Lessons from Cornwallis XV and the Afghanistan Experience

1. Analysis of Strategies for Future Conflicts: Lessons from Cornwallis XV and the Afghanistan Experience Dave Mason Emeritus Scientist Defence Research & Development Canada Centre for Operational Research & Analysis David.Mason@forces.gc.ca Presented to: Cornwallis XVI: Analysis for Future Conflict Uberlingen, Germany 18–21 April 2011

2. Outline • Introduction and aim • Failed/failing states, carts, horses, … • Who were the experts here? • Some over-arching fundamentals first … • Establishing a stable & secure environment • Understanding the ‘human terrain’ • Reaching a formal peace agreement • Building a governance system • Building a justice system • Building the police forces • Building a national army • Building an economy • Building public works • Dealing with corruption • Building education and health care systems • Assembling the jig-saw puzzle

3. Introduction and Aim • Cornwallis XV: Analysis for the Future of Afghanistan • 29 March – 1 April 2010 • Washington, DC • Dave Davis approached the Cornwallis ‘fellows’ to develop a synthesis of the insights from the collective experience in Afghanistan that was presented and discussed at Cornwallis XV • AIM: To consolidate insights from C-XV into a strategic framework that might be applicable to the analysis of future conflicts • Ian Mitchell’s ‘Prologue’ was invaluable in compiling this analysis

4. Failed/Failing States, Carts, Horses, … Stable & secure environment Justice system Governance system Constitution Health Public works Police forces Which of these components/issues are more important than others? Which must be addressed earlier, and which can be left to later? National army Functioning economy Formal peace agreement Tax base Elections Education External funding Corruption Free press

5. Who were the Experts?Partial List of Cornwallis XV Presenters: • Christian Aulbach, First Secretary for Political Affairs, German Embassy, Washington • John Applebaugh, Research Associate, Institute for National Strategic Studies • Thomas Blau, Professor, College of international Security Affairs • Walter Clarke, retired US foreign service officer • Christian Delanghe, LTG (ret’d) French Army, commanded in SFOR in Bosnia, • Amy de Vries, research psychologist at Dstl, UK, deployed analyst to TF Helmand HQ • Gene Dewey, former US Assistant Secretary of State, UN Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees, and US Special Envoy to Afghanistan • Ethan Kapstein, Professor, U of Texas (Austin), former Ex Director of Economics & National Security Program at Harvard U., author of The Fate of Young Democracies • Clare Lockhart,Director, Institute for State Effectiveness,co-author of Fixing Failed States, UN advisor to the Bonn Agreement in Afghanistan • Lisa Schirch, Executive Director of 3D Security Initiative, Professor of Peacebuilding, Eastern Mennonite University, author of 4 books • Lynette Stehr, senior scientist with Tetra Tech Inc. • Also: a representative from Afghanistan embassy sat in • Inputs from re-presentation of C-XV highlights in Ottawa, May 2010 (Cdn:) • Adrienne Turnbull, analyst twice deployed to support CF in Kanadahar Canadian Input:

6. Some Over-Arching Fundamentals First … • Although each conflict is unique, we must learn from past experiences • Aulbach: For example, there are numerous parallels in Afghanistan with the Marshall Plan for post-WWII Germany • Delanghe: Lessons from Algeria experiences decades ago, where captains became ‘kings of their valleys’, worked well • The role of the UN is paramount and fundamental • Cdn: The international community will never proceed without the support of a UN Security Council Resolution • Clarke: UN role in Afghanistan needed to be enhanced • Stability first, rebuild second • Applebaugh: Sequence will always be: Clear, Hold, Build • Dewey: Reconstruction begins with the return of refugees • Delanghe: If you try to deal with an insurgency, provide force protection and reconstruction all at the same time then reconstruction will suffer • Engaged nations need to show consistent foreign policy on the issues • Public opinion will inevitably sway decisions on national commitments • Dewey: Unhelpful that US changed its message to Afghanistan from “we won’t forget you” to “wait until after Iraq” • Engaged nations need to fully understand the ‘human terrain’ – the local history and culture • Delanghe: Don’t try to impose our model on other nations • Will discuss with full slide later • ...

