CSA RESET Update 5 March 2008

1. CSA RESET Update5 March 2008 UNITED STATES ARMY UNCLASSIFIED // FOUO

2. Purpose and Agenda • Purpose: To update the CSA on RESET with the initial focus on equipment • Agenda: • G-3: Restoring Balance • G-8: Equipment Reset • Bottom Line Up Front • RESET Pilot equipping • Reutilization of Theater Provided Equipment • Funding • G-4: RESET Logistics Focus Areas • G-1: Manning Update • Closing Comments

3. G-3: Restoring Balance

4. G-3 / G-8: RESET Imperative & Equipment Reset • RESET the force expeditiously for future contingencies: • Components of RESET: Family, Soldiers, Equipment, and Training are stressed and the force is stretched thin. • Army Staff will provide recurring updates to the CSA on the status of our Reset efforts. Subsequent briefs will focus on: personnel, logistics, and the RESET pilot. • This review will focus on Equipment Reset. Units complete RESET fully manned, equipped, rested and intellectually prepared to begin focused individual & collective training Equipment Reset supports all the imperatives: Imperatives: • PREPARE Soldiers for success in current operations • Train for assigned operations • Equip for current mission needs • Grow agile and adaptive leaders   • SUSTAIN our Soldiers, Families, and Civilians • Provide QOL for Soldiers and Families • Recruit & Retain quality • Implement ARFORGEN • Support for Wounded Warriors     • TRANSFORM to become the Army the Nation needs today and in the future • Build strategic depth • Equip units to standard design • Grow the Army (48 AC BCTs by 2011) • Modernize the force • RESET to restore readiness and depth for future operations • Repair, recap, replace equipment • Accelerate Grow the Army • Train for full spectrum operations    4 UNCLASSIFIED // FOUO

5. G-8: Bottom Line Up Front: • Key Reset Issues: • Anticipate challenges to meet S2 at Return+180 metric for selected RESET Pilot units. • Reutilization of Theater Provided Equipment (TPE) is a key enabler to restore readiness and strategic depth. • Dependent on supplemental funding to accomplish Reset; funding not consistent or predictable and does not fill equipment shortages - require remaining $7.6B in procurement funding. • Although improving, visibility and accountability of equipment Army-wide remains a significant challenge. • How the Army can mitigate these Reset issues: • Continue dialogue with OSD and Congressional leadership on impacts and risk of late and short funding streams on Army Reset and Restoring balance - on time funding results in on time equipment. • Bring definition of readiness into the 21st century, retool it for long-duration, irregular wars and major conflicts - might well change assessment of today's Army units. • Continue to emphasize retrograde of equipment from Theater.

6. G-8: RESET Pilot Equipping • Issue 1: Challenges to meet S2 at Return+180 metric for selected RESET Pilot units. • Facts: • The Army does not have enough equipment on hand to fill all units to 100% MTOE = Force Feasibility Reviews (FFRs). • Equipment shortfalls exist for pacing items: • IBCT: FFR for 14 of 28 pacing items: medium tactical trucks and heavy tactical trucks. • HBCT: FFR for 6 of 22 pacing items: Intelligence equip, communications gear, and ambulances. • Total logistic response time (TLRT) and procurement time for some systems >120 days may prevent meeting the R+180 timeline Army wide: RADARs (Q36 and Q37) and aviation. • Discussion/Conclusion: • Unit commanders are focused on their next mission and not on meeting readiness standards in AR 220-1. • Units preparing for deployment have turned away equipment and deferred purchasing stock funded items not required for their future mission (tents, camouflage nets, unarmored vehicles). To achieve an S2 rating, units must accept all equipment and purchase required stock funded items. • Recommendations: Review how units report readiness IAW AR 220-1 and retool it for an era of persistent conflict.

