The Nathanael Greene Liberty Fellowship Montgomery NJ Summer Institute

1. The Cold War in the Middle East:Part 2 – Case StudiesEric Davisdavis@polisci.rutgers.eduhttp://fas-polisci.rutgers.edublog: The New Middle East The Nathanael Greene Liberty Fellowship Montgomery NJ Summer Institute American Institute for History Education June 26, 2010

2. How can studying the relations between US and individual states in Middle East help us better understand the Cold War in the region? What positive policies did the US follow and which policies had negative consequences? How can a case study approach deepen our understanding of US foreign policy in the region? In what ways do these case studies suggest ways to improve effectiveness of US foreign policy in the Middle East and elsewhere? What are this module's learning objectives?

3. Case study allows an in-depth analysis of US foreign policy in specific space and time This approach allows examining a variety of factors shaping US policy in different areas of Middle East 3 cases have been and continue to be key to US foreign policy in Middle East from 1950s to present American foreign policy in Egypt, Iraq, and Iran has had largely negative consequences for the US How can US avoid repeating mistakes in these and other countries of the Middle East today? Why choose a case study approach?

4. One of most populous states in Middle East Occupies strategic position along Suez Canal Considered the most powerful Arab state Has highly developed human resources in terms of educated middle classes Its extensive press, professional associations, economic enterprise and TV and film industry affect all countries of Middle East Why is Egypt important to US interests in Middle East?

5. Despite an elected parliament, and strong judiciary, Egypt’s government was very corrupt and repressive by 1950s Egypt’s army was angered by lack of preparation and its ineffective arms when it fought in Palestine in1948 US pressure on Egypt to join Middle East Treaty Organization (METO) created great resentment US came to be viewed as successor to Great Britain as region’s main (neo) colonial power Why did Egypt fail to ally with US in 1950s?

6. July 22, 1952 Revolution (really army coup d’état) was led by Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser Nasser (Jamal ‘Abd al-Nasir) wanted to rid Egypt of its corrupt government and British colonial presence, especially Britain’s control of Suez Canal Nasser and Free Officers not hostile to US when they first came to power in 1952 Egypt angered US when it refused to join METO (later called CENTO/Baghdad Pact) Relations began to cool as Egypt enacted land reform and appeared to be moving to the left Egyptian Revolution of 1952

7. Free Officers who led 1952 Revolution

8. Anwar al-Sadat, 1918-1981 Gamal Abdel Nasser 1918-1970 Assassination of Sadat October 6, 1981

9. US became very hostile when Egypt purchased modern weapons from Czechoslovakia in 1955 This was the USSR’s first foothold in the Middle East arms market and broke West’s arms monopoly Egypt increasing seen as Soviet client state 1955 Non-aligned Movement established in Bandung, Indonesia, with Nasser in leadership role With People’s Republic of China and Yugoslavia as members, movement viewed as pro-communist The Czech Arms Deal of 1955 and Non-aligned Movement

10. US actions in UN after 1956 Tripartite Invasion temporarily improved relations with Egypt United Arab Republic (1958-61) that united Egypt and Syria seen as threatening to Israel Eisenhower’s Sec. of State John Foster Dulles obsessed with spread of communism in Middle East helped promote strong US-Israel ties By end 1960s, Middle East increasingly polarized between pro-US and pro-USSR states US Policy after Eisenhower administration

11. President Kennedy improved relations with Egypt through Public Law 480 program PL 480 gave Egypt surplus US farm products with Egyptian repayments set far in the future US-Egypt relations began to deteriorate again after Kennedy assassination 1963 Lyndon Johnson seen as much more pro-Israel Egypt broke diplomatic relations with US after June 1967 War Egypt and the Kennedy administration

12. Death of Nasser in Sept. 1970 brought Vice-President Anwar al-Sadat to power Sadat decided way to force Israel to withdraw from Egypt through closer ties with US Jettisoned Egypt-USSR alliance in 1972 and attacked Israel with Syria in October 1973 War led to Camp David Accords of 1978 Not US policy, but Sadat’s decision for closer relations, that created the present US-Egypt alliance US -Egypt Relations after 1970

