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Chapter Thirty-Five

Chapter Thirty-Five. Public Goods. Public Goods -- Definition. A good is purely public if it is both nonexcludable and nonrival in consumption. Nonexcludable -- all consumers can consume the good. Nonrival -- each consumer can consume all of the good. Public Goods -- Examples.

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Chapter Thirty-Five

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  1. Chapter Thirty-Five Public Goods

  2. Public Goods -- Definition • A good is purely public if it is both nonexcludable and nonrival in consumption. • Nonexcludable -- all consumers can consume the good. • Nonrival -- each consumer can consume all of the good.

  3. Public Goods -- Examples • Broadcast radio and TV programs. • National defense. • Public highways. • Reductions in air pollution. • National parks.

  4. Reservation Prices • A consumer’s reservation price for a unit of a good is his maximum willingness-to-pay for it. • Consumer’s wealth is • Utility of not having the good is

  5. Reservation Prices • A consumer’s reservation price for a unit of a good is his maximum willingness-to-pay for it. • Consumer’s wealth is • Utility of not having the good is • Utility of paying p for the good is

  6. Reservation Prices • A consumer’s reservation price for a unit of a good is his maximum willingness-to-pay for it. • Consumer’s wealth is • Utility of not having the good is • Utility of paying p for the good is • Reservation price r is defined by

  7. Reservation Prices; An Example Consumer’s utility is Utility of not buying a unit of good 2 is Utility of buying one unit of good 2 atprice p is

  8. Reservation Prices; An Example Reservation price r is defined by I.e. by

  9. When Should a Public Good Be Provided? • One unit of the good costs c. • Two consumers, A and B. • Individual payments for providing the public good are gA and gB. • gA + gB c if the good is to be provided.

  10. When Should a Public Good Be Provided? • Payments must be individually rational; i.e.and

  11. When Should a Public Good Be Provided? • Payments must be individually rational; i.e.and • Therefore, necessarily and

  12. When Should a Public Good Be Provided? • And ifandthen it is Pareto-improving to supply the unit of good

  13. When Should a Public Good Be Provided? • And ifandthen it is Pareto-improving to supply the unit of good, so is sufficient for it to be efficient to supply the good.

  14. Private Provision of a Public Good? • Suppose and . • Then A would supply the good even if B made no contribution. • B then enjoys the good for free; free-riding.

  15. Private Provision of a Public Good? • Suppose and . • Then neither A nor B will supply the good alone.

  16. Private Provision of a Public Good? • Suppose and . • Then neither A nor B will supply the good alone. • Yet, if also, then it is Pareto-improving for the good to be supplied.

  17. Private Provision of a Public Good? • Suppose and . • Then neither A nor B will supply the good alone. • Yet, if also, then it is Pareto-improving for the good to be supplied. • A and B may try to free-ride on each other, causing no good to be supplied.

  18. Free-Riding • Suppose A and B each have just two actions -- individually supply a public good, or not. • Cost of supply c = $100. • Payoff to A from the good = $80. • Payoff to B from the good = $65.

  19. Free-Riding • Suppose A and B each have just two actions -- individually supply a public good, or not. • Cost of supply c = $100. • Payoff to A from the good = $80. • Payoff to B from the good = $65. • $80 + $65 > $100, so supplying the good is Pareto-improving.

  20. Free-Riding Player B Don’tBuy Buy Buy Player A Don’tBuy

  21. Free-Riding Player B Don’tBuy Buy Buy Player A Don’tBuy (Don’t’ Buy, Don’t Buy) is the unique NE.

  22. Free-Riding Player B Don’tBuy Buy Buy Player A Don’tBuy But (Don’t’ Buy, Don’t Buy) is inefficient.

  23. Free-Riding • Now allow A and B to make contributions to supplying the good. • E.g. A contributes $60 and B contributes $40. • Payoff to A from the good = $40 > $0. • Payoff to B from the good = $25 > $0.