7. Some Over-Arching Fundamentals (cont’d) • Have patience • Delanghe: It will take at least one full generation to resolve problems in Afghanistan • Aulbach: Will need to keep a military presence up to 10 years in Afghanistan, reconstruction indefinitely • Schirch: Project permanency by posting top diplomats and military commanders for several years or longer • Cdn: On the other hand, mission fatigue can result in degraded performance • Division of duties between engaged nations needs to be well thought through • Delanghe, Aulbach: Assigning lead nation responsibilities to different functions didn’t work so well in Afghanistan • US: ANA, Germany: ANP, Italy: Justice, …

8. Establishing a Stable & Secure Environment • Applebaugh: Objective of intervening forces: Clear, Hold, then Build • Applebaugh: UK only cleared Nad Ali district in Helmand, Taliban re-took • Turnbull: We’ve never been able to ‘Clear’ effectively in Afghanistan • Understand the threat well • Applebaugh: Taliban are, in reality, quite a diverse mix, ranging from • Religious fundamentalists (15%) that you can’t negotiate with, to • Economically motivated opportunists (60%) which you can negotiate with • Will never eliminate them • Delanghe: Distinguish ‘enemy’ from ‘adversary’ • Some may eventually be on our side, some never will • Applebaugh: Insurgents’ strategy will be: Discredit, Exhaust, Inherit • Applebaugh: GIRoA is the big threat to the Taliban’s ability to control a region • Turnbull: Multiple powers are competing in Afghanistan • Local/tribal governance and/or warlords currently have as much influence in a region as GIRoA and Taliban • Applebaugh: Insurgents don’t win insurgencies, governments lose them • De Vries: Learn about insurgents from their messages • How messages are delivered says a lot about them - YouTube, web sites, ... • ...

9. Establishing a Stable & Secure Environment (cont’d) • Communication with the locals is critical • Turnbull: Canadian Forces commanders and troops employ translators and cultural advisors extensively • Our national military doctrine is usually outdated and not well focused on non-traditional military operations • Delanghe: France was too reactive in operations • Delanghe: French strategy/doctrine was outdated • Delanghe: Don’t resort to playing their game; make them play your game • Cdn: The military themselves are slowly coming to recognize that asymmetric operations are part of their day job • Intervening forces do need to be strategically and doctrinally flexible • Delanghe: Strategy often has to be modified ‘by valley’, like in Bosnia

10. Understanding the ‘Human Terrain’ • Find out what the people want concerning form of government • Schirch: Afghans want • A third option beyond the Taliban or the Karzai government • More regional diplomacy • To reach decisions by consensus • Applebaugh: Afghans must see their own government providing security, not the Taliban or foreign troops • Look at things from the peoples’ viewpoint • De Vries: Humans look for confirmation of our preconceptions in actions of others • Delanghe: Accidental deaths of civilians can certainly galvanize locals against international security forces • Turnbull: CF policy is to pay families when civilians are accidentally killed • Understand underlying cultural perceptions • Delanghe: Headgear can set an unintended tone • Dewey: An Afghan’s greatest fear is having to leave his/her home • McChrystal’s policy of evacuating locals did not go over well • Afghan diplomat: Afghans don’t really care if their ‘hearts and minds’ are won • Afghan diplomat: Elders have lost traditional power after 30 years of war • They want security to go forward, not backward to where they were

11. Reaching A Formal Peace Agreement • A formal peace process/agreement is a cornerstone of success • Attributes of a good peace process/agreement: • Schirch: A peace process needs to be regional, iterative,and all inclusive • Lockhart: Justified grievances need to be redressed • Lockhart, Schirch: Things like a simple acknowledgement of past actions are important • There is no peace agreement in Afghanistan • Schirch: Taliban leadership is, in fact, accessible … • Turnbull: Problem is that nobody speaks for the entire insurgency • Taliban and other components of the insurgency don`t really talk (lucky for us) • Schirch: Enemy will only negotiate if they believe they will do worse otherwise • Questions: • Does the lack of an agreement in Afghanistan hinder progress? • Is a peace agreement even possible for Afghanistan? • Schirch: Half of all peace agreements fail

12. Building a Governance System • Governance system may need to be built from scratch • Applebaugh: All vestiges of government (at all levels) in Afghanistan were lost over 3 decades of civil war • Work with all parties to develop a constitution, a fundamental prerequisite • Bonn Agreements initiated early on led to an accepted constitution for Afghanistan based on its 1964 version • Some form of representative government is essential • Cdn: The west does not need to fall on its sword over the term ‘democracy’ • Cdn: Elections are important for the people to perceive that their new government is at least somewhat representative • But wait until conflict has subsided and peace agreements have been attained • Form of government needs to consider cultural factors • Local tribal powers are strongly ingrained in Afghanistan • Lockhart: In Afghanistan, five natural levels of government need to be acknowledged • Nation, Province, Region, District, Village • ...

