Cyclone Nargis in Burma/Myanmar

1. Cyclone Nargis in Burma/Myanmar Mio Imada Kandai Suzuki Yiming Zhang

2. What is Cyclone Nargis? • May 3, 2008 • Worst cyclone recorded on the basin • http://video.on.nytimes.com/video/2008/05/05/world/1194817109514/cyclone-nargis-devastates-myanmar.html

3. History of Myanmar 1948 – Union of Burma gains independence from Great Britain 1962 - Myanmar controlled by military regime after a coup d'état 1962-1972 – “Burmese Way to Socialism” • 1988 – Pro-democracy demonstrations “8888 Uprising” • 1989 – "Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma" → "Union of Myanmar“

4. 1990 – Free elections, National League for Democracy (NLD) wins majority, Junta refused to step down 1991 – Aung San SuuKyi awarded Nobel Peace Prize, under house arrest 1997 – Admitted into Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 2007 – Saffron Revolution 2008 – Cyclone Nargis

5. Cyclone Nargis 2nd 3rd May 2008 • 140,000 dead and missing • 800,000 displaced • Totally affected 2.4 million people (OCHA estimation) • Estimated damage • at US$10billion

6. ASEAN Charter • ASIAN Charter was set forth in ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Jakarta June 2004. • … reaffirm ASEAN’s goal and principles… collective responsibilities of all ASEAN Member Countries in ensuring non-aggression and respect for each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; the promotion and protection of human rights… and the establishment of effective and efficient institutional framework for ASEAN.

7. Drafted Blueprint from EPG • Eminent Persons Group (EPG) was created to draft the plans of ASEAN Charter, in 2007 the report was submitted • Inclusion of international humanitarian law as well as the R2P principles • Creation of regional human rights mechanism • Non-consensus-based decision making • Consultative mechanisms which engage participation of civil society groups • Sanctions against erring members • However, High Level Task Force (HLTF) which drafted the ASEAN Charter was not bound to follow the recommendations made above.

8. Basic Problems • High Level Task Force (HLTF) was formed to draft the ASEAN Charter. • HLTF only consisted of ten people • Only 9 to 10 months time span for draft • Final version made available only few days before

9. Criticisms • “falls short of what is needed to establish a ‘people-centered and ‘people-empowered’ ASEAN… fails to put people at the center,… The Charter is all about how governments will interact with each other, but not about how they also should interact with the people… lacks necessary details for the settlement of disputes” • “… it codifies existing norms and maintains its historical identity as inter-government organization.” “The decision to adopt the ‘ASEAN Way’, which priorities agreement by consensus… means that its claim to become an increasingly rules-based organization will remain just that.” - Ambassador Barry Desker Ambassador Barry Desker from cil.nus.edu

10. EPG Recommendation (people-centered organization) • “the importance of rallying the people of ASEAN behind ASEAN’s goals…” and “consciously adopt this objective as part of their work and mission.” • “strengthen its links with civil society organizations and draw upon their networks and strengths as strategic partners for ideas and initiatives to develop the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community.” and “establish consultative mechanisms with civil society organizations to interact regularly with these groups.” • “ASEAN need to shed its images of being an elitist organization…”

11. State-Centered ASEAN Charter • Non-interference in the internal affairs of ASEAN Member States. • Respect for the right of every Member States • Abstain from any participation in any policy or activity… which threaten… political and economic stability of ASEAN Member States

12. Consensus Decision-Making • “As basic principle, decision-making in ASEAN shall be based on consultation and consensus” (Article 20) • “A formula for flexible participation, including the ASEAN Minus X formula, may be applied where there is consensus to do so.” (Article 21)

13. Creation of Regional Human Rights Body… in work • Creation of human rights body that “operate in accordance with the terms of reference to be determined by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting.” (Article 14)

14. Non-Consultations with Civil Society Group • “ASEAN may engage with entities which support the ASEAN Charter, in particular its purpose and principles.” (Article 16)

15. Absence of Sanction • Impossible to achieve their aim to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedom.

16. R2P in Southeast Asia • States remains largely suspicious; - Government focuses on state and regime security, as opposed to human security - Emphasis on principles of sovereignty and non-interference to forestall external involvement

17. Myanmar and its inactions • Myanmar’s authority initially relied on its own relief activities (relief camps) • May 5 “welcome relief supplies”. • Despite that, obstructed int’l org. & aid agencies from rapidly accessing and bringing relief people were left without drinking water, shelter

18. UN Humanitarian Relief Coordinator, urged Myanmar’s authorities to “respond to the outpouring of int’l support and solidarity by facilitating the arrival of aid workers, and the clearance of relief suppliers in every way possible.” Ban Ki-moon: “The situation was at a critical moment”  diseases, vulnerable children • But delays in issuing visas and gaining appropriate access continued.

