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The Evolving Federal PKI

The Evolving Federal PKI. Gary Moore Entrust Technologies Richard Guida Chair, Federal PKI Steering Committee. E-Transaction Landscape. Intra-agency personnel matters, agency management Interagency payments, account reconciliation, litigation Agency to trading partner

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The Evolving Federal PKI

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  1. The Evolving Federal PKI Gary Moore Entrust Technologies Richard Guida Chair, Federal PKI Steering Committee

  2. E-Transaction Landscape • Intra-agency • personnel matters, agency management • Interagency • payments, account reconciliation, litigation • Agency to trading partner • procurement, regulation • Agency to the public

  3. E-Transactions Drivers • Long-term cost savings • Trading partner practices (e.g., banks) • Public expectations • Federal/State Statutes (e.g., GPEA) and policies • International competition

  4. Challenges All Applications Face • Authentication of Users • Non-repudiation for transactions • Confidentiality (privacy) • Interoperability • Liability • Scalability/extensibility

  5. Public Key Technology • Authentication • Technical non-repudiation • Data integrity • Confidentiality • Interoperability • Scalability/extensibility

  6. How PK Technology Works • Two keys, mathematically linked • One is kept private, other is made public • Private not deducible from public • For digital signature: One key signs, the other validates • For confidentiality: One key encrypts, the other decrypts

  7. Digital Signature (example) • Sender hashes document, signs hash with private key and sends with document • Recipient hashes document he or she received, creating “raw hash” • Recipient applies public key of sender to signed hash to get sender’s raw hash • If raw hashes are same, transaction validates

  8. Confidentiality (example) • Sender generates symmetric encryption key and encrypts document with it • Sender encrypts symmetric key with public key of recipient, sends that and encrypted document to recipient • Recipient decrypts symmetric key with his or her private key • Recipient decrypts document with symmetric key

  9. The Critical Questions • How can the recipient know with certainty the sender’s public key? (to validate a digital signature) • How can the sender know with certainty the recipient’s public key? (to send an encrypted message)

  10. Public Key (Digital) Certificate A document which - • is digitally signed by a trusted third party (called Certification Authority) • is based on identity-proofing done by a Registration Authority • contains the individual’s public key and some form of the individual’s identity • has a finite validity period

  11. X.509 v3 Certificate

  12. Public Key Infrastructure • Registration Authorities to identity proof users • Certification Authorities to issue certificates and CRLs • Repositories (publicly available data bases) to hold certificates and CRLs • Some mechanism to recover data when encryption keys are lost/compromised • Certificate Policy and related paper

  13. Federal PKI Approach • Establish Federal PKI Policy Authority (for policy interoperability) • Implement Federal Bridge CA using COTS (for technical interoperability) • Deal with directory issues in parallel • Border directory concept • Use ACES for public transactions

  14. Federal PKI Policy Authority • Voluntary interagency group - NOT an “agency” • Governing body for interoperability through FBCA • Agency/FBCA certificate policy mappings • Oversees operation of FBCA, authorizes issuance of FBCA certificates

  15. Federal Bridge CA • Non-hierarchical hub (“peer to peer”) • Maps levels of assurance in disparate certificate policies (“policyMapping”) • Ultimate bridge to CAs external to Federal government • Directory initially contains only FBCA-issued certificates and ARLs

  16. FBCA Architecture • Multiple CAs inside membrane, cross certified • Adding CAs straightforward albeit not necessarily easy • Solves inter-product interoperability issues within membrane - which is good • Single consolidated X.500 directory (but also support LDAP access)

  17. Current Status • Prototype FBCA: Entrust, Cybertrust • Initial operation 2/8/00 • Production FBCA: add other CAs • Operation by late 00 • FBCA Operational Authority is GSA (Mitretek technical lead and host site) • FBCA Certificate Policy (by mid-00) • FPKIPA Charter (done)

  18. Intra-Agency PKI Examples • DOD (>250K certs => >>4M by 2002; high assurance with smartcards) • FAA (~1K certs => 20K+ in 2000; software now, migrating to smartcards) • FDIC (~4K certs => 7K+ in 2000) • NASA (~1K certs => 25K+ in 2000) • USPTO (<1K certs => 15K+ in 2000)

  19. Border Directory Concept • Each agency would have Border Directory for certificates and CRLs • May shadow all or part of local directory system (allows for agency discretion) • CAs may publish directly in border directory • Unrestricted read access • Directory resides outside agency firewall • chain (X.500 DSP) or LDAP referral to FBCA DSA

  20. FBCA DSA Border DSA 1 Border DSA 2 LDAP Server X.500 DSA Border Directory Concept Agency 3 PCA 1 Internal Directory Infrastructure PCA 3 PCA 2 FBCA Agency 2 Agency 1 LDAP X.500 - DSP Internal Directory Infrastructure chaining Query-Response Internal Directory Infrastructure

  21. Access Certs for Electronic Services • “No-cost” certificates for the public • For business with Federal agencies only (but agencies may allow other uses on case basis) • On-line registration, vetting with legacy data; information protected under Privacy Act • Regular mail one-time PIN to get certificate • Agencies billed per-use and/or per-certificate

  22. Access Certs for Electronic Services • RFP 1/99; bids received 4/99; first award 9/99 (DST), second award 10/99 (ORC), third award 10/99 (AT&T) • Provisions for ACES-enabling applications, and developing customized PKIs • Agencies do interagency agreement with GSA • Certificates available now

  23. Electronic Signatures under GPEA • Government Paperwork Elimination Act (October 1998) • Technology neutral - agencies select based on specifics of applications (e.g., risk) • But full recognition of dig sig strengths • Gives electronic signature full legal effect • Focus: transactions with Federal agencies • Draft OMB Guidance 3/99; final 5/00

  24. Organization

  25. PKI Use and Implementation Issues • Misunderstanding what it can and can’t do • Requiring legacy fixes to implement • Waiting for standards to stabilize • High cost - a yellow herring • Interoperability woes - a red herring • Legal trepidation - the brightest red herring

  26. Legal trepidation - the brightest red herring • PK technology is NOT the most complex subject presented in a courtroom • Case law only develops when you use something • Technology and commerce marches on regardless of legal uncertainties • Unreasonable to demand standard of proof higher than in paper world

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