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School Choice and Information: An Experimental Study on Matching Mechanisms

School Choice and Information: An Experimental Study on Matching Mechanisms. Joana Pais (ISEG) and Ágnes Pintér (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid). Main objectives. Analyze the performance of three well-known matching mechanisms regarding strategy-proofness , efficiency , and stability ;

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School Choice and Information: An Experimental Study on Matching Mechanisms

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  1. School Choice and Information: An Experimental Study on Matching Mechanisms Joana Pais (ISEG) and Ágnes Pintér (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)

  2. Main objectives • Analyze the performance of three well-known matching mechanisms regarding strategy-proofness,efficiency, and stability; • Examine the role of information in the decision making in these situations: • Does the amount of information participants hold affect the performance of the mechanisms? How?

  3. Motivation • Matching: pervasive phenomenon arising both in social and economic situations • Examples: • Assignment of civil servants to positions • Students’ admission to schools • Some entry-level labor markets • Assignment of donated organs to patients • Rarely exists complete information

  4. Two-sided matching markets • Agents belong to one of two disjoint sets (e.g. teachers and schools); • Each agent has preferences over the other side of the market and the prospect of being unmatched; • Matching problem: to assign teachers to schools. • Highly valued properties of matching mechanisms: • Stability: no pair of agents who are not matched together would rather prefer to be so matched. • Strategy-proofness: truth is dominant strategy • Pareto efficiency

  5. The mechanisms and properties

  6. Experimental design • School choice model: • 5 teachers to fill 5 vacancies across 3 schools • Teachers: strict preferences over schools; Schools: strict preferences (exogenous) over teachers and fixed capacity • 3x3 design: for each mechanism three different info setting (zero-, partial- or full-information); • Symmetric payoffs (3, 9 or 15 euro), but not necessarily symmetric induced preferences – average payoffs were around 13 euro. • Schools are NOT strategic agents!

  7. Strategy-proofness, efficiency, and stability

  8. Results • Across mechanims: • Truthtelling: B0 = GS0 < TTC0; B1<GS1=TTC1; B2<GS2<TTC2 • Efficiency: B0=GS0=TTC0; B=GS<TTC • Stability: GS0>TTC0, GS0=B0, B0=TTC0; GS1>TTC1=B1; B2=GS2=TTC2 • Across informational scenarios: • Truthtelling: B0>B1=B2; GS0>GS1=GS2; TTC0>TTC1, TTC0=TTC2, TTC1=TTC2 • Efficiency: B0>B2=B1; GS0>GS1, GS0=GS2, GS1=GS2; TTC0=TTC1=TTC2 • Stability: Info0=Info1=Info2

  9. Summarizing Therefore, we conclude that • information plays an important role in decision making, and • the use of the TTC mechanism in practice would be more desirable than of the others.

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