1 / 13

Options for Protection: Protecting National Electric Grids and Critical Infrastructures

Options for Protection: Protecting National Electric Grids and Critical Infrastructures. Bronius Cikotas John Kappenman. An Overview of Space Weather & EMP Risks and the US Electric Power Infrastructure. Comparing Space Weather Threat to Other Power System Threats.

kathy
Télécharger la présentation

Options for Protection: Protecting National Electric Grids and Critical Infrastructures

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. Options for Protection: Protecting National Electric Grids and Critical Infrastructures Bronius Cikotas John Kappenman

  2. An Overview of Space Weather & EMP Risks and the US Electric Power Infrastructure Comparing Space Weather Threat to Other Power System Threats Conventional Terrestrial Threats Geomagnetic Storm Threats High Winds & Ice Loading – Design Code Storm Development Electromagnetic Processes nearly Instantaneous Lightning – Shield Wires & Lightning Arresters Geographic Extent Planetary Scale - Impact at each station – with Large Cumulative Impact Seismic – Design Code Terrestrial Weather – Air mass related that can take many days to evolve - Hurricanes Industry Design Approach Design Evolutions have unknowingly Escalated GIC Risks and Potential Impacts Un-Recognized Systemic Risk – No Design Code Yet to minimize this Threat Severe Threats are geographically confined Continuously monitor and base operational decisions on Terrestrial weather conditions

  3. Common Solution Approaches - Overview • Hardening the Power Grid for Naturally Occurring Geomagnetic Storms also Hardens against slow pulse or E3 portion of EMP • Hardening the Power Grid for Fast Pulse or E1 portion of EMP Threat also diminishes Threat from RF Weapon Attacks (IEMI) • Proximity Control – important for Physical Attacks also diminishes Threat from IEMI • Layered Mitigation Approach for both Geomagnetic Storms and EMP • Improved Situational Awareness for Power Grid Operators is needed and is readily available (Emphasis on disturbance environments/GIC levels instead of ambiguous K Indices) • Hardening - Major Emphasis should be focused on Preventing Storm-Related Catastrophic Failure - Remedial Design measures for the Grid (transformer neutral devices) are readily feasible and cost effective

  4. Common Solution Approaches - Overview • Given Sufficient Time the Reoccurrence of Large Storm Event is a Certainty – with Significant Consequences for Society • Power Grid has not been designed for Terror or War Fighting Mission, but it does provide an attractive and asymmetric target. • Proliferation of Nuclear Materials & Designs is a reality • Non-Nuclear Device Options are readily available & growing in unchecked capability • Methods for Hardening Infrastructures are known and readily available – not a Technology Push • International Standards & Guidelines exist for Hardening against EMP and IEMI Threats

  5. Common Solution Approaches – GIC Blocking • Blocking Devices will Protect Transformers and Grid from Damage • Devices were originally developed in early 1990’s • At Present Only Limited Numbers of Devices are installed • Wide-Spread Installation Needed to Reduce GIC Flows • Appropriate & Robust Design will work to Block GIC from Storms and EMP • Can be easily applied Remedially to Today’s Power Grids GIC Blocking Capacitor Hi-Speed ByPass Electron Tube is Critical High Speed / High Current Technology

  6. Improved Situational Awareness View of Storm Environment - May 4, 1998 Provides Details on Impacted Region to End-Users Synoptic Condition Map provides Ability for End-Users to Quickly make Situational Assessments

  7. Improved Situational Awareness Storm and GIC Flows in New England Transformer GIC Red & Green Indicate Polarity of GIC – Red Into Transformer, Green Out of Transformer Geo-Electric Field Orientation and Size of Vector Indicate Relative Direction and Intensity of Field Power Grid State Estimation at 4:16 UT May 4, 1998

  8. Improved Situational Awareness Other Critical Infrastructures • Improved Situational Awareness – End Users of Electric Power with Critical Functions • Examples are various IT, Telecommunications, SCADA centers • Critical Systems which have UPS (Uninterruptible Power Supply) and Back-Up Generation Capability • “Island or Disconnect from the Grid” for extra protection • UPS’s general vulnerabilities to Harmonic Distortion due to Geomagnetic Storms (from Defense Dept work)

  9. Common Solution Approaches – E1-EMP & IEMI Hardening • Shielding Structures • Filtering • Zoning or Nesting of Multiple Barriers

  10. Common Solution Approaches – E1-EMP & IEMI Hardening Concept of Layered Mitigation

  11. Common Solution Approaches – E1-EMP & IEMI Hardening • Cable Management • Power cables • Data communications (e.g. IT networks) • Auxiliary circuits (e.g. door openers, fire alarm) • Sensitive circuits Widespread migration to Fiber Optic-based Data and Signal Cabling is an important improvement in Robust Hardening for E1 & IEMI Threats

  12. Example of Bulkhead Device for EMP Protection for Power Supply to Secure Facility 4138 Bi-tron™Series Configuration 13.8kV Power Out 13.8kV Power In Flange Provides secure grounding of power feed penetrations at Facility Wall Perimeter

  13. Time Scale of EMP Protection MOV – much slower New Advanced Fusion Systems technology significantly improves Protection margin compared to MOV

More Related