformed personnel have increased 57% in real terms (per person) over previous decade.5 • Contract resources offer government an opportunity to reduce expenses and find specialty skill sets; personnel costs are the concern of the contract firm. • US Government has greatly increased use of contracted personnel in last decade to extend its capabilities, despite directions to the contrary . • Contract organizations have a potentially different set of incentives from the government – minimize costs. Potentially reduces resources associated with vetting and oversight. Snowden case seems to illustrate this.

  6. Costs incurred by Lack of Due Diligence • The Cost of Cutting Corners with Infrastructure • Sony fined $400K by the UK for failure to protect PII, on top of the $171M in outage losses by a hack of their interactive gaming network6 • PII maintained on five year old servers, non-updated software, poor security • Cost of failure in Personnel Reliability • Manning's release of diplomatic cables to WikiLeaks had "a chilling effect that will go on for some time" on foreign officials' willingness to speak candidly to U.S.7 • 855 man-hours estimated by the Army to review the posted Wikileaks documents, WITH computer aided analysis8 • Civilian Arsonist costs the Navy $94M in direct costs and the loss of an Attack Sub9 • Information Technology & Innovation Foundation: Snowden may cost U.S. cloud industry $35B in losses to foreign competitors because of PRISM revelations10 • SEC and mandatory disclosure of Cyber Self Assessment11 • Fines for compliance failure?

  7. Implications and Policy Responses? • Risk to intellectual property protection and innovation R&D collaboration requires access to information, but greater access raises the risk of unwanted disclosure and economic damage to innovative firms, hampering economic competitiveness • Some policy responses? • Greater resources for personnel vetting and oversight – difficult in constrained environments; Individual privacy concerns as well • Higher access standards – but this imposes costs on collaboration and span of control • Limits of access by any one individual or group – this drives up personnel costs • Conclusion: • In a Technologically riskier environment there is greater need for new technological solutions and system responses • Other non-technical (e.g. cognitive) approaches to Personnel Reliability

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