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Conference on the Political Dimensions of Poverty Reduction Holiday Inn, Lusaka

Politics and the PRS Approach in Southern Africa Benjamin Roberts. Conference on the Political Dimensions of Poverty Reduction Holiday Inn, Lusaka 9-11 th March 2005. Scope of presentation. Aim:

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Conference on the Political Dimensions of Poverty Reduction Holiday Inn, Lusaka

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  1. Politics and the PRS Approach in Southern Africa Benjamin Roberts Conference on the Political Dimensions of Poverty Reduction Holiday Inn, Lusaka 9-11th March 2005

  2. Scope of presentation • Aim: • Provide a desk-based review of emerging findings on the political dimensions of the PRSP approach in the sub-region • Builds upon recent research by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI, London) • Outline: • Coverage of the PRSP initiative in the sub-region • Emergent themes from the process of development and ongoing implementation of PRS’ • Limitation: • Formulation versus implementation (evidence base)

  3. PRSPs in Africa • PRSPs: dominant vehicle for development policy in SSA. • Sub-Saharan Africa (48) • 19 full PRSPs • 9 I-PRSPs • 8 not eligible • 12 no (I-)PRSP • Southern Africa (14) • 5 full PRSPs • 1 I-PRSP • 6 not eligible • 2 no (I-)PRSP but started process Full PRSP I-PRSP Not eligible

  4. PRSPs in Southern Africa: Experience to date

  5. Source: World Bank, UNDP (2004)

  6. Creating Spaces: Opening up policymaking processes • PRSP formulation: conceived as being conducted in consultation with a broad range of stakeholders. • Opening new spaces for domestic policy dialogue one of potentially most salient contributions of PRSP process • Southern Africa: Some supporting evidence that process of formulating PRS’ begun to encourage opening up of policy spaces. • Representation of CS in PRSP processes has commonly assumed the form of the participation of NGOs, both in institutional structures overseeing PRSP formulation and local consultations. • Process: catalyst for establishment of new national networksof CSOs to engage with poverty policy (e.g. MEJN, CSPR) Pre-existing umbrella organizations also instrumental (e.g. LCN).

  7. Creating Spaces: Opening up policymaking processes • Predominant form of CS participation through district, regional and national consultations. • Varied in coverage and depth: from 7 zonal workshops in Tanzania to, consultations in 200 villages in Lesotho. • Engagement with CSOs: varied in level of inclusiveness and representation: Collaboration less frequent, and joint decision-making extremely rare (Eberlei, 2001). • ‘Fast trcak’ PRSPs (Tan, Moz) appear less consultative in nature than some more recently produced PRS’ (Zam, Les). • Relative inexperience of govts; desire to secure debt relief. • Despite positive achievements, concerns that PRSP process may have by-passed politics in some countries and established forms of representation that do not necessarily advance the interests of the poor over the longer term. • Problem: key actors and institutions (parliament, politicians, and political parties) marginally involved • What organizations, interest groups or social forces have managed to take advantage of the political space?

  8. Political Timing of PRSPs • Launch of the PRSP approach by IFIs and subsequent adoption by countries in Southern Africa: corresponded to different national political events and processes. • Political timing can be either more or less favourable to the PRS process. • Some instances: relatively fortuitous concurrence between national and international timetables, allowing both governments to use ongoing domestic processes to feed into PRSP formulation, helping to shape them as ‘nationally owned’ strategies. • Less favourable: in the face of electoral politics, the PRSP initiative may produce a tension between the desire for a deep, participatory process on the one hand and the urgency of finalizing the PRSP quickly in order for poor countries to access debt relief

  9. Political Timing of PRSPs • Tanzania: • 2000 was an election year: President Mkapa keen to be seen to be doing something about poverty and debt burden. • The PRSP/HIPC initiative provided President and CCM with a crucial opportunity in run-up to the elections: • Decision to eliminate primary school fees: politically popular policy change; • Accessing debt relief • Theme of his re-election campaign. • Next elections scheduled for October 2005: Election calendar is again coinciding with the development of the second PRSP.

  10. Political Timing of PRSPs • Mozambique: Timing proved to be of mixed favour. • Political deadlock following disputed Dec-99 electoral outcomes deteriorated into riots in Nov-00. Increasing focus on these events crowded out time and space for political dialogue on poverty reduction policy during a key phase of the PRSP process. Consequently, neither parliament nor political parties were brought into the PRSP process. • Nonetheless, fortuitous coincidence betw. national and international timetables: govt use Action Programme for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty 2000-2004 (PARPA) as basis of I-PRSP and PRSP formulation, thus helping to shape them as ‘nationally owned’ strategies.

  11. Political Timing of PRSPs • Zambia: • PRSP process coincided with debacle and fragmentation of the ruling party following President Chiluba’s attempt (late ‘00/early ’01) at changing constitution to allow for a third term. • Also occurred alongside Dec 2001 electoral campaign. Impact: parties and candidates notably absent from the PRSP debate. Fear that the PRSP would be perceived as a political platform for political parties to gain unnecessary mileage. This made it difficult to invite parties to PRSP conferences. • Malawi: • I-PRSP preparation understood simply as a requirement for reaching the HIPC Decision Point.

  12. Political Timing of PRSPs • Lesotho: potential political risks to PRSP process emerged around May 2002 elections (in middle of PRS formulation): • Concern: result in insufficient attention being paid to developing the PRSP: affect participatory process; quality and timeliness of final document (disruption of process). • Concern: change in government may affect commitment to PRSP (ownership). • Community consultations occurred weeks before Election Day: were not disrupted. • Timing of Parliamentary briefings during the preparation of the 2002 General Elections not ideal.

