1 / 21

Why Does State Farm Charge Young Men So Much More Than Young Women for Auto Insurance?

Why Does State Farm Charge Young Men So Much More Than Young Women for Auto Insurance?. Learning Objectives. In the market for insurance, asymmetric information leads to two problems: adverse selection and moral hazard. Learning Objective 17.1. Asymmetric Information.

hedia
Télécharger la présentation

Why Does State Farm Charge Young Men So Much More Than Young Women for Auto Insurance?

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript


  1. Why Does State Farm Charge Young Men So Much More Than Young Women for Auto Insurance? Learning Objectives In the market for insurance, asymmetric information leads to two problems: adverse selection and moral hazard.

  2. Learning Objective 17.1 Asymmetric Information Asymmetric information A situation in which one party to an economic transaction has less information than the other party. Adverse Selection and the Market for “Lemons” Adverse selection The situation in which one party to a transaction takes advantage of knowing more than the other party to the transaction.

  3. Learning Objective 17.1 Asymmetric Information Reducing Adverse Selection in the Car Market: Warranties and Reputations Some states have passed “lemon laws” to help reduce information problems in the car market. Most lemon laws have two main provisions: 1 New cars that need several major repairs during the first year or two after the date of the original purchase may be returned to the manufacturer for a full refund. 2 Car manufacturers must indicate whether a used car they are offering for sale was repurchased from the original owner as a lemon.

  4. Learning Objective 17.1 Asymmetric Information Asymmetric Information in the Market for Insurance Asymmetric information problems are particularly severe in the market for insurance. Buyers of insurance policies will always know more about the likelihood of the event being insured against happening than will insurance companies.

  5. Learning Objective 17.1 Asymmetric Information Reducing Adverse Selection in the Insurance Market To reduce the problem of adverse selection, insurance companies gather as much information as they can on people applying for policies. People applying for individual health insurance policies or life insurance policies usually need to submit their medical records to the insurance company.

  6. Learning Objective 17.1 MakingtheConnection • Does Adverse Selection Explain Why Some People Do Not Have Health Insurance?

  7. Learning Objective 17.1 Asymmetric Information Moral Hazard Moral hazard The actions people take after they have entered into a transaction that make the other party to the transaction worse off. Don’t Let This Happen to YOU!Don’t Confuse Adverse Selection with Moral Hazard

  8. Learning Objective 17.2 Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Financial Markets Reducing Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Financial Markets In response to investor complaints after the stock market crash of 1929, Congress established the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to regulate the stock and bond markets. The SEC requires that firms register stocks or bonds they wish to sell with the SEC and provide potential investors with a prospectus that contains all relevant financial information on the firms.

  9. Learning Objective 17.2 MakingtheConnection • Using Government Policy to Reduce Moral Hazard in Investments The government has intervened to increase the confidence of investors in the securities traded on the New York Stock Exchange and in other financial markets.

  10. Learning Objective 17.3 Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Labor Markets Principal–agent problem A problem caused by agents pursuing their own interests rather than the interests of the principals who hired them. Firms have several ways to make a worker’s job seem more valuable: • Efficiency wages. • Seniority system. • Profit sharing.

  11. Learning Objective 17.3 17-3 Solved Problem Changing Workers’ Compensation to Reduce Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard Compensation that depends on how much workers sell will reduce adverse selection and moral hazard.

  12. Learning Objective 17.4 The Winner’s Curse: When Is It Bad to Win an Auction? Winner’s curse The idea that the winner in certain auctions may have overestimated the value of the good, thus ending up worse off than the losers. FIGURE 17-1 Oil Company Bids to DrillOff the Louisiana Coast

  13. Learning Objective 17.4 The Winner’s Curse: When Is It Bad to Win an Auction? 1 “In competitive bidding, the winner tends to be the player who most overestimates true tract value.” 2 “He who bids on a parcel what he thinks it is worth will, in the long run, be taken to the cleaners.”

  14. Learning Objective 17.4 MakingtheConnection • Is There a Winner’s Curse in the Marriage Market? A life of bliss or the winner’s curse?

  15. Learning Objective 17.4 The Winner’s Curse: When Is It Bad to Win an Auction? When Does the Winner’s Curse Apply? Does the winner’s curse indicate that the winner of every auction would have been better off losing? No, because the winner’s curse applies only to auctions of common-value assets—such as oil fields—that would be given the same value by all bidders if they had perfect information.

  16. Learning Objective 17.4 17-4 Solved Problem Auctions, Available Information, and the Winner’s Curse When the bidders lack full information, the bids are farther apart, and farther from the true value of the item.

  17. Learning Objective 17.4 The Winner’s Curse: When Is It Bad to Win an Auction? Pacific Telesis Uses the Winner’s Curse to Its Own Advantage Fear of the winner’s curse affected the bidding in auctions for wireless service in California.

  18. Learning Objective 17.4 MakingtheConnection • Want to Make Some Money? Try Auctioning a Jar of Coins The highest bidder on this jar of coins could lose money.

  19. Should Bad Credit Increase Your Car Insurance Rate? LOOK An Inside Your Money: Bad Credit Can Inflate Car Insurance Premiums

  20. K e y T e r m s Adverse selectionAsymmetric informationMoral hazardPrincipal–agent problemWinner’s curse

More Related