ESSENTIALS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

1. ESSENTIALS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

2. Chapter 8 War and Strife

3. War: The Data • 14,500 armed struggles in history, depending on how we define war • Approximately 3.5 billion deaths • Since 1816, between 224 and 559 international and intrastate wars • War incidence has declined after 1991. • Number of battlefield deaths has declined by 80% since 1991.

4. Is War Inevitable? Realist Answers • War can be managed but never eliminated due to human nature. • States exist in an anarchic system, with no overarching authority to provide security or settle disputes. • States are thus insecure and must rely on self-help to find security. • Insecurity can lead to the “security dilemma.”

5. Irony of the Security Dilemma • As one state seeks to ameliorate its insecurity, it seeks power. • Once state A gains power, it inadvertently makes state B insecure. • State B then seeks more power, which it might not have otherwise done. • As state B gains power, state A again becomes insecure and seeks more power.

6. Irony of the Security Dilemma • RESULTS: Vicious circle of power accumulation Permanent condition of tension

7. Liberals: Is War Inevitable? • Anarchy is a structural restraint. • States can learn to cooperate because of self-interest in the benefits of peace. • International institutions act as cooperation enablers by reducing transition costs and increasing cheating costs—“cooperative competition.”

8. Liberals: Is War Inevitable? • Benefits of cooperation will push more states to become democratic. • More liberal, democratic states = more peace

9. Radicals: Transcending War • Capitalism turns human nature toward greed and relentless, destructive competition. • The state supports repressive forces of capitalism at the expense of the majority of people, both domestically and worldwide (imperialism). • War will exist so long as capitalism exists. • War can be eliminated through the triumph of socialism, which fosters sharing of resources and labor.

10. Constructivists: Reducing War • Threats are socially constructed. • Implications of material objects are socialized as threatening. • Different types of socialization can lead to different outcomes. • Example: United Kingdom versus Iran owning nuclear weapons

11. Causes of War Individual Level of Analysis • Individual(s)—realists and liberals • Personal characteristics of leaders • Misperceptions • Communications failures

12. Causes of War Individual Level of Analysis • Individual(s)—realists and liberals • Characteristics of the masses • St. Augustine—act of self-preservation • Niebuhr—war is inherent to humans • War as the unusual event

13. Causes of War State Level of Analysis • State and society—liberal and radical views • Struggles over internal structures and characteristics of states cause war. • Liberals—democracy restrains leaders, provides outlets for opposing viewpoints.

14. Causes of War State Level of Analysis • Disagreement about effect of capitalist structure • Liberals say those states avert war, prefer trade. • Radicals say this leads to competition among social groups, stagnation, collapse, or the search for external markets in diversionary war.

16. International System as the Cause of War • International system—realist and radical views • Anarchy, no final arbiter of disputes • System in state of nature (Hobbes) • Realists—war is caused by states challenging international hierarchy due to • Changing state capabilities • Changing distribution of power among states

17. International System as the Cause of War • Radicals—dominant states need to expand, leading to war over resources.

18. Explaining Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait • Individual Level • Saddam Hussein was insecure and ruthless, misinterpreted U.S. intentions, and miscalculated Saudi Arabia’s interests. • State Level • Iraq had historic claims on Kuwait and it was in Iraq’s national interest to seize Kuwaiti oil fields; authoritarian governments are more likely to choose war as the means to settle disputes.

19. Explaining Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait • International Level • Iraq believed invasion would not invoke a response, UN Security Council lacked the cohesion to act, and Arab League would not condemn other Arab states’ actions.

21. War over South Ossetia, 2008 • Individuals • Promises of Saakashvili election—sought to bolster Georgian pride • Putin promised force and aggressive diplomacy • State/Society: no democracy

22. War over South Ossetia, 2008 • International • Russia sought to keep out competitors and maintain its position as the regional power. • Georgia sought the greater power’s protection.

23. Categorizing Wars • Interstate war—between states, as they have recognizable leadership and locations and formal militaries • Intrastate/civil war—between factions within state over control of territory or institutions; many have international repercussions; can last decades; high human costs

24. Categorizing Wars • Total war—massive loss of life, widespread destruction; many participants, including multiple powers; all available weapons utilized; civilians and military targeted • Limited war—may be limited by goals pursued, type of weapons used, amount of resources used; targets

27. Explaining the Decline of Total War • Memories of World War II • Nuclear war too costly • Development of security communities • Realists: rise of U.S. hegemony • Liberals: democratic peace, economic interdependence, international organizations • Constructivists: people socialized into attitudes, values, and beliefs in peace