13. Sadat isolated in Arab world as result of peace treaty with Israel and was assassinated in October 1981 While Egypt removed itself from military conflict with Israel after 1973, it became a weaker regional power in Middle East as a result Palestinian problem intensified without Egypt’s support of a possible solution Kennedy administration most successful because it demonstrated respect for Egypt and used aid as a tool Egypt today is very autocratic and repressive and US is identified by Egyptians and Arabs as providing main source of regime’s support Lessonsfrom US-Egypt relations

14. Iran was a neighbor of USSR and has had strong communist (Tudeh) party, esp. among oil workers Soviet supported creating pro-Soviet republics from minorities 1945-46, e.g., Kurds and Azerbaijanis US disturbed when Mohammed Mossadegh (1882-1967) came to power in 1951 Mossadegh was from an aristocratic background was a and reformer, with best interests of Iran at heart US and Britain angered when Iranian parliament nationalized Anglo-Iranian Oil Company March 1951 The Cold War and the US in Iran

15. Iran ruled by Reza Shah Pahlavi, army officer who seized power in 1923 Reza Shah (d. 1944) tried to modernize Iran but deposed by Britain in 1941 as too pro-Axis Young son, Mohammed Reza Shah, took power 1941 but removed by nationalist forces 1951 Mossadegh elected on nationalist credentials and promises to use oil wealth to benefit people Background to US interests in Iran

16. Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) formed by British in 1908 with a concession from the Persian (Iranian) government Company had 60 year lease and paid royalties to Iranians and low wages to Iranian workers As nationalism grew, so did demands for higher royalties and Iranian control over company As with Iraq Petroleum Company, AIOC (BP after 1954) did not recognize or meet nationalist demands Iran and Western oil interests

17. Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi 1919-1980 Shah and President Nixon Dr. Mohammed Mossadegh 1882-1967

18. Operation Ajax name of 1953 CIA coup against Iranian government with British help CIA agent Kermit Roosevelt bribed army officers, Shiite clerics, mobs, newspapers, to help stage coup Mossadegh ousted in 1953 and jailed Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi was reinstated as ruler Shah’s regime after 1953 extremely repressive, with US and Israel training hated SAVAK secret police Iranians welcomed Shah’s overthrow in Islamic Revolution of 1978-79 1953 US coup against Mossadegh

19. US supplied Shah with most modern weapons Nixon administration developed Nixon Doctrine in response to troop losses in Vietnam Doctrine sought to find regional powers to protect US interests so US troops would not be needed Shah designated US agent in Persian Gulf Shah isolated from Iranian people and thought SAVAK and US support would sustain his rule US-Iranian relations under the Shah

20. One of greatest setbacks to US in Middle East Iranians more anti-Shah than pro-Khomeini, who eliminated all democratic political forces Iranians held US Embassy personnel hostage for 444 days from Nov. 1979 to Jan. 1981 New radical Islamic regime greater threat to US oil and strategic interests than USSR Regime today attempting to develop nuclear weapons and threatens to attack our ally Israel Islamic Revolution of 1978-79

21. Iran underscores again the need for US to support democracy in the Middle East for both moral and practical reasons US support for the Shah brought to power in 1979 the most threatening regime to US interests anywhere Iran also shows fallacy of foreign policy that avoids focusing on social reforms so as to win “hearts and minds” Iran demonstrates that military power far less effective than a reform based foreign policy Lessons learned from Iran

22. Unlike Egypt, Iraq cooperated with US on military treaty, joining Baghdad Pact in 1955 US deeply shaken by July 14, 1958 Revolt that overthrew pro-US Hashimite monarchy 1959 Iraq withdrew from the Baghdad Pact New leader, Gen. cAbd al-Karim Qasim, was a reformer who pushed land reform, expansion of education and nationalization of oil industry Historical basis of US-Iraqi relations