13. Building a Governance System (cont’d) • Interim ‘Government in a Box’ solutions may be required • Applebaugh: PRTs have been demonstrated as a reasonable substitute for ‘government in a box’ until one can be established • Turnbull: Some feel PRTs are flawed and undermine GIRoA and hence the people`s confidence in GIRoA • Wilkinson: Three ways to build the government • Top down with strong central government first • Advantage: Host nation ownership • Problem: Imposed, so not respected locally • Bottom up with respected local governments first • Advantage: Empowers locals and responds to their needs • Problem: Poor resource management and connectivity • Middle out, with solid regional government first (Wilkinson recommends) • Advantages: Can reach both ways easily • Many important resources are regional (water, electricity) • Taliban cut transmission lines from Kajaki Dam

14. Building a Justice System • Enforcement requires early establishment of functioning police forces • Bendett: Justice system needs to respect traditional law in tribal regions • The rule of law cannot be established immediately • Lockhart: Need to set a definitive point in time where: • Amnesty is declared for past actions • Law is enforced from that point forward • With a justice system in place: • Problems like corruption can be dealt with • Delanghe: Then you can deal with insurgents as criminals, not a military enemy

15. Building the Police Forces • The rule of law is not possible without alaw enforcement organization • The western model of police forces may be quite foreign to the local culture • No similar body ever existed before in Afghanistan • Rule of law and the judicial system have traditionally been weak there • Delanghe: French Gendarmerie model (500 yrs old) may be useful? • Police reported directly to head of government • Had officers work in pairs and live in barracks to minimize corruption • Aulbach: Local respect is a cornerstone for success of a police force • Corruption will never enable respect to be gained • Police forces have to be paid a fair wage to minimize corruption potential • ANP recruits were vouched for by local elders in some areas • Training and mentoring the police forces • Needs to be well planned and organized • Aulbach: German effort to train ANP was a failure • Bendett: US hired contractors to train ANP pre-2009 … wasn’t best approach • Bendett, Starr: The right office needs to hold the responsibility • Special Inspector-Gen. for Afghanistan (SIGAR) should have ANP training authority • Turnbull: Need to integrate trainers and mentors into the police forces • Canadian police officers act as both trainers and mentors, and patrol with the ANP

16. Building a National Army • It will have to train with and take over from the intervening forces at some point in time • Army must be respected by the people and viewed as their protectors, therefore • Control of the army needs to be clear and rational • Leadership needs to well selected • Soldiers need to be paid respectably to minimize power abuse potential • Recruit to attain a representative demographic • Army needs to be capable • Training, training, training …

17. Building an Economy • Turnbull: Top priority for people (even before physical security) is simplya job that will provide enough money for the basics of food and shelter • Asia Foundation: Unemployment (40%) and corruption are the top two concerns of Afghans • Conflict can destroy a national economy • Lockhart: In 1950s, Afghanistan had an economy similar to modern-day Turkey • Kapstein: Legal land titles are critical for self-investment, and Afghanistan’s system is a mess • Security is an essential prerequisite to rebuilding an economy • Kapstein: Construction sector is particularly sensitive to security • Initially, external funding from the international community will be required to help rebuild an economy • An functioning economy generates the tax base necessary to fund critical government services over time • And permits the external funding taps to be turned off (down) • Turnbull: but a government has to be trustworthy; nobody wants to pay taxes to a government that even the international community doesn’t trust • Young: Pumping money in the side doors undermines the government • Money will get collected either way; if government doesn’t then criminals will • ...

