1. National SeriesLecture 1IntroductionGeorgia Bradford Disarmament Research CentreDivision of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK Picture Image Transparent Globe by digitalart- from: http://www.freedigitalphotos.net/

2. Outline • Where we are in the early 21st century • Outline of the following lectures • What we should know(learning outcome) • What we can do(policy contribution) Picture Image: Golden World In Hands by jscreationzs- from: http://www.freedigitalphotos.net/

3. What is “Life Science”? “Any field of science that is leading to or has the potential to lead to an enhanced understanding of living organisms, especially human life.” E.g. Biology, proteomics, genetic engineering, nanotechnology, aerosol technology, chemistry and mathematics (National Research Council, 2006: 27) • Applied in: • Public health, Medicine, Agriculture, Energy, Environment and National security studies

4. Biotechnology: An integral part of national strategy in the 21st Century A growing market in Biotechnology: the pharmaceutical market (National Research Council, 2006: 85) • Similar results in number of researchers and the amount of private investment for R&D in the life sciences • Rapid growth in the Asia-Pacific region • (Ernst&Young 2011, Frost&Sullivan 2010)

5. Science Outlook: Georgia Georgian National Academy of Sciences (GNAS) • GNAS was established in February 1941, in Tbilisi. • GNAS consists of 10 scientific departments including: • Medicine, • Agricultural sciences, • Chemistry and chemical technology, and • Biological sciences • GNAS publishes 5 academic periodicals including Bulletin of the Georgian National Academy of Sciences (BNAS) (GNAS 2012) http://www.science.org.ge/english.html

6. Georgia Institutions for the life sciences in higher education (not exclusive) State Universities • Tbilisi State University • Ilia State University • Gori University • Tbilisi State Medical University • Georgian State University of Subtropical Agriculture Private Universities • University of Georgia • Tbilisi Medical Institute • Tbilisi PetreShotadze Medical Academy • Kutaisi Institute of Medicine • Institute of Medicine Management and Stomatology

7. Why do we care? Should this be an issue for us? The dual-use nature of science and technology: • “Every major technology — metallurgy, explosives, internal combustion, aviation, electronics, nuclear energy — has been intensively exploited, not only for peaceful purposes but also for hostile ones.” • “…Must this also happen with biotechnology, certain to be a dominant technology of the twenty-first century?” Matthew Meselson: Professor of Molecular Biology at Harvard University (Meselson, 2000: 16)

8. Meselson’s Forecast in 2000 Ability • “Our ability to modify fundamental life processes continues its rapid advance” • “We will be able not only to devise additional ways to destroy life but will also become able to manipulate it” Dilemma • “…[This has a] Vast potential for beneficial application and could have inimical consequences for the course of civilization.”

9. Meselson’s Forecast in 2000 “At present, we appear to be approaching a crossroads —a time that will test whether biotechnology…” • It will come to be intensively exploited for hostile purposes, or • Our species will find the collective wisdom to take a different course.

10. Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)1972 Article I • “Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain: • 1. Microbial or other biological agents or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes.” • This applies for not only states but also non-state actors

11. Science and Security: Dual-Use The need for a broader conceptualisation of dual-use • Biological agents and toxins can be used for hostile purposes withoutweaponization and technology is typically diffused globally for peaceful purposes • Hostile use can take the form of criminal acts or terrorist acts (non-state level) in parallel to military application (state level), • The BTWC prohibits the misuse of the life sciences by both states and non-state actors

12. Georgia with international regimes WMD • “Nonproliferation challenges relevant to Georgia primarily relate to export controls. Georgia does not possess or produce nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, and is a party to the major nonproliferation treaties and regimes. ” BTWC • Accession (22 May 1996) • “Some vaccine manufacturing facilities in Georgia that were part of the Soviet Anti-Plague system possessed dual-use biological weapons production capabilities” . [However],...All dual-use equipment and selected buildings at Biokombinat were eliminated based on the 30 December 2002 agreement between Georgia and the United States” CWC • Signature (14 January 1993); Ratification (27 November 1995) • A founding member of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (Nuclear Threat Initiative 2012)

13. National Series: Lecture Outline 2.Biosecurity Threats 3. The Web of Prevention 4. National Measures 5. Responsibility of Scientists Picture Image: Transparent Globe by digitalart- from: http://www.freedigitalphotos.net/

14. Reviewing threats (Lecture 2) • ‘No single focal point’ of threats • Potential actors, material and information, which can be related to dual-use issues, exist at international, regional, national, local and individual levels. Natural outbreaks of infectious disease Safety/accidental risks at laboratories Manmade threats: warfare, crime and terrorism Unpredictable future of the life sciences

15. The Web of Prevention (WoP) (Lecture 3) To address natural outbreaks of infectious disease • Public health preparedness and response planning To address safety/accidental risks • Laboratory regulations to safely manage dangerous pathogens and toxins, to prevent an accidental release into the environment and unauthorized access To address manmade threats • Strong international arms control agreements with effective national implementation • Internationally coordinated export controls • Intelligence • Biodefense To address the unpredictable future of the life sciences • Oversight: Review of security-sensitive science and technology developments • Responsible conduct in research through education

16. Natural threats Safety risks Manmade threats Governance of science

17. National implementation (Lecture 4) To National Context

18. National implementation (Lecture 4)

19. References • The references cited in this lecture are viewable in the Notes section of this presentation.