Welcome to Intuitionism!

1. Welcome to Intuitionism!

2. Sir William David Ross:(1877-1971) The Right and the Good (1930): An introduction to Intuitionism as a Model of Ethics:

3. Ethical Intuitionism. • Ross combines aspects of Mill and Kant in what may be termed as “ethical intuitionism.” • Against utilitarianism: Ross contends that we have an intuitive knowledge of the rightness and wrongness of acts that doesn't amount to the evaluation of the consequences of our actions.  • Unlike Kantianism, Ross contends that this intuitive knowledge doesn't consist of a set of moral absolutes that can not be overridden.  • In sum, Ross contends that our moral principles present us with prima facie duties. • Prima facie means “on first appearance” or “on the face of it.” •   While these duties' value is not upon circumstances, their applicability is so dependent.  Ross contends that circumstances are extremely important in determining our overall duty, and here our perception of the situation is also extremely important. 

4. 1. An Introduction Ross advocates ethical intuitionism: We know the basic truths of ethics by intuition; intuitive recognition is neither reason nor feelings; there is also no special intuitive faculty which enables us to clearly know what is our duty is in a given situation. We do have a “sense” but it is “highly fallible”; it is the only guide we have to our duty (pp. 41-42). Consider: when you are in the right circumstance, you can see what is right and what is wrong. Though highly fallible, it is self-evident.

5. Consider the following: Ross states: “I suggest “prima facie duty” or “conditional duty” as a brief way of referring to the characteristic (quite distinct from that of being a duty proper) which an act has, in virtue of being of a certain kind (e.g., the keeping of a promise), of being an act which would be a duty proper if it were not at the same time of another kind which is morally significant… [there is] is a prima facie rightness of certain types of act… [this] is self-evident; not in the sense, that it is acting for one’s self-interests evident from the beginning of our lives… but in the snese that when we have reached sufficient moral maturity and have given sufficient attention to the proposition it is evident without need of further proof” (pp. 19-).

6. 1. An Introduction Whether this faculty is implanted in us by God or part of our nature that distinguishes us from other creatures, it is a sense we have, and if we are receptive to it and honest about it we cannot deny its existence. He lists 7 prima facie (conditional duties we know):

7. 1. An Introduction • Ross contends that there are at least six types of prima facie duties: 1. Duties of Fidelity: those that rest upon previous acts of my own (promising and reparation); 2. Duties of Gratitude: those that rest upon previous acts of others (gratitude); 3. Duties of Justice: those that rest on the fact or possibility of a distribution of pleasure or happiness (justice); 4. Duties of Beneficence: those that rest on the fact that there are others whose condition we may make better (benevolence); 5. Duties of Self-Improvement: those that rest on the fact that we may make ourselves better (self-improvement); 6. Duties of Non-Maleficence: those that rest on our obligation to not injure others (non-maleficence); -He does not claim his list of prima facie duties is an ultimate list. 

8. Prima Facie Duty • In sum, moral knowledge arises first when a notice a feature of the situation we are in which makes a moral difference to how we should behave here. But we immediately notice that what matters here must matter in the same situation wherever it appears. Thus, we discover a moral principle by intuitive induction from what the initial case contains. • Ross held that the principles we come to know are self-evident to us, but form this means only that no more is needed to reveal their truth to us as general guides to our behavior than what is in the case before us. • Prima facie means “on first appearance” or “on the face of it.” This means they can be overridden by other duties when a conflict occurs in a situation. In contrast, actual duty or duty proper is our obligatory responsibility, no matter the nature of the occasion.      According to Ross, "duty proper" is a "toti-resultant" property that is determined by looking at the total situation—and this usually involves considering a number of different (and conflicting) prima facie duties!  • Ross insists that when an act is a prima facie duty, this is an objective fact about it—it is a duty.  Its "prima facie" character comes from considering the action in this single light alone.  That is, being a prima facie duty is a "parti-resultant" property of an action—it is an objective fact about the act from a single perspective. 