18. Building an Economy (cont’d) • Encourage entrepreneurship • Fulton: Multinationals are focused on profit and don’t tend to create lasting jobs • Fulton: Locals have the local knowledge and networking to make things work • Kapstein: Accept that a large percentage of the economy will be informal • Est. 40-50% of the Italian economy is informal • Maximize the nation’s geographic, geologic, and climatic advantages • Lockhart, Turnbull: Afghanistan’s land-locked status can be an economic asset as crossroads of Asia • As part of the ancient Silk Route, this has been a traditional source of income • Efficient ring road system required • Lockhart: Afghanistan should focus on construction, textiles, gem stone industries • Turnbull: USGS estimates huge reserves of oil and gas in Afghanistan • Lockhart: Monopolies can be a critical component to economic success, but government has to manage them fairly • Kapstein: Good measure of a government’s chances of survival is the interest rate on government issued bonds • Kapstein: Just do it … even the experts don’t really understand functioning of national economies

19. Building Public Works • Restoration of public utilities is one of the first things that must be tackled to ensure public safety, health, and comfort • Water, electricity, gas • Functioning utilities are a prerequisite to jump-starting an economy • Stehr: Electricity and telecoms are more needed than a skilled workforce • Mason: Economies run on the beds of trucks • A passable road system is essential • Ensure gasoline and diesel are widely available • Medical facilities are important to the people • Education facilities are important to the people • Turnbull: Optics are important • Practice of putting an international stamp on projects is a huge problem • Would be better to make it look like GIRoA did it to build Afghans’ confidence in their government • Fulton: Promote entrepreneurship with external funding of public works • The locals will have to be able to maintain what is built

20. Dealing with Corruption • Corruption is a universal human tendency • Young: ‘It’s their culture’ is not the reason it exists in Afghanistan • Mason: The human race wouldn’t be at the top of the food chain on this planet if it wasn’t for that fatal human trait: greed • External funding is essential to rebuild, but it invites corruption • SIGAR: 30% of the money leaving Kabul ($10M/mo.) is lost to corruption • Turnbull: Much of the money is lost before it ever gets there • “Most charities are a great way to fund fat white men” • Blau: “Money is a weapon system” • Corruption cannot be controlled without • Having a functioning justice system in place • Having a functioning police force in place to enforce the laws • Underpaying officials (judges, police, …) invites corruption • People notice it, and people abhor it • Asia Foundation: Corruption (and unemployment) are the top two concerns of Afghans • Bendett: Bribes estimated as 23% of Afghan economy! • ...

21. Dealing with Corruption (cont’d) • But is a limited amount of corruption necessarily bad in the transition period? • Young: Minor levels of corruption are more acceptable • Baumgarten: Bribery is an accepted part of transportation costs • Mason: Chicago wouldn’t have become the great city it is without corruption • William Young, cultural anthropologist at SAIC, gave a great discussion of corruption using the example of the agricultural situation at Lashkar Gah in Helmand province • Police, who are paid $50/mo., extract ‘fees’ from local poppy farmers • Mayor buys up land when he knows where USAID wants to build • Eradicating the poppies just penalizes hard working folks • Stehr: Poppies comprise 4% of their economy • Farmers will gladly grow crops other than poppies if • Irrigation systems are repaired • Roads are improved to get crops to market • Government gives them price support • Turnbull: The Taliban rely on poppies, which tolerate very arid conditions • Keeping irrigation systems broken means farmers are almost guaranteed to grow poppy

22. Building Education and Health Care Systems • Conflict decimates school attendance: • Blau: Afghans have to cope with a lost generation - 70s to 90s • Lockhart: Currently no education beyond age 11 in Afghanistan • Having educated people across the spectrum is absolutely a key to nation’s rebuilding • Health care is important to the people • Education is important to the people

23. Assembling the Jigsaw PuzzleBuilding Blocks of a Nation CONSTITUTION Free Press Law/Justice System National Government Provincial Governments Police Services Municipal Governments External Funds National Armed Forces Taxes NATIONAL REVENUE SYSTEM Controls Health Care System Key Monopoly Controls Funds Education System Public Works Welfare System

24. Assembling the Jigsaw PuzzleNotional Sequence of Events Constitution Free press Governance system Elections Justice system Police forces Formal peace agreement National army Establish stable & secure environment Functioning economy Tax base External funding Education system Public works Health care system TIME Q: In what order do these need to happen? A: It depends … every case is unique, but here are some underlying principles