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Computer-aided Hazard Identification

Computer-aided Hazard Identification. Paul Chung (p.w.h.chung@lboro.ac.uk) Department of Computer Science. Hazards and Operability (HAZOP) Studies. Established and widely used technique in the process industry for hazard identification Time consuming, labour intensive process: Tedious

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Computer-aided Hazard Identification

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  1. Computer-aided Hazard Identification Paul Chung (p.w.h.chung@lboro.ac.uk) Department of Computer Science

  2. Hazards and Operability (HAZOP) Studies • Established and widely used technique in the process industry for hazard identification • Time consuming, labour intensive process: • Tedious • Expensive

  3. Computer-aided HAZOP • Different levels of support: • Electronic report form • Electronic data (on plant, on fluids, etc.) • Automated Hazard Identification • Continuous operation • Batch operation

  4. Automated Hazard Identification • Continuous operation • From basic research to commercial product – HAZID • Basic technology • Signed directed graph (SDG) representation • Fault propagation • Go through a list of deviations systematically and identify the faults that cause the deviations and the consequences that result from the faults and deviations

  5. HAZID Overview • Automated extraction of plant design from a CAD system, e.g. Intergraph SmartPlant P&ID • Convenient forms for adding any missing process specific information • Tick boxes for selecting analysis options: • Deviations, e.g. more flow, less flow, etc. • Items to HAZOP, etc.

  6. HAZID Overview • HAZOP style output in different output formats • XML, with HTML web page view. • Excel spreadsheet. • Query facility for viewing analysis results • e.g. viewing faults and consequences relating to a particular plant item • e.g. viewing the propagation path between a particular fault and consequence • Compare facility for viewing the difference between two HAZID runs • Useful for after making a change to the design

  7. 7 Hazid Operation Select SP P+ID From SmartPlant Hazid maps SP icons to Hazop “Process” models Run Hazid data wizard, Extract plant data from SP database: *Plant Items *Piping, valves, fittings *Controls *Fluids information: Temperature Pressure Fluid name Converts P+I diagram to Analysis model Hazid analyses plant and generates Hazop Report

  8. 7 Hazid Operation Select SP P+ID From SmartPlant Hazid maps SP icons to Hazop “Process” models Run Hazid data wizard, Extract plant data from SP database: *Plant Items *Piping, valves, fittings *Controls *Fluids information: Temperature Pressure Fluid name Converts P+I diagram to Analysis model Hazid analyses plant and generates Hazop Report

  9. 7 Hazid Operation Select SP P+ID From SmartPlant Hazid maps SP icons to Hazop “Process” models Run Hazid data wizard, Extract plant data from SP database: *Plant Items *Piping, valves, fittings *Controls *Fluids information: Temperature Pressure Fluid name Converts P+I diagram to Analysis model Hazid analyses plant and generates Hazop Report

  10. 7 Hazid Operation Select SP P+ID From SmartPlant Hazid maps SP icons to Hazop “Process” models Run Hazid data wizard, Extract plant data from SP database: *Plant Items *Piping, valves, fittings *Controls *Fluids information: Temperature Pressure Fluid name Converts P+I diagram to Analysis model Hazid analyses plant and generates Hazop Report

  11. 8 Mapping SmartPlant to Hazid models SmartPlant Database References Hazid Model Types Mapping created by user for all company, then mapping is >95% automatic Automatic mapping by Hazid: = Centrifugal Pump = Valve = ????? Mixer Stripper Absorber Reactor User makes choice **This User mapping is required only once for the whole Project**

  12. 9 N4 N1 N3 N5 N2 Checking Automatic Nozzle Mapping Hazid model is process function: But P+ID is piping: Vapour Out Port Vapour/Liquid In Port Vapour Liquid Liquid Out Port User confirms nozzle functions: N1 is vapour/liquid in port, N2 and N3 are liquid out ports, N4 is a vapour out port N5 is Cleanout liquid in port.

