Intuitionism

1. Intuitionism G.E. Moore, W.D. Ross

2. G.E. Moore? Who? • ‘Common Sense’ philosopher – often keen to take ‘common sense’ view of philosophical problems • Along with Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein, made Cambridge centre for ‘analytic philosophy’ • Died in 1944 • Wrote at length about morals. • ‘Principia Ethica’ is his most famous book. • Argues for intuitionism plus a form of utilitarianism… intuitive moral principles identify the good and utilitarian principles maximise it…

3. Moore’s Ethical Intuitionism • A form of non-consequentialism • He argues: • “The Good” is indefinable, • but there are objective moral truths, which are • self-evident to a mature mind. • Hence known by intuition. • ‘This, while not strictly provable, is a presumption of mature common sense – and so should be accepted unless we have proof to the contrary.’

4. Aside: Closed versus Open questions • A closed question must be answered with a simple yes" or "no", or with a specific piece of information. • An open-ended question cannot usefully be answered with a simple “yes”, “no”, or a single specific piece of information. • Which is which? • How much do you weigh? • Is Mozart a pop musician or a serious composer? • Can Hitler be a vegetarian if he eats meat? • Are exam results the only reason for coming to school?

5. 1. The Good is indefinable • Moore’s argument that the good is indefinable is known as ‘The Open Question Argument’ • O.Q. Arg. = asking "Is it true that X means/is Y?" • Closed question if the answer is ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ • Shows that X is clearly defined • Open question if a conceptually competent person can debate the response. • Shows that X is not clearly defined

6. Moore’s reasoning • Exemplar 1 – Open or Closed? • Take X to be ‘Father Christmas’ and Y to be ‘kindly old man’ • Is it true that X means Y? (Or: is it true that X is Y?) • Exemplar 2 – Open or Closed? • Take X to be ‘Good’ and Y to be ‘socially approved’… • Is it true that X means Y? • Exemplar 3 – Open or Closed? • Take X to be ‘Good’ and Y to be any plausible quality that you like • Is it true that X means Y? • So, FC is adequately defined, and ‘Good’ is not adequately defined…

7. All moral Questions = Open Questions • Their answers cannot be deduced from the concepts in the terms alone. • For Moore, all moral questions are synthetic, not analytic. • The Open Question Argument shows any attempt to identify morality with some set of observable, natural properties will always be an open question. • Contrast e.g. colour identities, which are observable and public…we know what ‘yellow’ is, or means • So moral facts cannot be reduced to natural properties • Hence Ethical Naturalism (= moral values are found in nature) is therefore false.

8. 2. Objective moral truths are intuited • Moore’s argument for this is something like: • Either there are no moral truths (too dreadful to contemplate) • Or moral truths are found in nature (commits Naturalistic Fallacy, so is wrong) • Or there are intuitive, self-evident moral truths • ‘self-evident to a mature mind’ • Not a matter of demonstration, proof, justification • Basic moral truths are ‘simple ideas’ • similar to basic colour ideas, such as the idea of ‘yellow’ • they can’t be further analysed, unlike complex ideas (‘horse’ = hooves + neigh)

9. Analogy: maths and morality • Mathematical principles (e.g. 2+2 = 4, y squared tends to infinity) • Intuited • Yet precise • And largely agreed upon by experts of different cultures • Moral principles (e.g. all men are created equal; Pleasure is intrinsically good; Hatred is wrong) • Intuited • Yet precise • And largely agreed on by experts of different cultures • Does this analogy hold? • moral principles are vague, • Moral principles are widely disputed by experts • Moral principles are subject to social conditioning…) • So: are there self-evident moral truths? • Moore: to doubt common-sense intuitions is crazy • But: this is mud-slinging, not argument…

10. Strengths of Moore’s Account • If moral truths are non-propositional, then much foolish moral debate can be avoided: there is nothing to articulate. • The counterintuitive analysis of some moral dilemmas offered by Utilitarianism is avoided: e.g. no ‘George’ or ‘Jim’ problem, as Moore’s account gives us a way of talking about what is intrinsically felt. • The doctrinaire sterility of Deontology can be avoided: we do what feels to us to be right, not necessarily only what we can rationally generalise. • There is widespread agreement about our moral intuitions, so Moore’s theory accords with the facts: it accords with ‘common sense’.

