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Land Use Controls and Zoning

Land Use Controls and Zoning. Chapter 10. Why do cities control land use?. Cities and government limit the location choices of residents and firms Limit population growth to control: Pollution Congestion Crime Atmposphere. Goal of the Chapter. Cities use land controls and zoning to:

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Land Use Controls and Zoning

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  1. Land Use Controls and Zoning Chapter 10

  2. Why do cities control land use? • Cities and government limit the location choices of residents and firms • Limit population growth to control: • Pollution • Congestion • Crime • Atmposphere

  3. Goal of the Chapter • Cities use land controls and zoning to: • Limit location choices of households and firms • Limit population growth • In this chapter we address 3 questions: 1)Why do cities control land use? 2)What are the markets effects of land use controls? 3) What are the legal foundations of zoning and other land use controls?

  4. Controlling Population Growth • Cities can limit population growth within a boundary by either using an Urban Growth Boundary or an Urban Service Boundary $ $ SL Business Bid Rent Residential Bid Rent wo RA DL u No N

  5. Urban Service Boundary • Suppose that the City refuses to Extend Urban Services beyond X miles from city center SL’ $ $ SL w1 wo RA DL X u N1 No N

  6. As the wages rise, due to the negative shock of labor demand: a) the business bid rent function shifts to left b) the residential bid rent function shifts to the right Urban Service Boundary (Cont) $ RA X u

  7. Who Gains and who Losses? Why? • People that own land in CBD? • People that own land in the Residential District? • People who own land outside the boundary line? • Business Firms? • Households?

  8. Building Permits • Cities may control residential growth by issuing building permits: S’ $ $ S S P2 P0 P1 D D H0 H H1 H

  9. Why have the costs of building a house decreased? How should the City should allocate the permits: H1 Permits to be allocated Value: H1*(P2-P1) City must assign permits to the projects that promote their Development Strategy or by auction? Building Permits (Cont) S’ $ S P2 P1 D H1 H

  10. Land Use Zoning • A zoning plan designates a set of admissible land uses for each plot of lands in the city. • In theory zoning will promote health, welfare and safety by separating land of incompatible uses. • Three types of zoning: • Nuisance Zoning • Fiscal Zoning • Design Zoning

  11. Nuisance Zoning: Separate incompatible land uses • Industrial Nuisance Zoning: Industries generate negative externalities, such as noise and air pollution. • Traditional Industrial Zoning: Exclusion from zone, reduces amount of pollution(?) • Performance Industrial Zoning: Set limits to quantity of pollutants, efficient(?) • Effluent taxes: Economically efficient Marginal External Cost=Effluent Fee • Spatial Effluent Fee→ Different taxes in different locations

  12. What is more efficient? • The Effluence Fee or Zoning?

  13. Retail and Residential Nuisance Zoning • Retail Zoning: Retail areas generate negative externalities such as traffic, noise, parking problems. • Traditional Retail Zoning: Zoning map that classifies an area as retail zone. • Performance Retail Zoning: Set upper limits for the amount of noise, odor, traffic, etc. • Residential Zoning: Residential externalities generated mostly by high-density housing. • Conventional Zoning: Exclude the project • Performance Zoning: Actual effects on the neighborhood.

  14. Fiscal Zoning (Exclusionary Zoning) • A city excludes households that impose fiscal burdens on the local government • High Density Housing: • Who wins and who looses from High Density zoning? • Owners of apartment land? • Owners of single family housing land? • Apartments owners? • Single family owners? • Households living in the fringe areas of the city • New commercial and industrial development

  15. The Tiebout Hypothesis • The Tiebout hypothesis, which states that individuals will costlessly sort themselves across local communities according to their public good preferences, is the workhorse of the local public finance literature. • Inclusionary Zoning: local developers have to build dwellings for low income households, mostly in the form of high density housings.

  16. Design Zoning • Planner designs a city arranging activities to promote the efficient use of the city’s infrastructure • Direct development • Transferable Development Rights • Define a “Preservation Zone” and a “Development Zone” • Give some TDR to the owner of the “Preservation Zone” land, and in turn these can be sold to people in the development zone for further development.

  17. Open Space Zoning • Should a city zone a parcel as open space and thus denying the landowner the use of her land? • Should the city purchase the land for open space?

  18. Evenson and Wheaton (2003) • Why is this paper important? • Understand how do we organize spatially • Understand the role of government in reducing negative externalities due to imperfect assignment of property rights • Objective of the paper: • Present their dataset • establish a series of stylized facts about how do cities zone

  19. Evenson and Wheaton (2003) (Cont) • 4 stylized facts: • Existing density and developments are crucial determinants of zoned density and allowed development (market work) • Future commercial development is permitted in high-density/lower-income cities and towns • Wealthier town more likely to set protected land aside (income is related to the extent that town allow development at all) • No significant effect of town income on the density of future development (do not supports Tiebout Hypothesis)

  20. Glasear, Gyourko and Saks (2003) • Goal: Analyze the effects of zoning on prices in NYC • Identification Strategy: Households buying apartments in NYC pay a Regulatory Tax that equals the difference between MC and MR (remember in perfect competition MR=MC)

  21. Glasear, Gyourko and Saks (2003) • Main assumptions: • Marginal cost is constant and accurately calculated • Market is assumed to be in equilibrium (no demand effects)

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