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Lecture 4

Lecture 4. Mental Causation, Behaviorism. Mental causation and dualism. The Problem of Mental Causation. “[I]t would be easier for me to concede matter and extension to the soul, than the capacity of moving a body and of being moved, to an immaterial being” (Elisabeth of Bohemia, 1643).

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Lecture 4

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  1. Lecture 4 Mental Causation, Behaviorism

  2. Mental causation and dualism

  3. The Problem of Mental Causation • “[I]t would be easier for me to concede matter and extension to the soul, than the capacity of moving a body and of being moved, to an immaterial being” (Elisabeth of Bohemia, 1643).

  4. The Problem of Mental Causation, cont. • Two objections inspired by Elisabeth of Bohemia’s question: • Objection 1: • The dualist cannot specify a mechanism, i.e., a “series of intermediate steps or stages that transform one state into another”(Crumley, p. 27).

  5. The Problem of Mental Causation, cont. • Objection 2: • The Argument From Causal closure: • Every physical event is completely explained by physical causes. (Premise) • Human actions are physical events. (Premise) Therefore, • Human actions are completely explained by physical causes. (From 1,2) Therefore, • There is no room for non-physical causes in explanations of action. (From 3) Therefore, • If dualism is true, then there is no mental causation. (From 4)

  6. Epiphenomenalism • Dualists who accept that the mental does not causally interact with the physical are epiphenomenalists. • Problems for epiphenomenalism: • Conflict with folk psychology. • Smullyan’s “unfortunate dualist”.

  7. behaviorism

  8. Background to Behaviorism: Interactionism • Introspectionists studied the mind by asking test subjects to report on their own mental states. Wilhelm Wundt, founder of introspectionism (and of psychology)

  9. Behaviorism • Behavior, unlike mental states, is publicly and directly observable. • Behavior should therefore be the focus of psychology.

  10. Behaviorism 1: Methodological Behaviorism • Psychology is the study of behavior. • Mental concepts do not illuminate behavior. • We do not know whether mental states exist.

  11. Skinner’s Notion of Operant Conditioning • The ultimate causes of an agent’s voluntary behavior are current stimuli and the rewards and punishments the agent has received for her past behavior. • Example: • Jimmy sings karaoke every week-end because he has received positive praise for his performances in the past.

  12. Behaviorism 2: Ontological Behaviorism • Psychology is the study of behavior. • Mental states do not exist; • they are fictions we invent when we don’t know the complex operant history responsible for a behavior.

  13. Logical Behaviorism • Mental terms are shorthand for more complicated behavioral descriptions. • Example: ‘John is in pain’ is shorthand for: ‘(a) If you ask John ‘Are you in pain?’ he will reply ‘Yes’, and (b) John tries to avoid the source of the pain, and (c) John grimaces, and (d) Etc…

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