7. Equipping driven by Latest Arrival Date (LAD) for deployment and Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRE) training. Focus on equipment to achieve readiness for a pending mission in theater. New Equipment Training conducted in conjunction with deliveries upon return. Equipping driven by unit return, not deployment cycle. Set conditions before redeployment. Focus on all authorized equipment (MTOE) to achieve full spectrum readiness at home station. New Equipment Training coordinated around reconstitution; may follow deliveries. G-8: RESET Pilot Adapting Equipping Strategies Old Equipping Strategy New Equipping Strategy Old Strategy Timeline 25% Automatic Reset Induction RESET Pilot Timeline Phase I: In Theater R-180 days 100% Property Accountability 100% Automatic Reset Induction 100% Battle Damaged Turned in Phase II: Reconstitution Phase III: Focused Training

8. IBCT Equivalents: • Medium Tactical Vehicles = 6 • Light Tactical Vehicles = 10 • NVG = 2.7 • Generators = 11 • HBCT Equivalents: • Tank = 2 • BFV = 2 • HTV = 10 • Thermal Weapons Sights (L) = 4 G-8: Reutilization of Theater Provided Equipment • Issue 2: Reutilization of Theater Provided Equipment (TPE) to restore readiness and strategic depth. • Facts: • TPE contains1.45 million items: • 20% of the Army’s modern truck fleet and nearly 100% of the Army’s armored trucks are in theater. • The Army now has over 1,600 MRAPs in theater. • The Army has refurbishment sites in theater to repair vehicles forward. • The Army is reducing its forces by 5 BCTs in Iraq. • Since 2003, the Army has increased depot capacity: • Output: 200% on track vehicles, 100% on radar & Stryker, and ~50% for all else • Direct Labor Hours up 117% at the Depots, from 12.5M (FY03) to 27.1M (FY08 projected) • Discussion / Conclusion: • As forces are reduced and MRAP numbers increase, theater should retrograde excess equipment to seed the depots. • To restore readiness and build strategic depth the Army can: • Retrograde worn Theater Provided Equipment (TPE) upon receipt of new production. These assets will provide seeds for the depots and be fielded to units after sustainment level Reset. • Maintain TPE currently in theater and field new production to units at home station. • Recommendations: Emphasize retrograding unneeded and worn out equipment from theater to restore readiness and build strategic depth.

9. G-8: Funding • Issue 3: Reset requires timely and adequate funding. • Facts: • Equipment Reset is entirely dependent on supplemental funding. • In FY08, received partial funding ($10.7B) 3 months late and still require $7.6B in procurement funding. • Not receiving the remaining $7.6B in procurement funding from Congress by Memorial Day will impact production lines and fielding schedules. • Discussion / Conclusion: • Delayed funding required cash-flowing OMA to Reset from other accounts. • Procurement funding delays results in later contract awards and later fieldings. • Procurement contracts not signed for new production lead to later delivery of systems replacements: Battle losses, Theater Provided Equipment replacement, and APS rebuild. • Impacts for the recapitalization program: Tanks & Bradleys for 4 HBCTs: 1 x 3ID, 1 x ARNG, 2 x Army Pre-positioned Stocks (APS) in FY09 and FY10. • Recommendation: Emphasize the importance of funding with OSD and Congressional leadership to restore balance.

10. G-4:What I Want To Leave You With Phase I: Setting Conditions Phase II: Unit Reconstitution Phase III: Focused Training • Phase I sets conditions for success and is logistics heavy. • Have identified 5 critical Logistics Focus Areas in Phase I. • Property Accountability • Retrograde • Redeployment • ARI • Battle Loss • Mapped out processes for each focus area. Identifying chokepoints/problem areas. • Working with process owners to incorporate improvements. • Will conduct Rock Drill (8-9 May 08) with Theater.

11. G-4:RESET Logistics Focus Areas (1 of 3) • RESET Logistics Focus Areas: • 100% Property Accountability. Equipment visibility is critical to RESET. Improving everyday. • Complex Problem: Split Property books, large volume of transactions, TPE, RFI, REF, Non-standard equipment (NS-E), “White” Equipment, ONS, Lateral transfers, unit turnover. • Inventory-in-motion impacts Lifecycle Accountability. Seams between PM and user, Company Commander transition, and user to graveyard. • Visibility affects redistribution of assets to meet requirements. • What we’ve done: • Rescinded Wartime accountability. • Fielded PBUSE. To date has improved corporate visibility from 21.8M items to 3.4B items and corporate value from $124M to $230B. • Operation TOTAL RECALL – Reestablished accountability for over $135M and 20k items. • Increased visibility as a whole to include NS-E – over 70k and $135M and $3.1B of White Equipment • Fielding PMs with PBUSE. • Desert Summit Conferences resolve Theater Class VII issues. • Established Property Accountability Task Force to gain Corporate level Asset Visibility. • Executed 100% Inventories in Theater (4/25 IBCT). Change of Command Inventories in Theater very successful. Property Accountability Retrograde ARI Battle Loss Turn-in Redeployment

