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Péter Marton Scholarship fellow Hungarian Institute of International Affairs pmarton@gmail

Missziós feladatok védelemgazdasági nézőpontból (a fókuszban Afganisztán) „Missziós feladat – többletköltség vagy beruházás a jövőbe?” Budapest, 2008. május 29-30.  Rendezők: Magyar Hadtudományi Társaság Zrínyi Miklós Nemzetvédelmi Egyetem Univerzita Obrany

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Péter Marton Scholarship fellow Hungarian Institute of International Affairs pmarton@gmail

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  1. Missziós feladatok védelemgazdasági nézőpontból (a fókuszban Afganisztán) • „Missziós feladat – többletköltség vagy beruházás a jövőbe?” • Budapest, 2008. május 29-30.  Rendezők: • Magyar Hadtudományi Társaság • Zrínyi Miklós Nemzetvédelmi Egyetem • Univerzita Obrany • Gesellschaft für Militärökonomie Péter MartonScholarship fellowHungarian Institute of International Affairspmarton@gmail.com „The challenge of coalition burden-sharing among members of a security community”

  2. On approaching the conceptual box I.

  3. On approaching the conceptual box II. Critical remarks incorporated: Delimitation of the defense economy vs. networked, multisectoral homeland security (blurring boundaries) Level of analysis issue: Costs/benefits analysis for the country or for the defence economy? Or for an entire security community? „Save Darfur” (or Eastern Chad etc.) – issue of returns supposedly irrelevant (a humanitarian/human security perspective) If the resources committed are insufficient – again, returns issue irrelevant: e.g. see investments in northern Afghanistan… Politics of scale shouldn’t be ignored: Visegrád-level cooperation or else – e.g. demining S-NGO Security costs and benefits and short-term/long-term approaches when translating to Forints/Euros… Impacts back on defence economy, too

  4. The aim of the presentation Title: The challenge of coalition burden-sharing among members of a security community Shedding light on what should work, why – and why it’s difficult – in the case of the Afghan mission. (Security goals; strategy disaggregation; a reflection on challenges.) Using International Relations and Security Studies discourse – their existing conceptual repertoire… + three case studies, to show: We’re not there - i.e.: no trans-Atlantic security community case-specifically, in the Afghan case…

  5. „Security community” Adler, Emmanuel – Barnett, Michael (1998): Security Communities, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (in Karl Deutsch’s footsteps) Amalgamated SC (political union) - Tightly coupled SC („common system of rule”) - [≈ European Union ] - Relatively tightly coupled SC („mutual aid,” „collective arrangements”) [≈ Transatlantic alliance ] - Loosely coupled SC („dependable expectations of peaceful change/no bellicose action”) - [≈ on a global scale ]

  6. Two alternatives Fukuyama, Francis (2004): State-building – Governance and World Order in the 21stCentury. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. Cooper, Robert (2002): The Post-Modern State. In: Leonard, Mark (ed.): Re-Ordering theWorld, London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 11-20. Fearon, James D. – Laitin, David D. (2004): Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States.International Security, Vol. 28.: No.4., 5-43. Mallaby, Sebastian (2002): The Reluctant Imperialist: Terrorism, Failed States, and the Casefor American Empire, Foreign Affairs, March-April, 2002, Vol. 81.: No. 2. Empire: core – gap; zone of peace – zone of instability; North – South etc. A core security community Interventionism on security grounds (Cooper, Fukuyama, Mallaby, Fearon and Laitin etc.) 2. „World society” – A first-order social level security community

  7. Security interdependence An abstract model (unlimited interdependence)Supposedly valid rationale for a global security community unit weakness a threat; negative spill-over effects; proximity irrelevant; unilateral defence a non-option Empirically more or less observable instead: security complexes (Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde)

  8. Approach adapted from Buzan et al. Buzan, Barry – Wæver, Ole – de Wilde, Jaap (1998): Security: A New Framework For Analysis. Boulder, Colorado and London: Lynne Rienner. A) Demarcation of security complexes geographically B) Sector-specific view of security complexes - disaggregation Adaptation: Geographically demarcated and issue-specifically disaggregated analysis Sectors ignored (non-applicable re: the threats considered Do issue-specific security communities emerge in the case of Afghanistan?

  9. Several more points re: issue-specific security complexes 1. Any meaningful difference between issue-specific security complexes and security communities? ► Incomplete cooperation dysfunctional? ► Cooperation = normality? (Equitable burden-sharing?) 2. Security vs. securitisation complexes (mixed epistemology) 3. Empirical data availability issue: problematic demarcation (e.g. refugees from traditional population movements; drugs trade: assessment of production, routes, consumption, harm…)

  10. Before the case studies Two critical points with regards to the Afghan „source” Partly non-synchronous spill-over effects (separability for analysis - seemingly). largest „refugee” movements: 1980s; terrorism externality: 1989-2001; drugs production upsurge after 2001 Spill-overs both ways (demand for drugs, precursors, arms, terrorism etc.) Refugees and the drugs trade by nature not suited to ground one’s Afghan policy on and thus not suited to inspire equitable burden-sharing themselves; terrorism taken care of to a degree, via internal AT – no agreement over CT, though

  11. Illustration: Opium production Gradual increase over 1990s, drop in 2000-2001 possibly overestimated by UNODC („foot in the door”)