9. Prima Facie Duty •   While these prima facie duties' value is not upon circumstances, their applicability is so dependent.  Ross contends that circumstances are extremely important in determining our overall duty, and thus perception of the situation is extremely important. • Ross claims there could be several characteristics which make an act right, and so prima facie duties are not reducible to some one characteristic or formula. • It is a pluralistic model. Ross claims there are several characteristics which make an act right, and they are not reducible to some one characteristic or formula.

10. 1. An Introduction Therefore, when you have a genuine intuition of rightness or wrongness, you cannot help recognizing that it is an ethical truth. Having the ethical tuition without recognizing it as an ethical truth would be like seeing a square without seeing that it is square. And if you don’t get these intuitive ethical insights, it is because you are deceiving yourself, lying, or your intuitive sense is severely disabled.

11. 2. Significant Points of Ross’ Model A.. This pluralistic approach states that we have a number prima facie duties: • A prima facie duty (also called "conditional duty") is a "characteristic . . . which an act has, in virtue of being of a certain kind . . . , of being an act which would be a duty proper if it were not at the same time of another kind which is morally significant." 1. A prima facie duty is more an account of the materials from which we must make a selection than it is an account of our actual obligations. 2. In our daily life we are more frequently than not confronted with conflicting and competing prima facie duties.

12. 2. Significant Points of Ross’ Model B. There is an absolute obligation to obey the prima facie duty that is the most “weightiest” in a given situation. These prima facie duties will assist in determining the content of the moral ought. 1. These duties are not all-inclusive. 2. They are not in a prearranged harmony of ranked priority nor do they occur singly. 3. These duties may contract each other in a given situation but because one of them is most apropos or most weighty, there is an absolute obligation to obey.

13. 2. Significant Points of Ross’ Model 4. There are a few general "rules of thumb" to follow in judging which prima facie duties are "more incumbent" than others in various situations--e.g., causing no harm is generally more incumbent than generosity.  5. There is no ranking among the prima facie duties that applies to every situation.  Each situation must be judged separately. 6. We apprehend our prima facie duties in much the same way that we apprehend the axioms of mathematics or geometry: we do so by reflecting on "the self-evident prima facie rightness of an individual act of a particular type." 7. "The moral order expressed in [the principles of prima facie duties] is just as much part of the fundamental nature of the universe . . . as is the . . . structure expressed in the axioms of geometry or arithmetic."

14. Example: • Most duties are prima facie, not absolute, duties. So, they can be overridden by other duties when a conflict occurs in a situation: • A1 A person ought not lie. • A2 A person ought to act with compassion toward others. • A3 A person ought to respect another’s autonomy. • A4 A person ought to act to protect others when they cannot protect themselves.

15. Example: A1-A4 propositions would elicit a prima facie duty for the person to follow the prescription. However, consider the following situation: 1. Your professor is dying. 2. Your professor is in great psychic and moderate physical distress. 3. Your professor has always had an intense fear of death and disease and has never handled bad news well. 4. The physician tells you that if your professor can maintain a positive attitude, he can live another year relatively pain free. If he becomes overly agitated, his condition will worsen, his physical pain will increase greatly, and his death will be much sooner. 5. You are sitting with him and he asks you whether he will be all right (meaning that he won’t die but will get better).

16. Example: • All the various moral maxims A1 to A4 can be applied to this situation. We are not deciding under which ethical rule to subsume this action; all four apply. • The problem is that they prescribe different actions. • A1 and A3 asserts that we tell prof. the truth and try to make it go as easily as possible. If he really knew that a positive attitude will help him live, then he could be part of his own cure. This decision would make A1 and A3 supervene A2 and A4.

17. Example: A2 and A4 suggest that he is not that type of a person. He will never take it well. Him him what you will, he will be unable to handle the news. He has a history of handling illnesses that were much minor as if they were fatal and as a result has gotten worse. It is truth that this time might be different, but you don’t think so. You will act in Prof’s best interests and conceal information from him because he needs protectio. This decision would make A2 and A4 supervene A1 and A3

18. Example: Which decision is the best to make? Which of these pairs of moral maixms ought to overrule the others? Clearly, they all can be properly ascribed to the situation, but since the dictate contradictory actions, it is necessary to choose one pair over the other. Since the duties involves are prima facie, not absolute, one duty may override another. This leads to the priority problem.