  13. PRS Implementation and Good Governance • When governments perform poorly: resources are wasted, services go undelivered, and citizens are denied social, legal, and economic protection. • Emphasis on good governance underlies PRSP approach and the associated ‘process conditionality’ • Latent political objective of PRSP approach: by encouraging good governance, the state will become more responsive to the needs of the citizenry, especially the poor • Lingering questions: • Is there any indication that governments are becoming more responsive to citizen demands across a range of policy areas? • Are neopatrimonial structures beginning to weaken and consequently facilitate progress in reducing poverty? • Examining existing documentation together with attitudinal data from Afrobarometer series: rather tentative conclusions

  14. PRS Implementation and Good Governance • Limitation: in most instances, 1 year is probably insufficient time to see significant results.

  15. State Responsiveness: Economic Reform • Management of the national economy in 2002/03 is viewed in a moderately positive light in all countries except Malawi. • Tanzania: 68% say government handling macroeconomic affairs fairly/very well; 50% in Zambia; 48% in Mozambique. • Malawi: two-thirds feel that economy being managed fairly/very badly. • Specific economic policies: generally negative appraisal • 53% of Tanzanians feel government is doing well at keeping inflation stable, a third or less think so in the other three countries. • In all 4 countries, government is rated as doing poorly in creating employment and narrowing gaps between the rich and the poor, especially Malawi and Zambia. • Tanzanians, Mozambicans: think mass living standards have improved since the adoption of economic structural adjustment and the PRSP while in Zambia and Malawi the converse is true. • Agreement thateconomic reform has reduced the availability of job opportunities and led to inequality. especially pronounced in Malawi and Zambia (nearly 80% perceive a worsening trend).

  16. State Responsiveness: Economic Reform • Majority think government’s economic policies have ‘hurt most people’ and that reforms have ‘only benefited a few’. • Zambia: 3 times as many people think that economic reform incurs more costs than benefits. • Moz: slim majority believe that ‘the government’s economic policies have helped most people’: possibly reflects relatively robust per capita economic growth 1993 - 2003 (5.7%). • Trends: little change with majority still perceiving adverse impact. • Growing social inequalities emerge as a driving force for popular dissatisfaction with market-oriented economic reforms. Perception of Economic Policies

  17. State Responsiveness: Economic Reform • While one might anticipate that, under such circumstances, people would support abandoning market-driven economic policies; reality is more mixed. • Tanzanians and Zambians: remarkable degree of economic patience, with 58% and 50% respectively willing ‘to accept some hardships now…in order for the economy to get better in the future’ • Malawians (40%) and Mozambicans (37%) are the less patient, and in the former case there is majority support (55%) for an overhaul of economic policy. • Economic patience: positive in that it gives policymakers time to achieve results, negative in that it may be sign of uncritical acceptance of status quo

  18. State Responsiveness: Social Reform • After more than 2 years experience in implementing PRS in Tanzania and approx. 1 year in other 3 cases: Remains great variation in perceived state responsiveness, as measured by the level of difficulty in accessing certain types of state provided services. • Relatively easy to get a place in a school for a young child; but difficult to access HH services, business loans or welfare payments • Perceived state responsiveness subsequently influences the overall assessment of government’s social performance. • All cases: majority believe government doing a good job in terms of addressing educational needs and improving basic health services. • Tanzania: approximately three-quarters give a positive appraisal. • More negative assessment is reported in relation to the delivery of water to the household.

  19. State Responsiveness • Limited level of agreement in these countries that ‘elected leaders…look after the interests of people like (me)’ or ‘listen to what people like (me) have to say’. • Despite participatory PRSP processes, upwards of two-thirds of citizens in the PRSP countries acknowledge that the agents of the state are unresponsive to popular needs (esp. high in Zam, Mal)

  20. State Responsiveness: Summing Up • Economic domain: Deeply entrenched view among citizens in the 4 countries that government’s economic policies continue to hurt most people, related to real concerns about the shortage of wage-paying jobs and about the poverty, destitution, and shortages of food that often accompany unemployment. • Social front: some signs that pro-poor spending is increasing the assets of the poor through the provision of social services (e.g. abolition of school fees in Tanzania). • Tension between the two dynamics: PRS’ likely to exacerbate this (‘old wine in new bottles’ debate) unless pro-poor growth achieved. • Tendency of PRS’ to privilege social sector spending (educ, health) while longer-term structural issues (e.g. employment, agriculture) tend to be underempahsised • Result: increasing disaffection, and belief that state is not listening to what people have to say and responding to their needs.

  21. Clients or citizens? Political Values • 2002/03 Afrobarometer round: Some tension between democratic and neopatrimonial political values • Strong desire to influence the decisions taken by political leaders and belief in equal treatment by leaders (rejection of neopatrimonialsm), • Apparent contradiction: 60 - 69% still tend to see themselves as the clients of “big men”. • Perceived Govt performance w.r.t. allowing ordinary people to influence government and treat people fairly? • Results indicate that further institutional development is required in these areas. • 73% Malawians think democratic transition improved ‘ability of ordinary people to influence what government does’; compared with half of Tanzanians, Mozambicans and Zambians. • Even less (47-56%) perceive gains in ‘equal and fair treatment for all people by the government since democratization. • Appears to be emerging an increasing demand for political accountability. However, despite this, there is still substantive room for improvement on the supply side in enabling the citizenry to influence government and promoting the equal treatment of all.

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