National Institute for Animal Agriculture April 1, 2014

1. National Institute for Animal AgricultureApril 1, 2014 Beth Lautner, DVM, MS Associate Deputy Administrator, Science, Technology and Analysis Services Veterinary Services Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service U.S. Department of Agriculture Veterinary Services Foot-and-Mouth Disease Strategies

2. Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) Virus Biology Picornavirus family, Apthovirus genus 7 serotypes: A, O, C, Asia 1, SAT1, SAT2, SAT3 Multiple topotypes (substrains tied to geographical region) within each serotype

3. Presumptive FMD Prevalence

4. FMD Serotype Distribution 4

5. Recommendations from WRLFMD strains to be included in FMDV antigen bank HIGH PRIORITY O Manisa O PanAsia-2 O BFS or Campos A24 Cruzeiro Asia 1 Shamir A Iran-05 (or A TUR 06) A22 Iraq SAT 2 Saudi Arabia (or equivalent i.e. SAT 2 Eritrea) MEDIUM PRIORITY A Eritrea SAT 2 Zimbabwe SAT 1 South Africa A Malaysia 97 (or Thai equivalent such as A/NPT/TAI/86) A Argentina 2001 O Taiwan 97 (pig-adapted strain or Philippine equivalent) LOW PRIORITY A Iran ’96 A Iran ’99 A Iran 87 or A Saudi Arabia 23/86 (or equivalent) A15 Bangkok related strain A87 Argentina related strain C Noville SAT 2 Kenya SAT 1 Kenya SAT 3 Zimbabwe

6. 6 Types of FMD Outbreaks

7. The goals of an FMD response are to: (1) detect, control, and contain FMD in animals as quickly as possible; (2) eradicate FMD using strategies that stabilize animal agriculture, the food supply, the economy, and protect public health and the environment; and (3) provide science- and risk-based approaches and systems to facilitate continuity of business for non-infected animals and non-contaminated animal products. APHIS FMD Response Goals 7

9. FMD response strategies—strategies are not mutually exclusive: • Stamping-out • Stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination to kill • Stamping out modified with emergency vaccination to slaughter • Stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination to live • Combination of options • Vaccination to live without stamping-out FMD Response Strategies 9

10. Challenges to Stamping-Out Only Strategies • Mobility of animals/products Huge herds, highly concentrated

11. Depopulation & Disposal Challenges • Captive bolting • Labor intensive • Slow • Rendering • Preferred • Capacity issues • Logistics issues • Unlined Burial • Polluting • Long-term environmental impact • Gunshot • Accessible • Expensive • Safety issues

12. Develop a Balanced Response Strategy

13. Continuity of Business Planning • Secure Milk Supply: for milk and milk movement in an FMD outbreak, to avoid and mitigate interruptions in movement. • Secure Pork Supply: for swine and pork products, to avoid and mitigate interruptions in movement.

14. FMD Response Capabilities Secure Food Supply Plans NAHERC National Animal Health Emergency Response Corps

15. National Veterinary Stockpile (NVS)

16. Current Deployable Capabilities • 24 Hour Push Packs of PPE and decon supplies • PPE individual kits • Antiviral medications • Vaccine • Poultry depopulation foaming units, CO2 carts • Mobile refrigeration/ vaccine storage & transport systems • Animal handling equipment • Response support services

17. Iowa Outbreak: One Infected County Total livestock affected: 2,110,282 17 Data: NASS, 2007

18. Iowa Outbreak: Three Infected Counties Total livestock affected: 4,342,744 18 Data: NASS, 2007

19. Iowa Outbreak: Nine Infected Counties Total livestock affected: 15,252,908 19 Data: NASS, 2007

20. Iowa Outbreak: Nine Infected Counties and Vaccination Zone 20 Total livestock affected: 23,453,329 Data: NASS, 2007

21. California Outbreak: One Infected County Total cattle, sheep, and goats affected: 2,466,012 Data: NASS, 2007 Complete county-level swine data for California is not available. 21

22. California Outbreak: Five Infected Counties Total cattle, sheep, and goats affected: 4,639,258 Data: NASS, 2007 Complete county-level swine data for California is not available. 22

23. Texas-Oklahoma-Kansas: Approximately Three Infected Counties Data: NASS, 2007 *Swine data provided may be incomplete; counties may choose not to report. Best available data incorporated. 23 Total livestock affected: 5,753,124

24. Texas-Oklahoma-Kansas: Six Infected Counties Data: NASS, 2007 *Swine data provided may be incomplete; counties may choose not to report. Best available data incorporated. 24 Total livestock affected: 10,593,857

25. Texas-Oklahoma-Kansas: Twelve Infected Counties Data: NASS, 2007 *Swine data provided may be incomplete; counties may choose not to report. Best available data incorporated. 25 Total livestock affected: 17,805,604

26. The Complexities of FMD Vaccine Planning 7 serotypes: A, O, C, Asia 1, SAT1, SAT2, SAT3 Multiple topotypes within each serotype Topotypes within serotype ± cross-reactive Most vaccine inactivated (killed) Molecular vaccines in development (Genvec) Two categories: Emergency Vaccine - ≥ 6 PD50 Commercial Vaccine - ≥ 3 PD50 Emergency vaccine stored as concentrate Commercial vaccine stored as finished product Difficult to anticipate what to bank Novel vaccine technology needed

27. Mission Statement The NAFMDVB fosters the preparedness for responding to an FMD outbreak in North America, maintaining expertise in FMD vaccines, vaccine deployment, vaccination and other FMD control measures. The NAFMDVB maintains the repository of vaccine antigen concentrates (VAC) for the production of emergency FMD vaccines.

28. Background Established: In 1982 from a Memorandum of Understanding between United States, Canada, and Mexico to ensure the availability and readiness of vaccines when needed, to control an outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease in North America. • Based on emergency vaccinate to kill strategy • Annual contributions from Canada, Mexico and the United States proportional to the susceptible animal population of each country.

29. Two Governing Bodies • The Commission:Chief Veterinary Officer from each country • The Technical Committee (TC): • Comprised of one technical and one regulatory representative from each country. • The TC advises the Commission on matters of a scientific and technical nature. • The TC works in coordination with the Emergency Management Working Group (EMWG) to advise the Commission on policy and implementation of the NAFMDVB program by each member country. • The EMWG is a subcommittee of the North American Animal Health committee (NAAHC) charged with coordinating, harmonizing, and expediting animal health emergency management in North America.

30. NAFMDVB Location • USDA’s Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory (FADDL) at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center. • Under stringent safety and security controls 24/7.

31. Facilities • Laboratory facility for antigen, sera and master seed testing. • Storage facility • Liquid nitrogen freezers for antigens and antigen samples • Refrigerators for pilot vaccines • Access to animal rooms with capacity to house 17 bovines of 400 pounds.

32. WELCOME / BIENVENUE / BIENVENIDOS USDA-APHIS-VS/NAFMDVB/ US COMMODITY GROUP DELEGATION VISIT LPA 20/02/2014

34. Questions?