19. Priority Problem: • For the ethical intuitionists, the ultimate solution to the competing maxims that should supervene is decided by level 2 intuition. • Level 1 intuition: a person grasps the truths or existence of the principles. The principles are the starting points of systems of knowledge (e.g., a person ought not to lie) (pg. 19).They are known immediately. • Level 2 intuition deals not with the principles by themselves but with principles situated in life. At this level, we are dealing with what we need to make actual ethical choices. To understand this operation we need to consider two functions (a) recognition and (b) application. • Recognition is the process by which we determine the particular action before us (e.g. woman is pregnant and considering an abortion; is she exercising autonomy or contemplating murder of an unborn). • Application: When an intuition become an element in this mode, one maxim actually supercedes another in its force. It is not the case that one maxim more correctly describes the situation. Rather, there is an instance of genuine conflict that must be resolved. • Thus in level two, intuitionism operates to provide a priority ordering among competing maxims, all of which can be properly ascribed as applying the situation in question. So, level 2 operates as the recognition of the appropriate moral maxim in a given situation, and in cases that involve more than one competing maxim, Intuitionism provides a priority in application by making one maxim the more important.

20. 2. Significant Points: C. Ross is a moral realist: Rightness and goodness are objective features in the world in the way that shape, size, and masses are. D. When are attitudes are appropriate it is because something is the way we think it is: it is really good, bad, right, or wrong. E. If X is good or right it is because X has a property or quality of goodness or rightness. F. It is the existence of our moral properties that make our moral judgments true. If there were no moral properties, there would be no truth for the moral properties make our moral judgments true.

21. 2. Significant Points: G. We do not live in an objective valueless world. Rather, there is no reason to think that the universe is valueless. Thus, some of our moral judgments are true and what makes them true is the presence of the relevant objective value.

22. 2. Significant Points: H. Ross was a non-naturalist realist: moral properties cannot be understood in wholly non-moral terms. I. If you define “right” as meaning derived from natural moral sentiments, you are putting forth a non-moral naturalistic definition. If you define good as meaning “such that it ought to be desired”, you are putting forth a non-naturalistic explanation. J. Ross doesn’t deny that certain empirical facts will be relevant to deciding whether we ought or ought not act in a certain way. His point is that when all the empirical facts are in, there is still a further moral judgment to be made-namely that these empirical facts make a certain act right or good. K. Ross also believes that these moral properties are simple, meaning they are not in combination with two or more properties or relations. And if it is simple it cannot be defined. So, rightness or goodness is indefinable.

23. 2. Significant Points of Ross’ Model L. There are a variety of relations among individuals that are morally significant--including potential benefactor-potential beneficiary, promiser-promisee, creditor-debtor, wife-husband, child-parent, friend-friend, fellow countryman-fellow countryman, and others.

24. 2. Significant Points of Ross’ Model M. There is are differences between prima facie duty and an actual, absolute, duty proper: 1. Actual duty or duty proper is our obligatory responsibility, no matter the nature of the occasion. 2. Whenever I have to make a moral decision in a situation in which more than one prima facie duty applies, I must "study the situation as fully as I can until I form the considered opinion (it is never more) that in the circumstances one of them is more incumbent than any other. . . ."  The prima facie duty I judge to be "more incumbent than any other" in the situation is probably my "duty proper" or actual moral obligation.

25. 2. Significant Points of Ross’ Model: N. List of prima facie duties (not exhaustive): FRG-NI-J-B-SI 1. Fidelity (Keep one’s promise); 2. Reparation (make up for wrongs done to others); 3. Gratitude (gratefulness and return the same); 4. Non-Injury (not to harm others); 5. Justice (prevent or correct mismatch between person’s pleasure or happiness and their merit); 6. Beneficence (generosity) 7. Self-Improvement (improve one’s condition).

26. 3. Differences to Consider: A. Ross agrees with G.E. Moore that defining ethical predicates in terms of natural predicates commits the naturalistic fallacy. However, he disagrees with Moore’s view of consequential ethics, believing that he commits a fallacy as well, namely, believing that good-maximization is the only content of the moral “ought.”

