Busan Outcomes Elements of analysis

1. Busan OutcomesElements of analysis TUDCN General Meeting Florence (IT) 12-14 December 2011

2. Overallassessment • GEOPOLITICS OVERSHADOW DEVELOPMENT RESULTS • CHINA and INDIA (voluntary commitments) • BRASIL, MEXICO (full support for BOD) • DONORS HIDE BEHIND BRICS TO LOWER ENGAGEMENTS • => OVERALL LACK OF COMMITMENTS • THE PARADIGM SHIFTED TOWARDS BRICS «MODEL» : «DOING BUSINESS» • ECONOMIC GROWTH AND “STEERED” «INCLUSIVENESS» • PRIVATE SECTOR AS DRIVER OF DEVELOPMENT • STRONG STATE AS “ENABLENER” • NATIONAL FRAMEWORKS AND OBJECTIVES • WHAT CAN WE DO BETTER THAN ACCRA AND HOW? • IMPLEMENTATION WAS AND REMAINS THE PROBLEM • COMMITMENTS AND STRATEGIES • MOVING FROM AID TO DEVELOPMENT (FROM AID TO RIGHTS)

3. GENERAL OUTCOMES • The answers given are uncertain and remain to be concretised (in-country partnerships and building blocs) • The commitments of the private sector are not tangible and the terms of engagement are weak • The overall architecture remains voluntary and undefined • The multistakeholder dimension is insufficiently recognised. The focus remains largely intergovernmental. =>>> The follow up process will be crucial

4. BOD Preamble • All partners, including civil society (?) • The China/India voluntary commitments (sic) • Recognising INEQUALITY, DECENT WORK and PROMOTE HR, DEMOCRACY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE AS PART OF THE DEAL • Missing out UN-EMPLOYEMENT • Diversification of actors • Differentiation of commitments • Embracing diversity • Common principles but diverse ways of implementing • Sustainable development (including social protection) • Funding for development: privatisation ????

5. BOD Commongoals & commitments • Consistence with internationally agreed commitments on HR, DECENT WORK, gender, … • Ownership, results (reducing inequality), inclusiveness, transparency and accountability • Shared principles • DEMOCRATIC ownership • Capacity development • South South and triangular • Diversity of funding • Implementation at country level

6. Operational paragraphs • Mexico para on diversity • Paris and Accra: Quo Vadis ? • South-South • Lessons learned from Paris evidence….??? • Development ownership but joint risk management; and very limited monitoring and assessment systems limited to country priorities only! Untying of aid reaffirmed. • Country systems by default but donor decides unilaterly on the use…contradiction • Gender : country priorities (!) and decent work is out • Parliaments and local governments

7. Operational paragraphs • Civil society §: adds to Accra with legal framework for enabling environment and acknowledge Istanbul Principles and Framework • Transparency: improved, standard accepted to be defined by December 2012 and implemented by 2015 • Predictability: Indicative tables by 2013 for AAA partners • Reduce fragmentation • Country-led arrangements by 2013 • Fragile states (new deal) • Societies at risk

8. Operational paragraphs • Aid to development effectiveness: growth? • Effective institutions: capturing on CSOs? • South South • South South • Private sector • Trade unions as partners in enabling environment • Private sector as partner in design of policies • Innovative financial expenses • Aid for trade • Advancing both development and business outcomes, mutually reinforcing • Corruption (missing tax heavens) • Climate change financing (UN)

9. Architecture and follow up • Continuity of commitments PD, AAA, GPED • National frameworks • Selective and relevant set of indicators and targets to measure progress • National/regional monitoring exercises • Institutional framework • Unclear references to regional organisations and UNDCF • “regular review of progress” • Working arrangements to be clarified by July 2012 • OECD and UNDP to support the functioning of the GPED

10. Our assessment • The overall focus confirms the trend towards privatisation and embracement of development by market driven goals, responding to the credo’s of neoliberal politics • Free game and support for private sector • Small states (but effective – sic) • Weakening of international commitments to optimise in-country “effectiveness” • Donor and (international) corporate driven • Broadening the agreement is positive and increases legitimacy • But weakens the overall strength of commitments • We are far from a standards based binding set of commitments (eg “convention”)

11. Our assessment • The in-country emphasis takes the burden from the donor behaviour (PD and AAA) toward to countries responsibility itself (undeclared donor objective: the problem is theirs) • We are far from a standards based binding set of commitments (eg “convention”) • We have good wording on decent work, social inclusion etc…and on certain points the language is better than AAA • However, it is very likely that donor resources will drive the agendas of the building blocks • Much remains to be made concrete in the action plan but the potential is there to influence some of it in a positive way.

12. Our commitments • ON THE PRIVATE SECTOR • We pushed for recognition as social partners • BIAC did not endorsed the demand for time reasons • Should we pursue this in order to have a seat on the table together with BIAC • Should we engage with the Private sector Building Block and under what conditions • ON DECENT WORK AND SOCIAL PROTECTION • No building blocks besides the Private sector and “results” • Rights Based Approaches Building Block may be a good way to promote DW and SP • Indicators on Decent Work to be included in the overall results assessment framework

13. Future CSO architecture • Now: BetterAid and Open Forum • Challenges: it is now about implementation in-country • Building blocks • But also CSO effectiveness etc • Two parallel structures are not useful nor workable • We could favour a multi polar architecture based on 1 unique governance framework • REGIONS, SECTORS & COMMON THEMES (BB) & SUPPORT • ITUC WOULD BE ONE OF THE SECTORS • PARIS OFFICE WOULD BE UNDER SUPPORT • ENABLING ENVIRONMENT COULD BE A COMMON THEME INTEGRATED OR IN PARRALEL TO RBA • 1 GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE (COORDINATION GROUP)