Columbia Space Shuttle Mission STS-107

1. Columbia Space Shuttle Mission STS-107 A Crisis of Leadership

2. Columbia Space Shuttle Mission The Columbia space shuttle disaster occurred on February 1, 2003 when it disintegrated during re-entry over Texas, with the loss of seven crew members. The loss was due to damage caused by foam insulation which broke off the external main propellant tank. The debris struck the leading edge of the left wing, damaging the Thermal Protection System (TPS). While Columbia was still in orbit, some engineers suspected damage, but NASA managers limited the investigation. NASA's Shuttle safety regulations stated that external tank foam shedding and subsequent debris strikes upon the Shuttle itself were safety issues that needed to be resolved. The majority of shuttle launches recorded such foam strikes and tile scarring in violation of safety regulations. Mission STS-107 was the 113th Space Shuttle launch. It had been delayed 18 times over the two years from its original launch date.

3. Columbia Accident Investigation Board Immediately following the accident, the CAIB was created, composed of military and civilian experts, and issued a report in 2003. Regarding organizational causes, the CAIB concluded the accident was: �... rooted in the Space Shuttle Program�s history and culture, including the original compromises that were required to gain approval for the Shuttle, subsequent years of resource constraints, fluctuating priorities, schedule pressures, mischaracterization of the Shuttle as operational rather than developmental, and lack of an agreed national vision for human space flight. Cultural traits and organizational practices detrimental to safety were allowed to develop�communication; lack of integrated management; decision-making processes that operated outside the organization�s rules� (Gehman 9). Additionally, �a broken safety culture,� schedule pressure, budget constraints, and workforce reductions were cited as contributors (Gehman 184-189; 131-139; 102-105; 106-110). The CAIB�s most severe criticism stemmed from the strong similarities between the losses of Columbia and Challenger. In both cases, the CAIB found disturbing instances of inadequate mission management decision-making.

4. CAIB Findings Management and Safety Culture Improvement Issues 1. Oversimplification of technical information could mislead decision-making. 2. Proving Operations are Safe instead of Unsafe 3. Management must guard against being conditioned by success 4. Willingness to accept criticism and diversity of views is essential Organizational issues 1. Effective centralized and decentralized operations require an independent robust safety and technical requirement management. 2. Assuring safety requires a careful balance of organizational efficiency, redundancy, and oversight. 3. Effective communications along with clear roles and responsibilities are essential to a successful organization. Technical Issues 1. Technical capability 2. Technical capability to track known problems and manage them to resolution is essential 3. Technical training program attributes must support potential high consequence operations (Gehman 170-200)

5. Post-Columbia Findings In January 2003, NASA established a new program called �Next Generation Launch Technology Program� which evaluated the development of new technologies that would significantly reduce costs and improve reliability and safety for access to space. It presaged a new era for NASA and marked a paradigm shift for the organization. NASA�s space shuttle program was also evaluated. The seven principles target organizational and leadership deficiencies covered in the report. SEVEN KEY PRINCIPLES OF PROGRAM AND PROJECT SUCCESS 1. Establish a clear and compelling vision. 2. Secure sustained support �from the top�. 3. Exercise strong leadership and management. 4. Facilitate wide open communication. 5. Develop a strong organization. 6. Manage risk. 7. Implement effective systems engineering and integration

6. Transformational Stewardship Transformational stewards are public leaders who �pursue organizational transformation while serving as stewards of their organization and core public administration values� (Kee, Newcomer, and Davis 154) NASA�s inherent organizational problems led to a crisis of leadership which became glaringly apparent in the wake of the Columbia disaster. The CAIB report confirmed this. A comprehensive plan was drafted to address the problems explored in the CAIB report. But has NASA learned from the lessons of Columbia and implemented the steps necessary for organizational change? In other words�has NASA begun to demonstrate the principles of transformational stewardship from lessons learned?

7. I. Complexity� �Perhaps the most important leadership role is the development of strategies, processes, policies, and procedures, and structures to deal with the complexity�an analysis�prior to initiating the change itself (Kee 171) The lack of a compelling, guiding vision of the future has had disastrous consequences for the U.S. space program. This, and lack of a national mandate for NASA and sustained support from the top�from the executive branch on down. The Bush Administration encouraged a compelling vision of human exploration of the solar system in 2004 and NASA responded by creating an ESMD, which identified the requirements of developing new systems that will be required to accomplish the missions and implement the vision with secured federal backing. Since 2006, NASA has moved aggressively with a new strategy which includes: Returning the Space Shuttle safely to flight and using it solely to complete construction of the ISS; Retiring the Shuttle in 2010 to free up a budget �wedge� in excess of $4B annually for use in developing future exploration systems; and Initiate immediate development of a new Crew Transportation System (CTS), composed of two new systems, the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) and the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV).

8. II. Stakeholder Perceptions �the leader must understand... a proposed change event and the strength and likelihood that those influences will impact the change� (Kee 174). ��develop�processes to help stakeholders understand and be prepared for likely gains or losses due to the change, correcting misconceptions�� (Kee 174). ��modification of org structures to enhance communication� in the change process�and mitigate problems arising from a culture that does not support or encourage stakeholder involvement� (Kee 176). NASA has identified three mutually dependent pillars it has begun to implement in its organizational structures which support an effective organization: culture, rewards, and structure. Each requires proactive leadership and dedication of programmatic resources to carefully design and foster. Communication is an essential ingredient to success in each of the pillars, and can be facilitated via careful design of the team structure. Alignment of the organization structure with the product or system being produced is important. Use of small �tiger teams� has proven successful in formulating new programs and executing projects.

9. III. Organizational Capability �The transformational steward�s role (in the short run) is one of diagnosing organizational strengths and weaknesses and developing strategies to overcome the weaknesses. In the long run, �seek to enhance the change capacity of the organization (Kee 175) NASA has implemented its new plan which addresses short term and long term issues and has demonstrated organizational changes which must occur as it transitions into a new age of space technology. �Transformational stewards should learn from the past, recognizing the causes of implementation successes and failures. Some common implementation strategies include creating a designated change team, rotating staff into and out of a change team, promoting processes that ensure transparent and accurate two-way communication between the change team and leaders external to the team, and ensuring that human resource personnel have the authority to effectively manage the change teams� (Kee 178). NASA has redesigned its managerial systems, communications networks, and crisis management procedures inherent from historical culture. It no longer practices �normalization of deviance� nor turns failure into �the memory of success.�

10. �Perhaps the most important role of a transformational steward is in helping create an organizational culture that supports change. This includes creating an openness to new ideas, creating mechanisms for authentic two-way communication�creating �learning organizations �that encourage systems thinking, self-reflection, and periodic reviews of what is working and what can be improved� (Kee 178). In the early days of Apollo, management required quantitative estimates for mission risks but began to address risks qualitatively, including cost and schedule. NASA used bottom-up, judgmentally based approaches, which were not tied directly to technical risks that were often the causes of mission loss. The Space Shuttle Program, as well as others, now has rigorous and continuous risk management critical to the avoidance of system failures that can bring down a program. Program leaders now use a blend of qualitative and quantitative risk assessment techniques, both of which have a strong foundation of technical principles and successful aerospace applications at this point In conclusion, the NASA�s ODT has identified and demonstrated several organization design and analysis techniques that, if used in combination with the seven key principles of program success, can significantly improve the agency�s ability to run effective program, project, and line organizations for the future. NASA has begun to demonstrate transformational stewardship.