23. Qasim’s initial close ties in 1958-59 with Iraqi Communist Party created great anxiety in US Qasim was a reformer, not a communist, and against sectarianism and corruption Qasim was highly popular among Iraqis CIA chief Allen Dulles called Iraq “the most dangerous [situation] in the world today” (1959) CIA helped Bacth Party overthrow him 1963 US-Iraqi relations under Qasim

24. Statue of cAbd al-Karim Qasim being washed in Baghdad 2007 Abd al-Karim Qasim 1914-1963

25. US helped first Bacthist regime (Feb.-Nov, 1963) overthrow Qasim’s popular reformist regime Brought to power a group of brutal thugs that Iraqi army ousted 9 months later in November 1963 US helped pave way for second Bacthist coup in July 1968 that brought Saddam Husayn to power Gen. Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr and Saddam Husayn used Iraqi defeat in June 1967 Arab-Israeli War to seize power Regime immediately began to terrorize the country US-Bacth Party Relations after 1968

26. Arab Socialist Bacth Party ruled Iraq from July 1968 to May 2003 It was a brutal regime that killed, tortured and imprisoned large percentage of population Est. 3 million Iraqis killed (15% population) Regime used Iraq’s oil wealth to develop military and country’s health care, education, and industry Like Nasser, Bacth Party promoted Pan-Arabism and very anti-US and anti-Israeli US-Iraqi relations 1968-1980

27. Iraq invaded Iran in September 1980 to overthrow Khomeini regime and become regional power Iraq feared Islamic Revolution in Iran might be exported to Iraq Saddam saw invasion as eliminating Khomeini regime and making Iraq main oil power in Persian Gulf Saddam miscalculated as Iraqi army did poorly in beginning of war Iraq used chemical weapons against Iran which first time WMD used by in warfare by a regional country US-Iraqi relations and Iran-Iraq War

28. Images from the Iran-Iraq War

29. Donald Rumsfeld Meets Saddam Husayn, Dec. 1983 Ayatallah Ruhallah Khomeini, 1902-1989 Saddam Husayn al-Takriti 1937-2006

30. US concerned that Iran might defeat Iraq and threaten Saudi Arabia and Persian Gulf oil Iraqis forces pushed back to Iraqi border by 1982 and suffered great loses 1983 Donald Rumsfeld visited Baghdad and US reestablished diplomatic relations 1984 Saudi Arabia and Kuwait gave Iraq huge loans and US secretly gave $5 billion in loans US provided intelligence assistance to Iraq Iranian radicalism and US-Iraqi relations

31. Folly of supporting dictatorial regimes in Middle East seen in Iraq’s seizure of Kuwait Saddam’s seizure of Kuwait led to 1991 Gulf War and great damage to Iraqi oil industry UN sanctions (1991-2003) destroyed Iraqi economy and education system Sanctions degraded Iraqi society and set stage for sectarian violence after US 2003 invasion Iraq’s seizure of Kuwait in 1990

32. The invasion and consequences of Iraq’s seizure of Kuwait, Aug. 1990 Damage to oil wells and Gulf environment

33. Supporting Saddam Husayn shows problems of US alliance structure and foreign policy in Middle East If US had not supported Shah’s repressive regime, there would have been no Islamic Revolution Fear of USSR and need to protect Middle East oil were the two curses that bedeviled US policy Saddam’s seizure of Kuwait in 1990 was in part due to ambiguous US signals 2003 war could have been averted had Bacthist regime been overthrown in 1991 Lessons learned from US-Iraqi relations

34. While US must maintain cutting edge military, regions’ problems can’t be solved through force US lacks man/women power and economic resources to sustain military bases and combat throughout world US must place more emphasis on multilateral, namely international efforts, to solve problems Social support for Middle Eastern countries, esp. jobs, is key to winning “hearts and minds” Educated and prosperous people do not engage in war Summary thoughts on Cold War and US policy in the Middle East