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Africa Strategy in the UN climate negotiations

Africa Strategy in the UN climate negotiations

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Africa Strategy in the UN climate negotiations

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  1. Africa Strategy in the UN climate negotiations Tosi Mpanu-Mpanu Democratic Republic of Congo ECBI Regional Capacity Building Workshop for UNFCCC negotiators: West Africa 5th July 2010, Dakar, Sénégal

  2. Overview • Africa Strategy in the negotiations • Scientific and economic context • Political context • Negotiations under the AWG-KP • Negotiations under the AWG-LCA • Process of negotiations • Prospects for Cancún and beyond • Conclusion

  3. Africa Strategy in the negotiations • Ensure African position is based on the latest scientific and economic analysis • Confirm African Common Negotiating Position and reiterate commitment to Bali Roadmap and to continuation of Kyoto Protocol • For the 42 African countries that have associated with the Copenhagen Accord, ensure it serves as a “floor” not a “ceiling” to ambition • Seek support for African science-based position at Ministerial and Head of State level, as appropriate • Identify democratic and transparent modalities for representation of African position at all levels, including during COP16 high-level segment

  4. Scientific and economic context • According to the IPCC • “Africa is one of the most vulnerable continents to climate change… • All of Africa is very likely to warm during this century. The warming is very likely to be larger than global, annual mean warming throughout the continent and in all seasons… • In all four regions and in all seasons, the median temperature increase lies … roughly 1.5 times the global mean response.” • Further warming risks • Reduction in crop yields in some countries of as much as 50% by 2020 • Increased water stress for 75-250 million people by 2020s and 350-600 million by 2050s • Cost of adaptation to sea-level rise of at least 5-10% of GDP • Recent analysis suggests climate change is progressing faster than predicted by IPCC and the economic costs may be higher • Africa’s position must be based on the latest scientific and economic analysis

  5. Political context • Parties agreed to implement the Convention and its Kyoto Protocol through the two-tracks of the Bali Roadmap • Kyoto Protocol: A second commitment period for Annex I commencing 2013 through the AWG-KP • Convention: Ensure the “full, effective and sustained implementation of the Convention” through the AWG-LCA • Some Annex I countries are now seeking to end (not implement) Kyoto Protocol and to reinterpret the Convention • They propose a “pledge-based” approach building on Copenhagen Accord that departs from the Convention, Kyoto Protocol and Bali Roadmap • According to analysis of the Copenhagen Accord • Annex I emissions could increase by up to 6% by 2020 from 1990 levels • 50% chance warming will exceed 3 degrees C • These are major developments in the negotiations which require a sophisticated and coordinated response by African countries

  6. Kyoto Protocol: AWG-KP • AWG-KP is addressing • Further commitments for Annex I Parties after 2012 • Other issues (land-use, surplus allowances, methodologies etc) • Agreement to pursue a “top-down” not a “pledge-based” approach to Annex I mitigation commitment in aggregate • African common position calls for Annex I reductions of 40% from 1990 levels (African Group called for 45% in Copenhagen) • Annex I are proposing a “pledge-based” approach. Current pledges by Annex I Parties to the Kyoto Protocol would yield: • A 10-14% reduction below 1990 levels by 2017 • A 4-8% increase above1990 levels by 2017 with loopholes (land-use and surplus allowances) • Even higher domestic emissions through use of markets and “offsetting” • A number of Annex I Parties are now saying they will not take a second commitment period favoring a “bottom up” approach under the Copenhagen Accord

  7. Kyoto Protocol: AWG-KP • Strategic priorities • Increase scale of Annex I ambition • Close land-use loopholes • Limit surplus allowances • Limit role for markets • Demand transparency on level of domestic reductions • Limit “migration” of KP issues to AWG-LCA • Confirm 2017 commitment period • Secure common G77 and China position on Annex I reductions • Confirm Cancún as agreed deadline for conclusion of AWG-KP • Build support with European and other partners to save KP

  8. Convention: AWG-LCA • Shared vision • Adaptation • Mitigation • Forests • Technology • Finance • Revised “Chair’s text to facilitate negotiations”

  9. Shared vision • AWG-LCA Chair’s revised text is improved in structure but still fails to include key proposals by G77 and China and African Group • In Bonn, G77 and China noted a range of revisions to preamble and to shared vision text • Shared vision must be sufficient to keep Africa safe, share burdens fairly, and guarantee the means required to develop and adapt to climate change • Strategic priorities • Review the shared vision to ensure an equitable approach • Adjust preamble to reflect key ideas put forward by G77 and African Group • Include a shared vision and global goal for each Bali building block • Include language requiring an equitable burden sharing paradigm • Ensure any review covers adequacy of Annex I commitments, financing and compliance • “A shared vision for long-term cooperative action, including a long-term global goal for emission reductions, to achieve the ultimate objective of the Convention…”

  10. Adaptation “Enhancing action on adaptation” • Parties had limited opportunities to discuss adaptation in Bonn • Considerable differences remain • Developing countries support creation of a work-programme, Adaptation Committee, Convention Adaptation Fund and a mechanism to address loss and damage • Many developed countries support existing mechanisms and continue to oppose new institutions including a mechanism to address loss and damage • Some G77 members expressed concern over proposed new “most vulnerable country” category; and continued differences remain on “response measures” • Strategic priorities • Ensure continued focus on Africa • Revise estimates of costs, loss and damage based on most recent information • Increase pressure for agreement on institutional proposals • Ensure simplified access for adaptation financing, and that funds are new and additional • Ensure consideration of vulnerable groups and communities, gender-sensitivity, ecosystems and traditional knowledge

