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ELECTRIC POWER GRID INTERDICITION

ELECTRIC POWER GRID INTERDICITION . Javier Salmeron and Kevin Wood, Naval Postgraduate School Ross Baldick, University of Texas at Austin. Sponsored by DoJ, Office of Domestic Preparedness . Purpose. In this presentation we will...

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ELECTRIC POWER GRID INTERDICITION

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  1. ELECTRIC POWER GRID INTERDICITION Javier Salmeron and Kevin Wood, Naval Postgraduate School Ross Baldick, University of Texas at Austin Sponsored by DoJ, Office of Domestic Preparedness

  2. Purpose • In this presentation we will... • Show the importance of analyzing vulnerabilities of electric power systems to terrorist attacks • Present our models, and exact and heuristic algorithms to carry out this analysis • Present results on standard IEEE Reliability Test Networks

  3. A Long-Recognized Issue (I) • “One can hardly imagine a targetmore ideal than the U.S. domestic energy” (A.B. and L.H. Lovins, 1983) • “Any U.S. region could suffer lasting and widespread blackouts if three or more substations were targeted.” (OTA, 1990) • “The U.S. is at, or is fast approaching, a crisis stage with respect to reliability of transmission grids.” (NERC, 2001) • “The U.S. electric power systems must clearly be made more resilient to terrorist attack.” (Committee on Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism, NRC, 2002)

  4. A Long-Recognized Issue (II) • (On Ahmed Ressam) “They were specifically trained to attack critical infrastructure, including electric power plants.” (CNN, 2002) • “And the threat isn't simply academic. U.S. occupation forces in Afghanistan discovered Al Qaeda documentation about the facility that controls power distribution for the eastern U.S., fueling fears that an attack on the power grid may one day become a reality.”(Energy Pulse, 2003) • “Blue Cascades” project (simulated terrorist attack on the Pacific Northwest's power grid). The study showed that such an attack, if successful, could wreak havoc on the nation's economy, shutting down power and productivity in a domino effect that would last weeks. (Energy Pulse, 2003)

  5. Terrorist Threat Potential targets: • Generating plants • Transmission and distribution lines • Substations Easy disruption + Widespread damage + Difficult recovery

  6. Our Approach • Assumes Information Transparency: Same information is available to both sides • Uses optimization to assess worst-case disruptions • Goal: • To provide insight on physical vulnerabilities and protective plans that proactively hedge against disruption caused by terrorist attacks

  7. Mathematical Analysis of the Problem • In order to better defend the electric grid it is valuable to understand how to attack it! • Optimal power flow model (minimizing load shedding) • Interdiction model (maximize disruption) • Additional features of the problem are: • Time scale: Very short-, short-, medium- and long-term • Customer types; ability to “share the pain” • Uncertainty about terrorist resources • Assumptions on protection resources

  8. DC-OPF: Power Flow Model (DC Approx.) s.t. i: bus, l: line, g: generator, c: customer sector PLine, PGen: power (MW) S: power shed  : bus phase

  9. I-DC-OPF: DC-OPF after interdiction Interdiction Model Where: s.t. Etc...

  10. Heuristic Solve the DC-OPFPower Flow Modelgiven the current grid configuration Based on the current and previous flow patterns, assign a “Value” (V) to each interdictable asset Interdictthe assets that maximize “Total Value”

  11. Exact Linearization of the Model

  12. Load shedding: 1,258 MW Load shedding: 1,373 MW IEEE Reliability Test System 96-99 Total load: 2,850 MW Interdiction resource: 6 terrorists Line x1 Single transformer x2 Bus or substation x3 Salmeron, Wood and Baldick (2004), IEEE Transactions on Power Systems

  13. IEEE Reliability Test System 96-99 Load: 5,700 MW 12 terrorists Shedding: 2,516 MW Salmeron, Wood and Baldick (2004), IEEE Transactions on Power Systems

  14. Trafos with spares Lines Slow repair One to several days Days to one week Weeks Grid Component Interdictable Resources M (no. of terrorists) Outage Duration (h) No repair Lines (overhead) YES 1 72 Lines (underground) NO N/A N/A E.g.: Transformers YES 2 768 Buses YES 3 360 Generators NO N/A N/A Substations YES 3 768 System Restoration MW shedding >1 months t (Attack)

  15. Total Load: 2,850 MW Substation Protected Substation Protected MW 2 3 3 4 Salmeron, Wood and Baldick (2004), IEEE Transactions on Power Systems t Attack +360h +768h +72h IEEE Reliability Test System 96-99

  16. Results for the Linearized MIP

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