12. G-4:RESET Logistics Focus Areas (2 of 3) • Retrograde • Established Retrograde Task Force to synchronize retrograde operations with strategic partners. • Retrograded 4,319 pieces (SWA/Korea/USAREUR) of Class VII Rolling Stock in FY08 (16,328 in FY 07) and 71 containers of Class II/IX to Sierra Army Depot (FY08) • Redeployment • Treating redeployment like a deployment. • Reduced costs and accelerated timeline. • Utilizing TP-4: Reduces retrograde cargo in-transit time by 43 days and costs 50% less than surface movement. • Accelerating surface timeline: Reduced OIF redeployment from 58 to 50 days. Reduced OEF redeployment by 10 days to 65 days (working towards 50 days). Property Accountability Retrograde Redeployment ARI Battle Loss Turn-in

13. G-4:RESET Logistics Focus Areas (3 of 3) Property Accountability Retrograde Redeployment ARI Battle Loss Turn-in • Automatic Reset Induction (ARI) • 100% vs. 25% for RESET Pilot units. • Synchronized with Army priorities. • Expedited Depot Returns. • Battle loss • 100% Battle Loss turn-in to Theater. • Established procedures that support early attrition of identified battle losses within 90 days from 2 years. • Working with DLA to expand DRMS capabilities • Allows earlier replacement of procurement items. R-180 to R-date is logistics task intensive. Success in these critical logistics tasks sets conditions for a unit’s successful reset.

14. G-1: Personnel Reset • Personnel Reset “Pilot” Criteria/Rules of Engagement: • Modification of ongoing actions • Coordination with resetting unit NET Redeployment (R) – 6 months • Soldiers know what they are doing post-redeployment • Maximize Mobile Training Teams to resetting units • Maximize officer OES attendance • Key leaders “as soon as possible” after redeployment • Key personnel (LOG & ADMIN) in place during “reset” • No DA directed training during R to R+180 • P2 by R+180 days • Key issues: • Competition for resources: 8 AC “Pilot” units - with 30+ other BDE-level AC non-Pilot units (re-deployers and deployers) • Each unit is unique – challenges with OCONUS/CONUS units, BCT/non-BCTs and Battalion size and below units • Shortages of Majors and Captains • Short notice LAD/MRE adjustments disrupt reset timeline

15. G-1: Personnel Reset • What is going well: • Units with farther out return dates – HRC in position to execute new criteria • Increase focus on key leaders and key personnel (admin & log) • Maximizing MTTs for NCOs. • Additional support to HRC’s efforts to move officers out of units for OES • Targeting all grades and skills to be manned at above 80% - some grades and skills will be less (critical MOS, CPT/MAJ Army shortage, etc.) • What needs improvement: • Close in units (4-25 INF, CAB 82nd, 43rd ASG(-)), short reaction time • Impacts inbounds – prior to “pilot” approval, HRC reset units based on MRE-45 not R+180 • Assignment Instructions & Request for Orders completed for close in units • There will always be a percentage of Soldiers who will leave the unit but are not on AI/RFO prior to redeployment • Vertical COP (DA to lowest unit level) of personnel reset expectations • “Systems” approach to resets versus “list management”

16. G-1: Personnel Reset • Fixes: • Increased coordination with units while in theater (Rules of Engagement, Personnel Disposition Rosters, expectations • Unit “buy in” of take out plan (agreeing to Soldiers HRC sees as need to leave the unit) • Increased dialogue with units to reassign officers • Earliest possible notification of a LAD change to personnel reset plan can be adjusted & maximized • Continue distribution of critical shortages across the non-deployers (maximize deployers and resetting units)

17. G-1: Personnel Reset (4-25 & CAB 82nd)

18. G-1: Personnel Reset - 7 Pilot Units: - (864th not shown) - Past and inside 6 month to redeployment - 20 Additional “NON” Pilot Units: - inside R-6 to R window - working with them on “personnel resets”. - Next month (Apr 08), 6 more non Pilot units are under R-6 - Not all “IBUs” (itty bitty units) shown to the right - ALL units competing for “available” Soldiers, coming out of the school house, training base, previous assignment, etc.