19. R2P & World Summit Outcome * WSU took core ideas from ICISS report *Both highlight the importance of SC authorization

20. Pushing the limits of R2P in Southeast Asia Rejected free humanitarian access odious international impression reinforced bad impression referendum on 10 May 2008 Junta was neglecting the grave humanitarian situation (impression) Sparking calls from members of the international community to invoke the R2P on Myanmar

21. International Reactions to Nargis • Bernard Kouchner- we have responsibility to IMPOSE humanitarian relief • Javier Solana- I totally agree with the guy above • Michael Byers- Canada could covertly air-drop aid packages • Jean-Maurice Ripert- France ‘could send men’ to Myanmar as the French navy had been conducting ‘operations’ off the coast of Myanmar • Liu Zhenmin- the issue should not be politicized and China would oppose any involvement of the UNSC • Sir Holmes- Kouchner’s call is unnecessarily confrontational

22. International Reactions to Nargis • RESPONSE FROM USA!!! • Laura Bush- strongly criticized the Myanmar junta for its lack of response in the aftermath of the cyclone. • The US State Department did not pursue a case for intervention based on the R2P principle. Instead, the US attempted to engage Myanmar’s strategic partners such as ASEAN, China, and India, to convince the regime to accept assistance from the international community.

23. Nargis and the Gaps in R2P Two key questions: • 1. Did Myanmar’s inability to render aid and protection to the victims of the cyclone in the first three weeks of the disaster trigger the responsibility to protect? • 2. Did Myanmar’s reluctant to allow the international community and humanitarian organizations entry into the country trigger the R2P?

24. Nargis and the Gaps in R2P R2P does not apply to Myanmar because there is no clause that applies to cases of natural catastrophes. ‘ Loophole’ The fact remains that there is no legal basis to do so under current international law.

25. Nargis and the Gaps in R2P Rejection of humanitarian assistance ? crime against humanity the state against its people as a crime against humanity (definition under Article 7 of the Rome Statute) In order to make a case for crime against humanity it is imperative to demonstrate that there was discriminatory, widespread and systematic violence or aggression- none of which can be convincingly proven in the case of Cyclone Nargis BUT,

26. Nargis and the Gaps in R2P • While some reports have implied that the three-week lapse had negligible impact on the number of casualties or deaths, it would be difficult to prove this conclusively as information gathering in the aftermath of the cyclone was patchy as best, due to the crisis situation and the focus on relief operations.

27. Nargis and the Gaps in R2P • http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7GQAa_0MVRU • Please be effective about the contents of this video.

28. Applying R2P to Myanmar case • May 7th First consideration of R2P - France initially invokes R2P to provide humanitarian assistance • May 13th Consideration of R2P (by UK) • R2P should be considered for natural disasters • May 16th ‘Crime Against Humanity’ • - Myanmar state television reports 77,738 dead, 55,917 missing • - May 19th Myanmar Agrees to ASEAN-ERAT • Agrees to aid led by ASEAN-ERAT under condition of • not politicizing aid, “without strings attached”

29. Why not apply R2P? • Paragraph 138 & 139 of the World Summit Outcome Document does not refer to natural disasters • ICISS report; military intervention for human protection (large-scale loss of life) •  “overwhelming natural or environmental catastrophes, where the state concerned is either unwilling or unable to cope, or call for assistance, and significant loss of life is occurring or threatened”.

30. Response • France regarded as considering a military intervention • Unsuccessful in calling for the UNSC to issue a presidential statement • But received strong rhetoric by securing a briefing from Sir John Holmes (British diplomat) ‘forget politics… forget the military dictatorship. Let’s just get aid & assistance through to people who are suffering and dying as we speak, through a lack of support on the ground’. (Australia, Prime Minister Kevin Rudd)

31. Impact of not applying R2P • Ban Ki-moon not pushing R2P • Aware that R2P popularity was dropping after War on Terror, and many countries were skeptical • Succeeded in protecting the concept by interpreting R2P in narrower definition

32. Achieving a Diplomatic Solution • Though R2P may not apply, invoking it  rhetorical device - possibility of military intervention by West - increased political pressure  more responsive Tool for West to influence Naypyidaw and ASEAN to facilitating humanitarian relief

33. Conclusions • Int’l response reinforced the consensual, narrower position agreed in Outcome Document • Southeast Asia wary of R2P • R2P not seen as applicable  still influential

34. R2P Evaluation • Just Cause 3/5 • Right Intention 5/5 • Last Resort 1/5 • Right Authority 3/5 • Proportional Means 1/5 • Reasonable Prospects 1/5

35. References • http://www.coolgeography.co.uk/A-level/AQA/Year%2013/Weather%20and%20climate/Hurricanes/Cyclone_Nargis.htm • http://www.slideshare.net/expattam/cyclone-nargis-22012483