11. Hold on! • What might be wrong with the idea of ‘self-evident’ moral truths?

12. A problem with self-evidence • Allegedly “self-evident truths” can differ widely. • “One basic principle must be the absolute rule for the SS man: we must be honest, decent, loyal, and comradely to members of our own blood and to nobody else. What happens to a Russian, to a Czech does not interest me in the slightest…” - Josef Goebbels (Nazi propagandist) • “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.” - Thomas Jefferson (First President of US…slave-owner…)

13. More issues with self-evidence… • Are self-evident truths present from birth? • Do all adults know them? • Is it self-evident what we ought to do in every concrete situation? (What dilemmas can you think of?) • Should we accept as self-evident any principle that seems initially plausible to us? (What could be wrong with a ‘gut feel’?) • Intuitionist moral education inculcates parental (and perhaps Nazi or terrorist) norms – which later will seem to be “self-evident truths.” • …We need some way to rationally criticise inherited moral intuitions.

14. Time to read Moore • No pun intended…let’s look to his text for a minute.

15. W.D. Ross – Prima Facie obligations • W.D.Ross (1877-1971) wrote The Right and the Good (1930) • Moral realist (believes in the existence of moral truth), and so is… • Not a consequentialist: you should aim for moral truth (some actions are wrong in themselves) not just (for instance) maximising the good… • For instance, we have a strong, but not exceptionless, prima facie (‘on the face of it’) duty to keep our promises. • Shares some similarities with Kant (so avoids pitfalls of utilitarianism) but also avoids issues over exceptionless promises…(Kant’s problem) and provides a way of reasoning about moral intuitions (Moore’s problem)

16. Moral Realism – an aside • = view that • ethical sentences express propositions and • Some such propositions are true. • Those propositions are made true by objective features of the world, independent of subjective opinion. • So “X is good” is true if that thing really is good. • These objective features are not natural features, though (to say so would be commit the Naturalistic Fallacy) • Ross: “The moral order...is just as much part of the fundamental nature of the universe…as is the spatial or numerical structure expressed in the axioms of geometry or arithmetic.” • These objective features or duties are known through (rational) intuition “at first glance” by the mature person • So, Ross, like Moore, is an intuitionist…

17. Reading Ross • Let’s take ten minutes to read over the five sections of Ross’s text, in five pairs or small groups. • Each group will then present their findings. Or ask questions of the text.

18. Ross’s list of obligations • (Ross does not claim that this list is all-inclusive) • Fidelity: Keep your promises. • Reparation: Make up for harm you do to others. • Gratitude: Return good for good. • Justice: Upset distributions of pleasure or happiness that don’t accord with people’s merit. • Self-improvement: Grow in virtue and knowledge. • Beneficence: Do good to others. • Nonmaleficence: Don’t harm others. • Morality is objective, but morals are conditional • When a conflict between duties arise one should follow the over-riding duty. • For instance, maximising the good is only the sixth of seven prima facie obligations…

19. Advantages of Ross’s Approach • Ross’s approach solves moral dilemmas: • in any given situation, any number of these prima facie obligations may apply. • In the case of ethical dilemmas, they may even contradict one another. • Nonetheless, there can never be a true ethical dilemma, Ross would argue, because one of the prima facie obligations in a given situation is always the weightiest, and overrules all the others. • This is thus the absolute obligation, the action that the person ought to perform. • Ross accepts a pluralistic view of value: virtue, knowledge, pleasure, life, and freedom (etc…)are good in themselves – and ought to be promoted for their own sake.

20. Problems with Ross • Why are ‘prima facie’ moral obligations any better than Moore’s ‘moral intuitions’? • Hence, all the problems of Moore’s intuitionism might apply…see previous slides… • ‘prima facie’ or ‘on the face of it’ may not carry the kind of genuine moral weight Ross wants • modern commentators often prefer the phrase ‘pro tanto’ or ‘as far as it is able, as far as it will go’ instead. • But doesn’t this sound like the kind of moral pragmatism that lacks ultimate grounding?

21. A conclusion about Ross • But (Kant): aren’t there exceptionless duties? • For instance, “Never set light to someone for a joke”, “Do not knowingly sentence an innocent person to death.” • Would it be possible for another of Ross’s moral obligations to override these? • Yet exceptionless duties are problematic • Cases to trouble consistency might exist • cases of inhumanity… • And where great evil is concerned… • Might not Ross’s approach offer a middle way between Kant and Utilitarianism? • Or: might it not sound very like pluralistic rule utilitarianism? • Intuition could simply provide the basis for the rules which we then systemically apply…