19. G-1: Personnel Reset - ~15 additional units under 6 months to available window - Also competing for same resources that redeployers need

20. Closing Comments • Key Reset issues: • Anticipate challenges to meet S2 at Return+180 metric for selected RESET Pilot units. • Reutilization of Theater Provided Equipment (TPE) is a key enabler to restore readiness and strategic depth. • Dependent on supplemental funding to accomplish Reset; funding not consistent or predictable and does not fill equipment shortages – require remaining $7.6B in procurement funding. • Although improving, visibility and accountability of equipment Army-wide remains a significant challenge. • How the Army can mitigate these Reset issues: • Continue dialogue with OSD and Congressional leadership on impacts and risk of late and short funding streams on Army Reset and Restoring balance -- on time funding results in on time equipment. • Bring definition of readiness into the 21st century, retool it for long-duration, irregular wars and major conflicts -- might well change assessment of today's Army units. • Continue to emphasize retrograde of equipment from Theater. • Much work has been done since RESET Rock Drill with great return on investment. • Subsequent updates will focus on: personnel, logistics, and RESET Pilot.

21. G-8 BACK UP SLIDES 21

22. Key Considerations One-time 100% inventory three months after redeployment in Feb 08 delayed accurate identification of equipment shortages. No property book officer assigned upon redeployment. Larger disparity between unit’s reported equipment on-hand data and data in PBUSE property book database. Equipment flow to unit for shortages of G8-managed LINs began in late-Feb 08 at R+90 with goal of restoring health no later than 21 Jun 08 (45-days prior to 4 Aug 08 NTC rotation). Routine attention and focus by DA Staff, FORSCOM, and AMC. Key Considerations Command-directed 100% inventory across BDE over 3-months (Jul-Sep 07) while deployed established property accountability and identified shortages. Follow-on inventory conducted in Feb 08. Property book officer assigned throughout deployment and redeployment. Smaller disparity between unit’s reported equipment on-hand data and data in PBUSE property book database. Equipment flow to unit for shortages of G8-managed LINs began in mid-Jan 08 at R+30 with goal of equipping to S-2 no later than 12 Jun 08 (Return+180) in accordance with the RESET Pilot Unit directive. Major attention and focus by DA Staff, FORSCOM, and AMC. BCT Equipping Comparison Snapshot3d BDE, 25th ID vs. 4th BDE (ABN), 25th ID 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division Location: “Bronco Brigade” at Schofield Barracks, HI Last Redeployed: late-October 07 from OIF Special Designation: None (Next Deployer in Fall ’08) HQDA G-8 Equipping Synch Conference: Feb 08 Equip No Later Than: 21 Jul 08 (45 days prior to MRE) 4th Brigade (Airborne), 25th Infantry Division Location: “Spartan Brigade” at Ft. Richardson, AK Last Redeployed: late-November 07 from OIF Special Designation: 1st of 13 CSA-directed RESET Pilot Units HQDA G-8 Equipping Synch Conference: Jan 08 Equip No Later Than: 12 Jun 08 (Return + 180)

23. Equipment Rating Based on FFR Authorizations HBCT would be S2 and IBCT would be S3 due to S Rating of Pacing Items Impact of FFR Application on Typical BCT MTOE Unit filled to 100% authorization except where FFR Applies 1/3 ID HBCT was used as a typical HBCT 3/1 ID IBCT was used as a typical IBCT. FFR quantities obtained from HQDA G37/FM Approved Constrained Sourcing Solutions, version 4 dated 251800 August 06.

24. BCT FFR Pacing Items

25. IBCT Build with FFR applied • IBCT equipped at 100% FFR is S3. • Per AR 220-1, a unit’s S-level cannot be greater than the S-level for any pacing item (i.e., if a unit is otherwise S1 and 100% fill, but one pacing LIN is S4, the unit is S4). • 28 pacing items for an IBCT, 4 pacing items are types of medium and heavy tactical trucks. • FFR for medium tactical trucks is 82% and heavy tactical trucks 70%, which means these pacing items would both be rated S3. • If you fill an IBCT to 100% MTOE/FFR the best they can be is S3.

