Environmental Economics
This text explores environmental economics and examines the concept of market failures, particularly focusing on externalities—both positive and negative. It discusses how markets may fail to produce efficient outcomes due to imperfect information and competition, emphasizing the importance of government intervention. The text outlines various policy responses, including property rights, regulation, emissions taxes, and marketable permits, that aim to correct inefficiencies associated with externalities like pollution. Understanding these mechanisms is crucial for developing effective economic policies.
Environmental Economics
E N D
Presentation Transcript
Environmental Economics • Perfectly competitive markets usually produce efficient outcome • When they don’t, we have a market failure • Imperfect information • Imperfect competition • Equity vs. efficiency • Externalities
Externalities • Exist when there are extra costs or benefits not captured by the market transaction • Costs of producing good and benefits of selling it accrue not only to sellers, but others as well • Benefits of receiving good and costs of buying it accrue not only to buyers, but others as well • Can be positive or negative
Positive externalities: • Individuals enjoy extra benefits they did not pay for • Market will supply less than socially optimal quantity • Ex., research and development • Negative externalities: • Individuals suffer from extra costs they did not incur themselves • Market will supply more than socially optimal quantity • Ex., environmental pollution • Government intervention is necessary
Why? • Suppose producing steel causes pollution (a negative externality) • Social marginal cost = marginal cost to all individuals in economy • Private marginal cost = marginal cost to producer alone • With negative externality, SMC > PMC
Without externality, point E is efficient (MC = MB) • With externality, must consider SMC SMC = SMB at lower quantity of steel (and less pollution) Government regulation required to correct inefficiency
Policy Responses to Pollution • Property rights (Coase theorem) • With appropriately designed property rights, government may not need to intervene directly • Consider a cattle rancher who lives next to a farmer • Cattle keep breaking fence and overgrazing farmer’s land • Suppose gov’t assigns property rights to rancher • If the cost of grazing to farmer outweighs the benefit to rancher, farmer will pay rancher to keep cattle away • Suppose property rights are assigned to farmer • If benefit to rancher outweighs cost to farmer, rancher will compensate farmer for damages • Either way, efficient outcome will emerge when MB to one party equals MC to other
Regulation • Command and control approach • Government sets pollution limits and requires uniform standards for all firms • Same benefits can be achieved at lower cost • Regulations don’t allow for variations across firms • Some firms can reduce pollution more efficiently than others; these firms should do the majority of pollution abatement
Emissions Taxes • More efficient than regulation • From steel example, MSC > MPC and output levels are higher than socially efficient level • By imposing a tax on each unit of emissions, the cost of pollution is internalized by firms • Cost of production is now higher – MPC to MSC (supply curve shifts left) • New equilibrium is socially efficient – lower quantity and higher price (price reflects social cost of producing steel)
Taxes are more efficient than regulation • Under regulation, firms have incentive to stay “just under” specified level • Taxes increase firms’ costs • Provides incentive to reduce pollution as far as possible and find new abatement technologies or less-polluting production methods
Marketable Permits • Gov’t chooses socially efficient level of and issues corresponding number of permits • Each permit allows firm to emit one unit of specified pollutant • Firms can sell their permits • Just like taxes, provides incentive to reduce emissions below regulated standard • Also reaches same reduction in pollution as regulation, but at lower cost
Consider two firms emitting SO2 (in tons) If left unregulated, each firm will release 6 tons of SO2 (12 tons total) Suppose goal is to reduce emissions to 6 tons total (3 tons each) Each plant’s cost of pollution abatement is as follows:
Plant A Plant B
Plant B can reduce emissions at a lower cost than Plant A • Goal is to emissions by 6 tons total • Regulation: each plant cuts emissions by 3 tons • Total Cost = $6 (Plant A) + $3 (Plant B) = $9
Marketable Permits Goal is to ↓ emissions by 6 tons total Each firm is given 3 permits: • Plant A buys a permit from Plant B (at what price?) • Plant A saves $3 by eliminating only 2 tons • Plant B must eliminate 4 tons, but this additional ton costs only $2 to abate • Overall, 6 tons of emissions are eliminated • Total cost = $3 (Plant A) + $5 (Plant B) = $8 • Firms with lower marginal cost of abatement eliminate more efficient (least-cost) outcome