28. How Wars Are Fought • Conventional warfare—weapons can be limited in time and space; precise targeting; easily available • Problems: chemical weapons; indiscriminate • Weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—nuclear, chemical, biological • Problems: radiation, indiscriminate

29. How Wars Are Fought • Unconventional warfare—ignores conventions of war • Guerilla warfare, revolutionary guerilla warfare, asymmetric conflicts, terrorism

30. Going Nuclear: The View from Iran • Iran has an “inalienable right” to develop nuclear energy technology for peaceful purposes via Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. • Oil and gas will run out and refining capacity is very limited; thus, an alternative energy source is needed. • But Iran’s legitimate security threats from neighboring countries (Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel) plus fear of U.S. invasion may push nuclear development.

31. Going Nuclear: The View from Iran • Iran’s decision was propelled by U.S. invasion of Iraq and its identification of Iran as part of “axis of evil,” even after post-9/11 intelligence information suggested otherwise. • Based on historic U.S. interference in Iran’s domestic politics, the population supports government policy.

33. Asymmetric Conflicts: Battle Tactics • Asymmetric warfare—between parties of unequal strength; weaker party seeks to neutralize opponent strengths by exploiting weaknesses • Guerilla war—a “small war” often inspired by nationalism • Revolutionary guerilla war—defeat technologically superior and well-equipped foe by exploiting weaknesses; civilians protect guerillas; traditional warfare concepts eliminated; win hearts and minds of the people

34. Terrorism as Asymmetric Warfare • Elements of terrorism • Act is political by nature or intent • Committed by non-state actors • Combatant or non-combatant targets • Use unconventional means at unpredictable places and intervals

35. Terrorism as Asymmetric Warfare • Motivated by political, religious, or economic goals • Seek to instill fear to attain goals

39. Terrorism’s Transformation since the 1990s • Attacks have become more lethal. • Choice of weapons has become more diverse. • More efficient infrastructure for terrorist networks • Example: electronic money laundering; funding via illegal activities; Internet recruiting

40. Terrorism’s Transformation since the 1990s • Wider range of groups: nationalist, radical religious, neo-Nazi, left-wing and right-wing • State sponsors, such as Cuba, Iran, North Korea

41. Responses to Terrorism • International level: conclusion of 12 conventions designed to punish hijackers; protect infrastructure, diplomats, and nuclear materials; and block financial transfers • State level: information sharing among states; monitoring of financial flows; USA PATRIOT Act

42. Just War Tradition—Jus ad Bellum Just conditions for going into war • Just cause: self-defense; defense of others; massive violation of human rights • Declaration of intent by appropriate authority • Have intentions of ending abuses and establishing a just peace

43. Just War Tradition—Jus ad Bellum Just conditions for going into war • Must have exhausted all other alternatives • Forces must be removed quickly after objectives are achieved.

44. Just War Tradition—Jus ad Bellum Just conduct in war • Distinguish between combatants and noncombatants • Noncombatants protected from harm • Violence proportionate to ends • Undue human suffering avoided • Individual responsibility for actions taken

45. Banning Landmines—Evolution of Norms • International campaign began in 1992 • Spearheaded by non-governmental organizations (NGOs); coordinator was Jody Williams • Argued weapons are indiscriminate and have an unfair destructive impact on innocent noncombatants • From arms control issue to human rights issue • Constructivists: demonstrates impact of norms and socialization in altering behavior of state and nonstate actors

46. Key Questions about Humanitarian Intervention • How massive do human rights abuses have to be before intervention is just? • Who decides when a humanitarian intervention is necessary? The United Nations? A coalition within the region? Any powerful state? • Is the humanitarian intervention occurring for legitimate reasons or as an excuse to achieve other objectives?

47. Key Questions about Humanitarian Intervention • Do states have a responsibility to protect (R2P)? • How can some interventions be justified while other situations cannot?

48. Can Military Intervention Stop Genocide? • YES—Genocide Convention approves state action • Force is the sufficiently fast response • Warns others • Coupled with humanitarian aid, most effective

49. Can Military Intervention Stop Genocide? • NO—Rarely involve state’s national interests • Complex organization, costly • Can be misinterpreted as neocolonialism • Nearby countries better informed but unprepared • Not effective deterrent, nonmilitary aid more effective over long term

50. Realist Approaches 1: Managing Insecurity Balance of Power—states, as rational actors, make decisions to increase their own capabilities and undermine those of others • Use of alliances to balance power both internationally and regionally (external balancing) • Increase military and economic capabilities to counter potential threats (internal balancing)