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Ask Steve

2. 8/18/2012. Purpose. This presentation capture responses made to questions asked by market participants during the CRR market trials, and will be of interest to a wider audience.It aims to provides further education to Market Participants on market rules, bid submissions, CRR reports, auction re

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Ask Steve

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    1. Ask Steve ERCOT CRR Team

    2. 2 8/20/2012 Purpose This presentation capture responses made to questions asked by market participants during the CRR market trials, and will be of interest to a wider audience. It aims to provides further education to Market Participants on market rules, bid submissions, CRR reports, auction results, etc. Note: both questions and responses are paraphrased when needed.

    3. 3 8/20/2012 Do the auctions have a minimum clearing price? No, not really. For options the minimum clearing price is 0.01. For obligations however, if they provide counter-flow the clearing price can be negative. Why was [source-sink] path not awarded to any Market Participants? I havent analyzed the binding constraints fully yet, but I suspect that it heavily loads a binding constraint that was also loaded by other, higher, bids; hence the higher priced bids were awarded rather than yours. Was I am the only bidder for that [source-sink] path? However, no MW has awarded to the only bidder? While you are the only bidder for that path you arent the only bidder for that network capacity. Let me give you an example on a simple network with no contingencies to illustrate. CRR AH Alpha bids for 150 MW of A to B Obligation at $200/MWhr and, CRR AH Beta bids for 20MW of C to D Obligation at $5/MWhr, The system cannot award both bids, as it would overload line EF (rated at 100MW). It will award as much as it can in order to maximize the objective function. In this case that would lead to: CRR AH Alpha gets awarded 100MW A to B at $200 clearing price. CRR AH Beta gets awarded 0MW C to D (the clearing price for C to D is also $200), even though he is the only bidder for that path. The binding constraint is line EF. If it is no MW awarded, why does it has the clearing price? In most cases that is the price you would have needed to bid to get some awarded MW.

    4. 4 8/20/2012 For my awarded CRR 61228, I bid $1000 on 500mw, but I was only awarded 286.6mw, at a clearing price of $5.90. If I wasn't award my full amount, shouldn't the clearing price be at least $1000? I believe you were constrained by the credit budget. While you are correct that if the binding constraint is a transmission element of some sort partially awarded bids clearing prices would equal their bid prices, that is not the case with binding budget constraints. We do not include budget constraints in the list of binding constraints available to market participants. It is our feeling that this is fairly confidential information that you would not want published. Two methods to see if you had a budget constraint come to mind. You could 1) Multiply all the awarded bids by bid price by time of use hours, add together and see if it equals your auction budget. 2) See if any partially awarded bids have clearing prices that dont equal their bid prices. Two other bids had a clearing price of $0, and respective bids prices of $2.50 and $100, and neither cleared. Why? I suspect that this was also due to the budget constraint. When there is a budget constraint as suspected above, is there a hierarchy for clearing the bids? Meaning, if my first bid utilizes my entire budget, are the rest of my bids ignored? Or does the system clear the greatest number of bids, and ignores the one with the highest financial impact? Or is it something entirely different? The system handles budget constraints in a similar manner as it handles other constraints. It looks at all bids (yours and others) and chooses (in ideal operations) the set of bids/offers that maximizes its objective function while respecting constraints (budget and network). As such the bid order doesnt matter (your first bid question) nor does the number of bids.

    5. 5 8/20/2012 I submitted a bid portfolio for the auction but it doesn't appear that we have been awarded anything in the auction. I am wondering why? It does not appear that you apportioned any credit to that particular CRR market. As such, your budget constrained all of your bids and you weren't awarded anything. I wasnt able to because The Counterparty Credit field is $0 and not editable, which restricts the Self-Imposed Credit to blank or $0. I think that may be the issue? Partly. The reason why it is not editable is because there is a limited, pre-defined window of opportunity to submit CRR Market Credit Limits. After which, if the Counter-Party did not assign any credit to a particular auction, will be zero-ed out. Consequent to that, the Self-Imposed Credit Limit will also be zero-ed out.

    6. 6 8/20/2012 What does the participation factor of 1 mean? This is excerpted from the common source/sinks file. Participation factor describes how flow gets split out to the different buses in a load zone or hub (or resource node). For example, let's say there is a load zone called LZ_EX which has three buses with the following names and participation factors: A1.5 B1.5 C3.0 Furthermore, suppose that there is a 12 MW CRR fromgen-1 to LZ_EX. The networkflow would be modeled as follows: 3MW from gen-1 to bus A (12 * (1.5/(1.5+1.5+3)) 3MW from gen-1 to bus B (12 * (1.5/(1.5+1.5+3)) 6MW from gen-1 to bus C (12 * (3.0/(1.5+1.5+3)) In the case of a resource node settlement point the participation factor of 1 means that all the power is being sent to the one bus in the list.

    7. 7 8/20/2012 Should the (source-sink) equal the clearing price? I found that it does only in some circumstances. For example: I used the source-sink file to find the difference between [source a] and [source b] as source-sink = -14.47 - - 14.37 = -0.10 While looking at the auction results; I see that the clearing price for [source a] is -0.51. Should these be equal? In the example you mentioned, the bid was a 24 hour bid. As such, the clearing price will not be equal to source-sink in a particular time of use due to the bid being optimized across the three times of use. I suspect that the other exception that you found were also 24-hr bids.