  13. 7 Hazid Operation Select SP P+ID From SmartPlant Hazid maps SP icons to Hazop “Process” models Run Hazid data wizard, Extract plant data from SP database: *Plant Items *Piping, valves, fittings *Controls *Fluids information: Temperature Pressure Fluid name Converts P+I diagram to Analysis model Hazid analyses plant and generates Hazop Report

  14. Equipment Knowledge Base Knowledge about behaviour of equipment Interaction between Faults, Deviations and Consequences These links are called “arcs” in Hazid Consequence Deviation Fault Fault- can causeConsequence Fault- can causeDeviationto process variable Deviation– can cause anotherDeviation Deviation– can causeConsequence

  15. Out In Equipment Knowledge Base Knowledge about Faults and Consequences This is mainly engineering knowledge and experience Fault– Bearing failure • Consequences • Casing damage • Seal damage and leakage • Loss of discharge pressure • Flow disturbance • Pump stops

  16. 7 Hazid Operation Select SP P+ID From SmartPlant Hazid maps SP icons to Hazop “Process” models Run Hazid data wizard, Extract plant data from SP database: *Plant Items *Piping, valves, fittings *Controls *Fluids information: Temperature Pressure Fluid name Converts P+I diagram to Analysis model Hazid analyses plant and generates Hazop Report

  17. HAZOP Style Output from HAZID

  18. HAZID Viewer Queries • Standard format questions: • What causes could there be for a selected hazard? • What consequences are there for a given failure mode? • How is a given hazard realised? • Show a path of deviations for propagation • Display all hazards with a given severity rank or higher

  19. Filtered Output showing Fault Paths for a given Hazard

  20. Automated Batch Plant Hazard Identification • Batch operation • Early research prototype (CHECKOP) • Basic technology • Action representation • State-based simulation • Go through a set of operation instructions systematically and identify potential ambiguities, operating problems and hazards • Applying guidewords such as before, after, no action, etc.

  21. CHECKOP System Overview

  22. Simple Batch Reactor Example

  23. CHECKOP Plant Description instance(tank101 isa tank, [content info [reactantA], outports info [out is [pump101,in]]]). instance(pump101 isa pump, [status is offline, outports info [out is [valve101,in]]]). instance(valve101 isa valve, [status is closed, outports info [out is [reactor101, in2]]]). instance(reactor101 isa stirred_tank_reactor, [ outports info [out1 is [valve103,in], out2 is [valve106,in]], heatSink info [hout is [jacket101,hin]], reaction info [reaction_ab_p] ]).

  24. Operating instruction format • Natural language • Easy for user • Requires natural language processing • Could be ambiguous • Structured template • Easy for computer to process • Limited expressive power

  25. Operating instruction format • Object Action • valve101 open • Object ActionuntilCondition • mixer onuntilelapsed-time 20 minute • Object1 Action Object2 Filler-wordFluiduntilCondition • reactor101 fill-from tank101 with reactantA untilvolume 30 percent

  26. CHECKOP Operating Procedure Input charge reactor101 with reactantA: { (1) valve101 open (2) pump101 start (3) reactor101 fill_from tank101 with reactantA until volume 30 percent (4) pump101 stop (5) valve101 close } etc…

  27. Deviation Generation • Combine each single action in the procedure with guide words, from: • No action – Simple omission. • Early/Late action – Sequence of procedure changed (how many steps feasible?). • Early/Late action termination – “until” condition of action varied. • Then, simulate the effect of executing the new procedure on the plant, detect hazards.

  28. Batch HAZOP Output

  29. Batch HAZOP Output

  30. Future Work on CHECKOP • A formal structured language for operating instructions • More guide words • “Other” Action – change other variables of the Action model • Rules for reasonable deviations • What are the most likely mistakes in operation? • Integrate with HAZID • HAZID is strong on process hazards, CHECKOP better for operating errors, etc. • HAZOP of start-up, shutdown, maintenance, etc.

  31. Conclusions • Automated hazard identification • continuous operation • commercial tool that can reduce the time of HAZOP • batch operation • promising area of research and development for identifying problems associated with human errors and operating procedures • Benefits: • Doing HAZOP earlier, and on modifications. • Consistent, repeatable, complete hazard identification method.

  32. Acknowledgements • The work described in this presentation is being funded by • HAZID Technologies Ltd • Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council, UK • Thanks are also due to my colleagues • Dr Steve McCoy • Mr Dingfeng Zhou

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