27. 3. Conscience Theorists: B. Infallible conscience theorists who subscribe to the view that we always have immediate or direct knowledge of our actual duty. Ross responds: 1. They fail to take into account the complexity of the situational setting and all that is involved therein. 2. They fail to face up to the fact that there are honest differences of opinion between people of good character as to what ought to be done in a given context. 3. They simply assume that there is no problem about selecting one’s actual duty from among the variety of moral claims simultaneously incumbent upon a person in a particular situation.

28. 3. Utilitarians: “It is plain, I think, that in our moral thought we consider that the fact that we have made a promise is in itself sufficient to create a duty of keeping it, the sense of duty resting on remembrance of the past promise and not on thoughts of the future consequences of its fulfillment. Utilitarianism tries to show that this is not so, that the sanctity of promises rests on the good consequences of the fulfillment of them and the bad consequences of their nonfulfillment. It does so in this way: it points out that when you break a promise you not only fail to confer a certain advantage on your promise but you diminish his confidence, and indirectly the confidence of others, in the fulfillment of promises….

29. 3. Utilitarians: It may be suspected…that the effect of a single keeping or breaking of a promise in strengthening or weakening the fabric of mutual confidence is greatly exaggerated by the theory we are examining. And if we suppose two men dying together alone, do we think that the duty of one to fulfill before he dies a promise he has made to the other would be extinguished by the fact that neither act would have any effect on the general confidence? Anyone who holds that neither act would be suspected of not having reflected on what a promise is.” The Right and the Good, 37-39.

30. 3. Utilitarians: C. He rejects utilitarianism for two reasons: 1. Single Criterion. He Rejects them on the ground that the single criterion upon which an actual obligation is supposed to rest-namely, whatever maximizes good-is both too simple for the diverse circumstances we face and too restricted in it scope. 2. Violates common sense. Imagine that we could bring about slightly more good by breaking a promise to benefit someone to whom we had made no promise. Ought we then to break the promise? Surely not. Consider this interesting portion where he defends the fact that his theory does not reduce to a mere production of good consequences:

31. 3. Kant D. Ross also rejects Kant on the basis of common sense: 1. Kant embraced exceptionless duties (e.g., the duty to keep promises). But common sense recognizes exceptions to these duties. Imagine a case where keeping a trivial promise would cause much harm. Ought we then to keep the trivial promise? Surely not.

32. 4. Advantages: • Deontological yet flexible in view of what prima duty will best fit situation. • Appeals to common sense. We don’t get tangled up in ethical theory and confused by moral speculation. 3. Feelings about right and wrong have a distinctive force that is appealing. • Acknowledges real moral conflicts and says we must choose the weightier principle in that situational setting. 5. We naturally tend towards Kantian-type principles.

33. 5. Potential Objections: • The list of prima facie duties is unsystematic and follows no logical principle. Response: The list is not complete. • Provides no principle for determining what our actual moral obligations are in a particular situation. Response: There is no reason to assume that they will be the same in any given situation. • List of prima facie duties is without justification; how can we be sure it is accurate? Response: Apprehending what is self-evident; we don’t overturn our moral convictions just because they conflict with some moral theory.

34. 5. Potential Objections: 4. Don’t our intuitions change or evolve in view of interaction with culture. 5. Clearly people can have different intuitions about moral issues. 6. How can we decide which intuitions we should trust. Consider the following response…

35. Response: “We have no more direct way of access to the facts about rightness and goodness and about what things are right or good, than by thinking about them; the moral convictions of thoughtful and well-educated people are the data of ethics just as sense perceptions are the data of natural science. Just as some of the latter have to be rejected as illusory, so have some of the former; but as the latter are rejected only when they are in conflict with other convictions which stand better the test of reflection. The existing body of moral convictions of the best people is the cumulative product of the moral reflection of many generations, which has developed an extremely delicate power of appreciation of moral distinctions; and this the theorist cannot afford to treat with anything other than the greater respect. The verdicts of the moral consciousness of the best people are the foundation on which he must build….” ~ The Right and the Good, pg. 46-7.