26. “Mountain of Steel”Composition of Theater Provided Equipment HBCT Equivalents Tank = 2 HBCT BFV = 2 HBCT HTV = 10 HBCT TWS (L) = 4 IBCT Equivalents MTV = 6 LTV = 10 SM ARMS = 1 NVG = 2.7 TWS (M/H) = 5 Generators = 11 G-8 677 LINs 228,106 Qty AMC 317 LINs 48,128 Qty Other 2813 LINs 1,172,411Qty Total 1.45M items CH-47 12 UH-60 11 Howitzer 62 IBA comp 572312 Warlock 14124/P-mask 992 CBPSS 6/Radios 7686 HF Radios 1810/CZY-10(COMSEC ) 2744 Generators 2149 (2-3Kw 447/5-30Kw 1567/100-200Kw 35) PVS-14 10654/PVS-7D 7169/PAQ-4C 771/PEQ-2A 5141/PVS-5B 829 PVS-5A 709/Knight 31/PVS-4(IMG) 1055/PVS-10 240/PRC-117F 1249/FAADC 22 M240 310/M240B 2270/240C 220/240H 18/MK-19 2138/M107 122/M2 3411 M249 1149/M24 88/M4 838/M16A4 265/M16A2 1185/M14 182/M14 NM GR 103 M60 22/M60D 31 M88 66/M1114 6581/RTCH 87/Atlas 321/Fox 16/Rllrs 50/Auger 52 FRS 73/Dozers 183/Scrprs 78/Grdr 86/5T Dump Trucks 57/Scp ldr 106 Tank 140/BFV 267/M113 440/M1025/26 780/M997 465/M1151/52 2897/Buffalo 75/Husky 49 RG-31 61/HEMTT 3313 [Crgo 2396/Tnkr 440/Wrkr 477]/M1165 363/ASV 847/FBCB2 8351Raven 186 LRAS 200/LLDR 21/ITAS 25/CSEL 142/ AN/TPQ-36 12/Prophet 9/BFT 68/Thermal weapons sight 3932 50cal tripod 1409/Aiming Circle 9 * Retrograde priorities established at AERC 7.0 Other Priority (P)* 6 (communication) P* 5 (communications) P* 4 (primarily NVDs) P* 3 (Pri small arms) P* 2 (Pri move) P* 1 (Pri move)

27. PTDO and APS Rebuild Timeline X X X X II X X X X SUS SUS SUS SUS APS 4 (Korea) - Funded FY08 FY09 FY11-14 FY10 X X APS 2 APS 5 PTDO APS 3 APS 3 APS 5 (Harvest & TPE) APS 5 On Order: AMC BUILDS IBCT PTDO SET FROM RETURNED APS-5 EQUIPMENT (IBCT & HBCT) AND TPE TO SATISFY POST SURGE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT FY07 Sup $1.6B Future Need $.9B FY08 Sup $1.7B FY09 Sup $1.2B (Equipment Procurement) FY07 SUP BEGINS BUILD OF APS 5 IN FY09 FY 08 & 09 SUP & POM 10-15 FUNDSCOMPLETE APS 3 & 5 IN FY11-14 FY07 & 08 SUP BUILDS APS 3 & 5 AND COMPLETES APS-2 IN FY10 TOTAL FUNDING REQUIRED FY09 SUP $2.0B($1.2B procurement, $0.4B OMA $0.4B AWCF) FY08 SUP $3.2B($1.7B procurement, $0.4B OMA $1.1B AWCF) POM 10-15 $1.5B($0.9B procurement, $0.6B OMA,, $0 AWCF) ALL APS REBUILD EFFORTS WILL BE VALIDATED BY G-8 THROUGH THE AERC PROCESS.

28. G-1: Personnel Reset G-1 Back-up Slides

29. G-1: Personnel Reset • Initiated personnel reset with 4-25 in Jun/Jul 2007. ROE & Personnel Rosters issued to 4-25 in Jul 2007 • Based on May 09 available date and consideration of Soldiers’ DEROS dates, HRC identified ~1600 Soldiers that should leave the unit. This group was divided to pre and post Sep 08 (Group 1 and 2) to facilitate installation support and ability of HRC to find follow on assignments for • Available date shift in Nov 07 impacted reset actions (took longer to cut RFO and AI, some previously identified Soldiers will no longer leave the unit, etc.) • Unit currently has 857 Soldiers on AI/RFO out of unit • Working ~125 Officers now • Unit reports that they have 115 Soldiers not on AI (all enlisted); 90 of which are ineligible to PCS and 25 will be on assignment by 29 Feb 08 • Unit projected at over 90% assigned strength at R+180 days (some grades and skills will not be that high).

30. G-1: Personnel Reset Test Returning Non-Test - Represents ~30 units all competing for same resources (Soldiers). Available