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This examination delves into the philosophical frameworks of Alfred North Whitehead and Nicolai Hartmann, highlighting their seemingly distinct yet deeply interconnected ideas. Both philosophers advocate for process-based approaches and emphasize the emotional underpinning of knowledge and values within their frameworks. They challenge traditional ideas by asserting that actuality precedes possibility and present unique categorizations of existence. This paper invites further inquiry into their commonalities, aiming to establish a more nuanced understanding of their contributions to modern thought.
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W and H RP
Whitehead and Hartmann • W: 1861-1947; H: 1882-1950 • Superficially widely different systems; very closeas far as their underlining attitudes are considered • Scientifically informed philosophies • Process-based philosophies • Articulated theory of categories • Knowledge rests on an emotional basis • Values are part of the overall frame • Against closed systems but in favor of a systematic attitude • Principle of identity left on the periphery of the framework • Deeply focused on their work; very reserved attitude
Whitehead and Hartmann • 2+2 structure • W: Two primary types of entities (actual entities; eternal objects) and two hybrid types (feelings; propositions) (PR 287) • H: Two primary spheres of being (real; ideal) and two secondary spheres (knowledge; logic) (G; M) • Actuality precedes possibility (against the mainstream idea that possibility precedes actuality) • Both have problems with the genus-species structure • W: useful for certain scientific purposes in their early stages; it does not satisfy the highest needs of abstraction • H: limits the genus-species structure to the ideal sphere and to the first step of categorial analysis • Relevance of process/event/time. Limited role for substance. Limited role for object/complex/system
Contact-points between W and H • Reality: • W: “stubborn facts” within actual entities • H: “reality is the absolute determination of being and not-being” (M.150-1) • Events happen only once; they pass but do not change • W: “an actual event, … is divested of all possibility” (PNK.66); “is just what it is and is just how it is related and nothing else” (PNK.61) • H: Actuality maintains itself in the flow of time; it is not fleeting. In this sense, the actual is an “eternal present” (N.13g) • Both past (and future) have being • W: being past does not take away being; what is lost is subjective immediacy • H: if past and future are non-being, they cannot exert any influence over the present because non-being cannot influence being. “A causal connection between something irreal and something real is a non-ens” (N.12d). Both past and future are. The difference among past, present and future is a difference between being actual and being non actual
Contact-points between W and H • The contact-points between W and H I have shortly presented do not exhaust the series of contact-points between these two thinkers • Many more can be detected. Those that I have selected are only the most apparent, those that are easier to detect. A thoroughgoing study of the convergences between H and W is still in wait • For a preliminary inquiry: J.N. Mohanty, Nicolai Hartmann and Alfred North Whitehead. A Study in Recent Platonism. Calcutta, Progressive Publishers, 1957 • If this conference will contribute to a more articulated understanding of W and H, it will have achieved its goal