Al Qaeda Organization Assessment and Forecast

1. Al Qaeda Organization Assessment and Forecast March 2011

2. AlQaeda Alarming reach in Europe The London bombing of July7, 2005: A classic AQ plot • The Mastermind: Mohamed Siddique Khan • Profile: • Visited Afghanistan in the late 1990s • Spentseveralmonths in Pakistan in 2003 and 2004 • Hadsome contacts with AQ figures in Pakistan • Hadhis training in Pakistan, close to the Afghan Border • Had contacts with AQ associates four monthsbeforeheled the London attacks • Hailed Osama Bin Laden as a hero on a video tape aired on AlJazeera 2 monthsafter the attacks • Policy Implications: • AQ was able to conductsimultaneousbombings in a major Europena Capital thousands of miles fromits base on the AF-PAK border • The attackstook place because of a cleardeterminationfrom AQ to mountterroristsattacksagainst the UK • Th Comând, Control, and inspiration for planning derivefrom AQ remainingcore leadership in the tribal areas of Pakistan

3. AlQaeda: Assessment and Forecast AS Sahab: A Vital Propaganda Arm • 90% percent of AQ battleisconducted in the media • AS Sahabsignaled the 9/11 attackswas in the works • Major forum for AQ keystatements (90 audio and Video Clips) • No fixed studio location, uses Final Cut Pro on laptops • Tapes are sophisticated, with animation effects, studio settings, and subtitles in English • AQ is capable of managing an advancedpropagandaoperation. • The role of Bin Laden and Zawahiri • Bin Laden remains in broadideological and strategc control of AQ • PoliticalStatementsreleased by Bin Laden and Zawahiri are the mostwidelydistributed in history • AQ influence in Iraq • AQ new leader in Iraq is a longtimeassociate of Zawahiri • Bothweremembers of Egypt’s ultra-violent Islamic Jihad • Abu Hamza Al Muhagertakeshisordrersfrom AQ on the AF-PAK border • Responsible for 90% of suicide bombings in Iraq • AQ Appeal to Other Militant Groups • In 2006, Gubudin Hekmatyar in Afghanistan, pledgedallegiance to Bin Laden • September 2006, Algerian Salafist Group put itselfunder AQ umbrella • November 2007, The LybianFighting group mergedwith AQ • Continuedstrength of AQ in attracting militant organizations

4. AlQaeda: Assessment and Forecast • AQ and the deteriorating Security in Afghanistan • Taliban Adopt AQ techniques of suicide attacks, IED, and the beheading of hostages • In 2006, MullagDadullah a key Taliban commander confirmed the cooperationwith AQ • The Afghan insurgencyadopts AQ techniques in makingmuch of the south a no-go area • AQ isenjoying a comeback along the AF-PAK border • AQ Base In Pakistan • A source of advice and personnel to the Taliban’scampaign of suicide attacks in Afghanistan • Operates a cluster of clandestine training camps in Pakistan • Th success of terrorists plots depends on the quality of training and the personaloperational doctrine • Deepcooperationwith Kashmiri militat groups such as Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohamed • AQ Global Jihad Movement AQ Core Core AQ Affiliates/Associates Salafi Jihad Homegrown Cells

5. Strategy and Goals of AQ PARTIAL GOALS END GOAL STRATEGY • Reawaken Muslims • Defend Islam • Defeat Enemies • Maintain the base at The AF-PAK Border • Stay relevant by spining hot-button • Issues to its purpose CALIPHATE JIHAD • Al Qaeda’s Strengths • Able to argue that US is fighting Islam • Inclusive ideology • Established new safe haven • Internet continues to work in its favor • Al Qaeda’s Weaknesses • Local setbacks and loss of key leaders • Entities competing for leadership of Muslims: Iran, Hizballah, Muslim Brotherhood • Most severe setbacks on ideological level • Killing of civilians / Muslims • Recantations • Bad behavior of local affiliates • Divisions over tactical, strategic questions • Constantly expanding the list of enemies • The lack of a positive vision

