1 / 22

Unauthorized Ticketing

Unauthorized Ticketing. Yesterday,Today & Beyond. Debbie Erickson Manager, Loss Prevention. Unauthorized Ticketing Statistics. 2008 – 2010 53 Incidents 1,838 tickets $ 4.3M Types: Agency Identity Theft Independent Contractors – Identity Theft Compromised GDS credentials

davida
Télécharger la présentation

Unauthorized Ticketing

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. Unauthorized Ticketing Yesterday,Today & Beyond Debbie Erickson Manager, Loss Prevention

  2. Unauthorized Ticketing Statistics 2008 – 2010 • 53 Incidents • 1,838 tickets • $ 4.3M • Types: • Agency Identity Theft • Independent Contractors – Identity Theft • Compromised GDS credentials • On-Line Booking Tools

  3. Unauthorized Ticketing Statistics - 2011 January – September 21 • 64 Incidents • 602 tickets • $ 1.3M • Types: • Compromised GDS credentials • Phishing Emails

  4. Comparison 2008 – 2010 vs. 2011 2011 has: • 33 % of the tickets issued • 30% of the dollar values • 55% of the incidents

  5. Departure - Arrival Airports Departure Airports: • ABJ 63% • CMN 12% Arrival Airports: • CMN 88% • ABJ 6%

  6. What are we collectively doing about these incidents? ARC: • Analyze data to identify and prevent possible unauthorized ticketing • Contact agencies for confirmation • Provide crucial data to each carrier • Investigate each incident • Identify new patterns of fraud

  7. What are we collectively doing about these incidents? ARC: • Sent Fraud alerts to agents • Established a GDS Fraud Working Group • Participated in Webinar with ASTA • Spoke at various agency groups • Initiated cases with Law Enforcement

  8. What are we collectively doing about these incidents? Carriers: • Interviewing passengers • Making decisions based on interviews • Initiating Law Enforcement interest

  9. What are we collectively doing about these incidents? GDS: • Analyzing data and identifying possible unauthorized tickets • Contacting agents to confirm • Inhibiting ticketing at user levels • Developing and implementing enhancements • Initiating Law Enforcement interest • Sharing fraud information

  10. What are we collectively doing about these incidents? Agents: • Monitoring ticketing records • Identifying phishing emails • Educating staff on IT security • Turning off ticketing after-hours/weekend

  11. What are the results of our initiatives? Fine-tuned our skills in identifying unauthorized ticketing Gained collaboration with GDSs Educated agents in security areas Identified new fraud markets Frustrated the Fraudster!?

  12. Frustrating the Fraudster? Fraudster knew how to gain credentials or access GDS developed and implemented additional levels of security Fraudster had to find new ways to obtain credentials or access!

  13. P H I S H I N G for T I C K E T S

  14. And, beyond . . . Spear-phishing – targeting specific employees within companies to lull them into revealing key credentials or to download malware

  15. P H I S H I N G for YOUR $ $ $ $ $ What can carriers do? • Know load factors before each flight out of CMN ABJ • Empty seats now occupied • Identify last-minute tickets • Issued from US travel agent - cash • Use ARC’s data to identify passengers attempting to use such tickets • Interview Passengers

  16. Interview Passengers • Name and contact information of passenger • When and where did they purchase the tickets • Name and contact information of seller • How much did they pay for the tickets • How did they pay for the tickets • How and when did they learn to come to the airport for this flight • Do they have a receipt or any documentation for the purchase

  17. What happens when you interview the passenger? • Offers alternative payment • OK with not boarding flight – walks away • Demands to board flight Frustrated Fraudster Has to Work Harder!

  18. Determine action based upon results of interviews • Advise passenger that the ticket was issued within hours of departure from US travel agent and you cannot confirm payment • Advise passenger that without confirmation, you are requesting passenger to provide alternative form of payment • Allow passenger to travel • Advise passenger they can’t travel today

  19. What happens next? Passenger still wants to fly so more phishing and additional tickets are issued! Watch out for new tickets – sometimes the same flight – next day!

  20. Where do we go now. . . Additional work is being done to identify best practices for agents, carriers and GDS Updating ARCs fraud pages to include proprietary information to authorized users of MY ARC Frustrate Fraudster!

  21. History repeats itself . . . Carriers that have taken even the “smallest” of actions to frustrate the fraudster, have seen DRAMATIC reduction in this type of fraud! The fraudster then picks another carrier who is not taking actions . . . Will it be You?

  22. And Beyond . . . Individual carrier problems are rare. Find a problem? Suspect a problem? Contact ARC: 703 816 8126 Loss Prevention 703 816 8137 Fraud Prevention

More Related