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57th IETF, Vienna Jari Arkko, Ericsson Research

SEND Issues draft-ietf-send-ipsec-01.txt (in part also the other drafts) http://www.piuha.net/~jarkko/publications/send/issues. 57th IETF, Vienna Jari Arkko, Ericsson Research. Some Issues Worth a Discussion:. 06 - Millisecond time granularity problematic

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57th IETF, Vienna Jari Arkko, Ericsson Research

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  1. SEND Issuesdraft-ietf-send-ipsec-01.txt(in part also the other drafts)http://www.piuha.net/~jarkko/publications/send/issues 57th IETF, Vienna Jari Arkko, Ericsson Research

  2. Some Issues Worth a Discussion: • 06 - Millisecond time granularity problematic • 07 - Cert-only ND protection not thought out • 14 - Is CGA-only RD protection useful? • 08 - Certificate details Only if AH is used: • 03 - Co-existence scheme flawed due to multicast?

  3. 06 - Millisecond granularity • Current timestamp granularity is one millisecond • Can not send two messages within one ms -- normally Ok, but can be problematic in some cases • Solutions: • 1) Not an issue • 2) Allow reception within the same ms; note that getting the same ND message twice is not an issue • 3) Increase allowed granularity to microsecond

  4. 07 - Cert-only ND protection • Complaint: certificate-only ND protection is “not thought out” • I think we generally agree, this part of the spec is not in as good status as the rest. • But are there any specific complaints or proposals to improve?

  5. 14 - Is CGA-only RD Protection Useful? • Current draft allows CGA-only RD protection • CGA tells nothing about your right to be a router • Should it be removed? • One thing CGA does for you in this case is that it allows to bind the selected default router to Redirects sent by it • Other RD-protection might be possible to arrange via heuristics (e.g. the router appears to route)

  6. 14 - Certificate details • (To be filled by Pekka & James)

  7. 03 - Co-existence scheme & multicast • Nodes may run multicast on the link, exchange link-local addresses • Since multicast does not use ND, such addresses may traverse from the secure side to the non-secure side • Violates addressing RFC • Solutions: • 1) In the ND-option approach, there are no “sides” and hence no problem • 2) Something else, what?

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