    8. 8 8/20/2012 Is ERCOT would be limiting the option paths available to bids, similar to other RTOs, (like PJM)? If so would they be publishing a list of Option Paths that are valid that market participants could bid on? Is there any reason why some of the option paths would be limited? Some of them could be limited due to SFT. Whereas an Option has to have clearing prices that is > than obligation clearing price and it should be revenue positive. As option cannot be negative. ERCOT is currently not limiting option paths (other than the inherent limiting via SFT; the set of awarded bids must be feasible on the network model/contingency set). If ERCOT does decide to limit option paths it will notify the market ahead of time per the ERCOT protocols section 7.5.2 (2) No later than six months prior to the Texas Nodal Market Implementation Date, ERCOT shall report to TAC about whether a limit on bid volume or a nominal transaction charge for each bid submitted would benefit the auction process. Recommendations from TAC must be approved by the ERCOT Board and may be implemented without further revision to these Protocols. Could you please explain (the set of awarded bids must be feasible on the network model/contingency set ). Meaning, it could not be awarded just because the bid price didnt meet the required price and could an option bid price be negative? The set of awarded bids must be feasible on the network model/contingency set was referring to the network constraint in the optimization. That is to say that when the awarded bids and offers are modeled in the system as the appropriate injection and withdrawal of MW at sources and sinks the power flows must be within safety limits both for the base case and for each contingency. The calculation engine optimizes the objective function subject to the network constraints and budget constraints.

    9. 9 8/20/2012 Questions related to the CRR network model: How are the nominations incorporated in the network model (rawd file), for example AE is allocated PCRR from STP to AE load zone, is that allocation reflected in the auction network model? If it is, how? Will the monthly network model for nominations reflect capacity that has been auctioned in the annual/previous auctions? how is the calculation performed? No awarded CRRs (preallocated or otherwise) are reflected in the rawd file. The information in the rawd file that is used is the network topology, not the generation. To see how the system is loaded from previously awarded CRRs you need to download the base loading file (Downloads->Common ->Market tab->Choose market->Base Loading). That is the procedure you would go through to find base loading for any auction or allocation. You should be able to do the same thing to look at monthly allocations.

    10. 10 8/20/2012 How many significant digits are accepted when entering Nomination MW capacity? It should be 1 digit to the right of the decimal point. Where is the settlement point for McCamey area wind units? To find settlement point locations, go to the download section of the application, download the source/sink points list, download the network model, and cross reference the two files. What do the Flowgate 1, 2, 3, and 4 represent? Finding out what flowgates are is a similar exercise as finding out what settlement points are; download the flowgates file, download the network model, and cross reference.

    11. 11 8/20/2012 It is understood that in the annual auction we have 36 separate auctions (3 day types per month times 12) meaning, for each day type we would provide a budget constraint, hence 36 budget constraints? If the answer to the above is yes, then what is the distinguishing feature between the annual auction and monthly? (e.g. isnt it possible to have the monthly component in the annual auction contain a single budget constraint for the three day types just as done for the monthly?). If we think as the annual comprised as a sequence of 12 monthlys then within the monthlys we should be able to co-optimize? It does get confusing, doesnt it. Maybe a chart can clear it up: Annual allocation: (no coupling/no budget constraint) First time run will allocate 2 years: 72 separate optimizations (24 months x 3 Times-of-use) Subsequent times run will allocate 1 year of PCRRs: 36 separate optimizations (12 months x 3 Times-of-use) Annual auction: (coupling within times-of-use, within year/ 6 budget constraints) 6 optimizations (2 years x 3 times-of-use) Monthly auction: (coupled across times-of-use/single budget constraint) 1 optimization

    12. 12 8/20/2012 In the auction portfolio editor, in the time of use box; in addition to peak week day, off-peak, and peak weekend, there is an additional entry: 24 hours. My understanding is there would be only three time periods not four in any auction: How is the 24 hours being used? Is there another auction related to the 24 hours period? The 24 hour bid works as linked PeakWD, Peak WE, and Off-peak bids in the monthly auction (ONLY). That is, if a 24 hour bid is awarded in an auction, three CRRs will be issued; one for Peak WD, one for Peak WE and one for Off-peak. Each of the three CRRs will be for the same MW amount and have the same clearing price, however.

    13. 13 8/20/2012 1.Which type of auction below is going to be used in the CRR auction. i) Dutch auction ii) Minimum bid action iii) Reserve auction In a Dutch auction, or absolute action, the CRRs are sold to highest bidders. In a minimum bid auction, the sale price is at or above a published price. In a reserve auction, the sale is not guaranteed. That is, the seller reserves the right to accept or reject the highest bid within a specified time frame. Sadly, it is beyond my capability to answer this simply without losing important concepts, for that reason I would like to refer you to the detailed design document for the CRR calculation engine, which Im sure youll find interesting and illuminating. This is a confidential document. To access this document, follow the steps outlined in http://nodal.ercot.com/docs/nda/

    14. 14 8/20/2012 How are the flow gates assigned to a generator in the Mc Camey Area? Is it based on the total output of all of the generators (e.g. entire plant); or contracted amounts based on a purchase power agreement (PPA) (e.g. pro rated basis)? Total output of plant. There does not appear that the flowgates have a source. Is this correct. That is correct. Flowgates have neither a source nor a sink. It is also my understanding that the flowgate can be resold by the CRR AHs that get the flowgate allocation. Is this correct? Yes Finally, can a QSE that has a PPA and is a QSE for the PPA, apply for the flowgate allocation. Our guidance from TPTF (and the protocols) is to ask the WGR for guidance on whom to assign the MCFRIs.

    15. 15 8/20/2012 Is the 'Auction Bids and Offers' all bids and offers that were submitted regardless of they were cleared or not? Yes

    16. 16 8/20/2012 Im not able to accept a bilateral trade posting that I see help? Youre only able to accept the bilateral trade posting if it is private (i.e. targeted to you). If you wish to accept a public posting, you need to initiate/target a private bilateral trade to the CRR AH who posted the public posting.

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