  24. Free-Riding Player B Don’tContribute Contribute Contribute Player A Don’tContribute

  25. Free-Riding Player B Don’tContribute Contribute Contribute Player A Don’tContribute Two NE: (Contribute, Contribute) and (Don’t Contribute, Don’t Contribute).

  26. Free-Riding • So allowing contributions makes possible supply of a public good when no individual will supply the good alone. • But what contribution scheme is best? • And free-riding can persist even with contributions.

  27. Variable Public Good Quantities • E.g. how many broadcast TV programs, or how much land to include into a national park.

  28. Variable Public Good Quantities • E.g. how many broadcast TV programs, or how much land to include into a national park. • c(G) is the production cost of G units of public good. • Two individuals, A and B. • Private consumptions are xA, xB.

  29. Variable Public Good Quantities • Budget allocations must satisfy

  30. Variable Public Good Quantities • Budget allocations must satisfy • MRSA & MRSB are A & B’s marg. rates of substitution between the private and public goods. • Pareto efficiency condition for public good supply is

  31. Variable Public Good Quantities • Pareto efficiency condition for public good supply is • Why?

  32. Variable Public Good Quantities • Pareto efficiency condition for public good supply is • Why? • The public good is nonrival in consumption, so 1 extra unit of public good is fully consumed by both A and B.

  33. Variable Public Good Quantities • Suppose • MRSA is A’s utility-preserving compensation in private good units for a one-unit reduction in public good. • Similarly for B.

  34. Variable Public Good Quantities • is the total payment to A & B of private good that preserves both utilities if G is lowered by 1 unit.

  35. Variable Public Good Quantities • is the total payment to A & B of private good that preserves both utilities if G is lowered by 1 unit. • Since , making 1 less public good unit releases more private good than the compensation payment requires  Pareto-improvement from reduced G.

  36. Variable Public Good Quantities • Now suppose

  37. Variable Public Good Quantities • Now suppose • is the total payment by A & B of private good that preserves both utilities if G is raised by 1 unit.

  38. Variable Public Good Quantities • Now suppose • is the total payment by A & B of private good that preserves both utilities if G is raised by 1 unit. • This payment provides more than 1 more public good unit  Pareto-improvement from increased G.

  39. Variable Public Good Quantities • Hence, necessarily, efficient public good production requires

  40. Variable Public Good Quantities • Hence, necessarily, efficient public good production requires • Suppose there are n consumers; i = 1,…,n. Then efficient public good production requires

  41. Efficient Public Good Supply -- the Quasilinear Preferences Case • Two consumers, A and B.

  42. Efficient Public Good Supply -- the Quasilinear Preferences Case • Two consumers, A and B. • Utility-maximization requires

  43. Efficient Public Good Supply -- the Quasilinear Preferences Case • Two consumers, A and B. • Utility-maximization requires • is i’s public good demand/marg. utility curve; i = A,B.

  44. Efficient Public Good Supply -- the Quasilinear Preferences Case pG MUB MUA G

  45. Efficient Public Good Supply -- the Quasilinear Preferences Case pG MUA+MUB MUB MUA G

  46. Efficient Public Good Supply -- the Quasilinear Preferences Case pG MUA+MUB MC(G) MUB MUA G

  47. Efficient Public Good Supply -- the Quasilinear Preferences Case pG MUA+MUB MC(G) MUB MUA G* G

  48. Efficient Public Good Supply -- the Quasilinear Preferences Case pG MUA+MUB MC(G) MUB pG* MUA G* G

  49. Efficient Public Good Supply -- the Quasilinear Preferences Case pG MUA+MUB MC(G) MUB pG* MUA G* G

  50. Efficient Public Good Supply -- the Quasilinear Preferences Case pG MUA+MUB MC(G) MUB pG* MUA G* G Efficient public good supply requires A & B to state truthfully their marginal valuations.

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