  11. Mitigation “Enhanced national/international action on mitigation of climate change” • Attempts by many developed countries to end Kyoto Protocol and move to “pledge based” approach building on the Copenhagen Accord under AWG-LCA • In AWG-LCA, some Annex I countries remain opposed to • Aggregate target for Annex I Parties • Negotiation on their individual targets • Comparability of efforts (scale, legal form, MRV, compliance) • International disciplines on how targets are achieved • Effective compliance measures • In parallel, they propose strong new MRV and “ICA” provisions for developing countries • Strategic priorities • Maintain the “firewall” between AWG-LCA and AWG-KP, and between paragraphs 1(b)(i) and (ii) of Bali Action Plan • Focus AWG-LCA discussion on comparability of efforts for Annex I Parties that are not Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (i.e. the United States) • Focus AWG-KP discussions on other Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol • Elaborate more detailed solution for the United States under the AWG-LCA

  12. Forests “Policy approaches and positive incentives on issues relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries; and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries” • Relatively limited discussion of forests in Bonn (the Chair’s revised text includes only two paragraphs) • Annex I countries continue to support market-based sources of financing • Some developing countries support markets, while others support a fund-based approach • Many countries noted importance of situating external processes (such as Paris-Oslo process) under UNFCCC once mechanism established • Congo Basin countries noted need for balance in rules for REDD-plus and LULUCF • Strategic priorities • Ensure balance between rules for REDD-plus and LULUCF • Review implications for market-based and fund-based financing • Ensure discussions of REDD move in parallel with other issues

  13. Technology “Enhanced action on technology development and transfer to support action on mitigation and adaptation” • Parties differed over the role of an enhanced Technology Mechanism, including a Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and Climate Technology Center and Network (CTCN) • Developed countries want the TEC and CTCN to have equal status; developing countries want a clear hierarchy with the CTCN reporting to the TEC • Developed countries want the TEC and CTCN to report to SBSTA; developing countries want the TEC to function as a subsidiary body reporting to the COP • Discussions in Bonn did not adequately address issues of intellectual property rights, endogenous capacities and technologies, or sectoral approaches to technology transfer (Article 4.1(c)) • Strategic priorities • Reinforce proposals for the structure of the technology mechanism • Increase focus on affordable access to technologies (including by removing IPR barriers) • Increase focus on enhancing endogenous technologies and capacities • Reinstate Article 4.1(c) discussions to focus on technology transfer in all sectors

  14. Finance “Enhanced action on the provision of financial resources and investment to support action on mitigation and adaptation and technology cooperation” • Developing countries confirmed • The need for a financial architecture including: 1) Finance Board accountable to the COP; 2) Funds as operating entities under supervision of Finance Board; and 3) Committee to MRV support • At least 1.5% of Annex I GNP (around $600 billion) is required. China noted $100 billion by 2020 is inadequate • That the recording mechanism for mitigation actions and support should be linked appropriately and guarantee access to funds • Many developed countries continue to favor a decentralized approach stressing existing institutions (e.g. the World Bank) and the need for country driven approaches • Some developing countries expressed concerns over use of the term “Copenhagen Green Fund” as deriving from the Copenhagen Accord, and the use of financing for coercive political purposes • Strategic priorities • Review financing architecture in light of G77 and China and African proposal/texts • Reiterate African Group’s demands for financing based on figures agreed in Copenhagen • Provide further evidence of needs for financing (both for mitigation and adaptation/damage)

  15. Process of negotiations • The SBI discussed arrangements for intergovernmental meetings, including controversial proposals to hold a high-level meeting before Cancún and extend the high-level segment of Cancún beyond the usual period • Caution was expressed by a number of developing countries on bases including: • Additional time should be given to meetings among negotiators • Complex technical issues should be addressed by experts • Discussions should remain open and inclusive • Ministerial meetings are not favored if funds are unavailable • Ministerial meetings are convened when negotiators have prepared something and not before • This in part reflected concerns over the handling of the Copenhagen climate meeting, including the exclusive process leading to the Copenhagen Accord • It was ultimately agreed in the SBI that “the bureau and incoming presidency [are] to make arrangements for the organization of the high-level segment” • The outcome is therefore a high-level meeting as part of COP 16, with no ministerial-level meeting mandated under the UNFCCC between now and Cancún

  16. Prospects for Cancún and beyond • Some Annex I countries and UNFCCC Secretariat have downscaled expectations for Cancún • Some Parties are calling for a partial outcome rather than the comprehensive outcome envisaged at Copenhagen • Further meetings are scheduled for: • 2-6 August in Bonn, Germany • [ ] October in China • African Group needs to balance ambition with realism (while maintaining public pressure for the fair and comprehensive outcomes required to keep Africa safe) • There is a realistic prospect of maintaining the two tracks of negotiations (i.e. KP and LCA) beyond Cancún, and securing a set of decisions under LCA • Outcomes under both tracks must be balanced and establish a favorable trajectory for negotiations in 2011

  17. Conclusion • Reiterate commitment to Bali Roadmap and continuation of Kyoto Protocol • State clearly support for a science-based and principled approach, not a “pledge-based” approach • Reinstate African science-based demands in each area of negotiations (AWG-KP and AWG-LCA) • For countries that have associated with the Copenhagen Accord, ensure it serves as a “floor” not a “ceiling” to ambition • Ensure democratic and transparent representation of African position at all levels, including high-level segment in Cancún