A Theory of Violence in Contemporary Civil Wars

1. A Theory of Violence in Contemporary Civil Wars Will Reno Northwestern University www.willreno.org, reno@northwestern.edu Thanks to Norges forskningsråd, 250173, “Political Economy of Jihad”

2. Armed groups & society: • Variation in armed group—community relationships • What are the impacts of these relationships for how armed groups utilize violence and in how they pursue governance among non-combatants? Prop 1: Armed groups use coercion and information to establish control over people and territory, leading to a threshold of collaboration over time (Kalyvas). I.e., Abu Musab al Zarqawi & the Omar Brigade – Iraqi practitioners of territorial control (targeted assassinations, etc). This is how those armed groups managed their local environment.

3. Prop 2: Prewar community institutions shape variations in rebel governance (Arjona) Weak local institutions -> culus regio, eius religio; that is to say, people obey the strongest force Strong local institutions -> Institutions, even informal ones, empower people to manage armed groups when they roll into town. Prop 2.1: Pre-existing networks (political parties, religious associations, student & veteran groups, etc.) shape organization and methods of armed groups as they form (Staniland). Networks, even if re-purposed for war, shape the options for armed groups as they navigate the non-combatants’ environment.

4. A Puzzle: Why would armed groups that face weak state institutions and can easily dominate local communities often fail to utilize these advantages to consolidate their dominance? Or why do someTerrorist Groups™ have a hard time setting up in Ungoverned Spaces™ (and others do not)

5. No holiday from history: State & societal contexts matter Early 19c European nation-states  guerrilla rebels Industrializing states  urban insurgency State-builders on global periphery  Maoist “liberated zones” Patronage on the global periphery  Armed conflict in collapsed states What explains this dominant mode of rebellion? Why don’t disciplined forces just use violence selectively, if people’s allegiances are reflections of their responses to acts of violence?

6. The distinctive social environment of state collapse (Look carefully: Not all states are alike)

7. Pre-conflict states, reciprocal infiltration & political violence Patronage state networks infiltrate other social networks as an alternative way to exercise authority Patronage politics supplemented with violence: “creative tension” to undermine collective action Reverse infiltration of networks of violence into the state regime; workable if the original hierarchy is maintained Disruption, often externally induced, fragments the state patronage and other social networks, leading to civil war

8. The Desert of the Real

9. Two Kinds of Armed Groups Town Rebels: Vice President Riek Machar, political insider, at his “rebel” HQ, April 2014 Bush Rebels: I don’t know who he is, but he is appears to be outside establishment networks * R.M. reads: Ashraf Ghani, Fixing Failed States, Acemoglu & Robinson, Why Nations Fail, Kevin Mauer, No Easy Day * Sheikh Munajjid ruled that creating a snowman is a sin

10. Degrees of Armed Group Control Measured in terms of (1) capacity to manage relations with non-combatants; (2) capacity to manage recruitment and discipline within an armed group; (3) capacity to use patterns of violence with predictable results. Low control: Symmetrical irregular warfare (clan-based militias in South Sudan slide) High control: Sustain “liberated zones” (Al-Shabaab, ISIS, etc.

11. A model of armed group control in collapsed states Strongman Dominator: Mastering local solidarities to master information flows Entrepreneurs: Seize dominant networks to selectively master information flows Mobilizers: Leaders master information to transform local solidarities

12. The Stark Fist of Reality

13. Ground check concepts For more on these coordinates: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34691602

14. Data & Measurement • Counting conflicts: If the character of warfare changes, what counts as conflict? Are networked bush rebels simply criminals? • Collecting Data: Where to find relevant data? • Conceptualization: Are state-centric data collection / approaches increasingly unhelpful? A “non-state realm” and its interactions may provide more useful insights for understanding contemporary patterns of conflict.

15. Collecting Data Building community histories, I • Secret documents that are not secret (reverse engineer via FOI requests). • Archival resources (UNOCHA, etc.) Building community histories, II • Construct ‘neighborhood biographies’; adapted focus group (with a nod to Ana Arjona) • Interviews

16. Data Collection in Somalia

17. Data Collection in Iraq

18. Data Collection in Mali

19. Questions? The Stark Fist of Reality