  12. The refugee flow security complex As of Jan., 2007: Pakistan: 3.5 million Afghan refugees Iran: 900,000 Afghan refugees (registered and non-registered together) An often-heard point about securitisation, but it doesn’t really work in practice like that: Number of people from Afghanistan claiming refugee status in Hungary: 2001, first ten months: 3409 (exceptional) Overall number of people getting refugee status, Hungary, 2006: 99; 2007, first three quarters: 90 Oa. no. of people getting „supplementary protection,” Hungary, 2006: 99; 2007, first three quarters: 62

  13. Refugee flow security complex A potential security community: the security complex minus the failed source state Security complex reordered post-2001; Western in-takers starting repatriations (e.g. Australia) – Direct and indirect in-takers Partly reversed flow now from Pakistan (10,000 refugees from Kurram) Iran using repatriation as a foreign policy tool in the spring of 2007 (generated crisis in domestic Afghan politics; sent a message to ISAF; stirred up some armed activity locally, in Shindand district, Herat province)

  14. Jihadist terrorism SCx: The threat to Hungary Past data: Some inicidents with Hungarian casualties, that can be connected to SCx looked at here: August 12, 2000: Srinagar, Jammu and Kashmir – two wounded (tourists) July 7, 2005: London – one wounded in the Tube bombings (migrant worker) April 24, 2006: Dahab, Sinai – one killed, one wounded (tourists) January 17, 2007: Baghdad, Yarmouk district – one killed (PS employee) v. the baseball rule…

  15. Jihadist Terrorism Security Complex Triangle within Middle East + West = autocracies – democracies – weak(ened) states… Migration: 4GW + ideology + deflection Deflection: significance post-2001 = hardening democracies, crushed states. A key aspect of security community provided. „Afghan mission = risk management”? Security complex wormholes: Air travel, money transfers, ideology, images etc.; - images via the media: „Normative difference” Merom, Gil (2003): How Democracies Lose Small Wars - State, Society, and the Failures ofFrance in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press An emboldenment effect?Iyengar, Radha – Monten, Jonathan (2008): Is There an “Emboldenment” Effect? Evidencefrom the Insurgency in Iraq. Paper published on-line by the authors, February 2008.URL: http://people.rwj.harvard.edu/~riyengar/insurgency.pdf, retrieved: April 10, 2008.

  16. The illicit opiate trade SCx Anchored SC (by demand) Anchor may shift, too (cocaine trade: North America ►Europe) Data reliability issue – problematic demarcation – e.g. routes? Securitisation of drugs in general varying: examples of Russia (ignorance?), China (sources’/routes’ issue), Iran (overly?), U.S. v. Netherlands, Afghanistan (cannabis)

  17. The illicit opiate trade SCx Wormholes: money laundering – developed banking systems: profit for the national economy? Arms and precursors the opposite way Differences on distance-to-source function: Armed smuggling v. concealment, corruption or stealth smuggling Health effects: direct/indirect (Iran: opium v. heroin) Large scale corruption: state capture Crime: market-related v. acquisitive

  18. The illicit opiate trade SCx:Health effects in Europe I. Source: UNODC World Drug Report 2007

  19. The illicit opiate trade SCx: Health effects in Europe II. Continued (next p.)

  20. The illicit opiate trade SCx: The illicit opiate trade SCx: Health effects in Europe II. (c’d) Remark: Firm, but non-full rank correlation (ρ=0.742) between rankings in terms of population abuse rate and rate of those treated for opiate-related problems; cases of spectacular discrepancy

  21. Drugs trade: non-suitable policy basis Reviewing balance of threat theory (sufficient basis without regression analysis): Functioning predictive factor: UK, Italy, Estonia/Iceland cases Weak predictive capability: Luxembourg, Iran (2.8% abuse rate) cases 3. Questionable prospects for elimination 4. Long-term, holistic effort needed as opposed to short-term, eradication-focused counternarcotics (see contrast: US CN strategy v. AFG National Drug Control Strategy) 5. Conversion issue (synthetic and other substances) 6. Migration (geographically – e.g. back to the Golden Triangle) Narcotics part of a bigger picture which nevertheless is there to be seen…

  22. Conclusions Review of the approach followed so far: Issue-specific/regional disaggregation of security complexes only mildly relevant to policy-making; Scarcely visible direct implications for most countries (other than potential) – no securitisation in the sense of licensing extraordinary measures; Other, less visible factors at play: a more pure impact of coalition burden-sharing dynamics: NATO Summits as force generation conferences…undermining the security community?

  23. Conclusions Keohane and Nye: interdependence in and of itself doesn’t provide a basis for harmony Keohane, Robert O. - Nye, Joseph S. (2001): Power and Interdependence. New York:Longman. Game theory (Fang and Ramsay) – lead nations pay more Complex theory (balance of threat, relative size, alliance dependence, domestic factors) Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold - Danny Unger (2004): Burden-Sharing in the Persian Gulf War. International Organization, 48:1, 39-75.

  24. Conclusions Alliance dependence a key driving factor in Hungary’s case – hard to quantify Alternative (normative remark): „alliance importance” (more fitting for a security community as opposed to a temporary alliance, arguably) The military’s organisational interests – ISAF case studies: Canada (Afghan mission showcasing the military’s importance) v. Netherlands (Afghan mission costs v. the rest of the pie) Hungary, Germany: decreasing defence budgets

  25. Conclusions What to do? Anticipate, adapt, advocate (Open-source) strategy conferences – internal and external feedback at the same time – a learning organisation – a learning society, incl elite? Run it home that the military is not a social welfare program as some claim.

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