6. Al Qaeda: A Five-Year Forecast • The Conundrum of Leadership • The Death of Bin Laden willikely trigger anti-Americanattacksaround the globe • Bin Laden’sdeathwill deal a seriousblow to AQ by depriving the organization of hischarisma and organizationalskills • Bin Laden’sdeathwilllikely trigger a succession battlewithin AQ and shake the fragile unity of AQ • A GrowingHaven on The Af-PAK border • TargetingThePakistanis diaspora in the West for recruitment • In adopting the AQ tactics and ideology, the Taliban act as a politicalconstituency to AQ in Afghanistan • The numbers of safehavens for AQ in Afghanistan are likely to increase if the country slidesinto chaos • The AQ European Militants : A growing Influence • Middle Easternmadrassasis the biggestterroristthreat to the West • Future terroristattacks on the West are likely to have a Europeanorigin • AQ recruitsfrom the European Union provideeasyaccess to the United States • British Citizens of Pakistanisdescent are likely to plot a major terroristattacks • 80% of British terrorists has eitherworked or beingtrained by AQ • The nexusbetween British Pakistanis, AQ, and the Kashmiri issue provides a ground for radicalization • The nexusbetween discrimination, alienation, and homesicknessplay a pivotalrole in radicalization • Imams play a vital role in turning second-generationmuslimsfrom radical ideologies

7. Al Qaeda: A Five-Year Forecast • The Iraq WarEffect • The pool of potentialterrorists has increasedexponentially in the past 5 years • The war has become the cause celèbre for Jihadists and isshaping a nwegeneration of terrorists leaders and operatives • The conclusion of the warislikely to generate a more powerfulferociousblowbackthanwhatfollowed the Afghan warwith the Soviets • Foreignfighters in Iraq are more battle-hardenedthan the «Afghan Arabs» whofought the Soviet army • In fightingagainst Coalition forces in Iraq, foreignfighters are acquiringskillsthatwillbeuseful for future terroristsoperations • AQ’sideashvefound more fertile groundamongIraqis • The growing Iraqi refugee populations canbe a breeding grounds for militants • Sunnis areas of central and western Iraq couldbecome a safehaven for AQ over the next five years • The drawdon of US combat brigades, islikely to enhance the perception of «defeat» of another world superpower, thusencouraging more foreign militants to join the Iraq Jihad Bandwagon • IraqisSunnis are more likely to join forces with AQ if Shhitesmilitiasintensifytheirattacks on Sunnis areas • SunnisIraqis’ perceptions of AQ wilbeshaped by the nihilistictendencies of itsrecruits

8. Al Qaeda: A Five-Year Forecast • AQ FututreTactics • Attack the Western economic and business targets to disrupt the West economies and, by implication the global economy • Targetingcompaniesthat have distinctive Western brand names • AQ willlikely continue itsattacks on Oil installations, pipelines, and oilworkers • AQ willlikelyintensifyitscampaign of attackingJewish and Israelitargets • The center for the AQ’s justification for attacks has moved to the Israeli-American alliance • AQ willlikelyincreaseitsdeployment of female suicide bombers becausetheyincrease the operations’ probabilities of success • The internet wil continue to occupy a vital role in spreading the AQ Jihad’stenets • In the next five years, AQ islikely to deploytwo fatal tacticsagainst Western interests: • A radiologicalbomb to cause enormous panic and concomittantlydamge global investor confidence • RPG(Surface-to-missiles) to bring down Commercial Jetliner • AQ willlikely change itsmethods of strikes to keep up with the increase of itsenemies, the quality of theirweapons and their destructive powers: • The need to inflict the maximum casualitiesagainst the enemy • The need to concentrate on the method of martyrdomoperations • The targets as well as the type and method of weaponsused must restore the struggle to its real size

9. TakeAway • Al Qaeda is not strongenough to launch a major terroristattackinside the US or Europe in the next five years • AQ will continue to train militants for successfulattacks in Europe • AQ leadership willlikelyremain in place for years • AQ affiliated groups’ lack of a real plan for governancemakeitdifficult for them to transforminto a genuine, political mass movement