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MDA Journey to Mission Success

MDA Journey to Mission Success. March 3, 2008. Randolph Stone Director-Quality, Safety & Mission Assurance Missile Defense Agency. Approved for Public Release 08-MDA-3305 (29 FEB 08). Agenda. Reasons for Quality Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System (GMD) History Major Problems Impact

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MDA Journey to Mission Success

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  1. MDA Journey to Mission Success March 3, 2008 Randolph Stone Director-Quality, Safety & Mission Assurance Missile Defense Agency Approved for Public Release 08-MDA-3305 (29 FEB 08)

  2. Agenda • Reasons for Quality • Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System (GMD) • History • Major Problems • Impact • Systems Engineering Improvements • Cradle-to-Grave Approach • Lessons Learned • GM Successes • Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KI) • Award Fee • Knowledge Points • MDA Assurance Provisions • Reasons for Quality • Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System (GMD) • History • Major Problems • Impact • Systems Engineering Improvements • Cradle-to-Grave Approach • Lessons Learned • GM Successes • Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KI) • Award Fee • Knowledge Points • MDA Assurance Provisions

  3. Reasons for Quality

  4. Great Prophet 2

  5. Taepo-Dong-1

  6. Ground-Based Midcourse Defense Sea-Based X Band Radar Ground-Based Interceptor Emplacement

  7. GM History • Program Description • National Missile Defense (NMD) Program began in 1996 under BMDO program • Realigned as the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System (GMD) under MDA in 2002 • A key component of the nation’s multi-layered Ballistic Missile Defense System • The GMD includes sensors, command systems, fire control systems, and Ground Based Interceptors (GBI) • In spiral development – 3 phases simultaneously • Design and Development, Operational, Support

  8. GM Major Problems • Directed to produce and field while still in the development & test phase • Rapid deployment – enormous pressure on PD to meet program schedule • Led to high-risk decisions regarding schedule, product quality, and program cost • Acquisition reform – removed Mil Stds, relied on industry “best practices” • Traceability and sub-contractor flow-down • High percentage of issues developed with sub-contractors • Unauthorized changes, poor communication, lack of prime oversight

  9. GM Major Problems • EKV team focused on technical aspects of design instead of producability of end item • No production control, constant engineering changes • Schedule slips, nonconformances and quality escapes • Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) • No formal qualification in design and development for COTS flight computer • Computer reset – Root Cause unknown for over a year • COTS became logistically expensive; would have been easier to build “Why Not Fly?” “Why Not Fly?”

  10. Impacts • GM experienced a string of failures between 2000 and 2005 • “Interceptor production slowed as the year progressed primarily because technical problems were discovered…these problems were traced back to poor oversight of subcontractors, too few qualification tests, and other quality assurance issues.” GAO Report, March 2006 GMD Test Failures

  11. IFT-13c Example Countdown automatically aborted due to a built-in-test anomaly that detected excessive drops of Electronic Control Unit (ECU) messages. Cause: Roundoff error propagation caused a timing mismatch. When the SIGI and FC clocks crossover, timing jitter occurs and occasionally data is sent to the ECU when it is busy, resulting in no responses. To avoid a recurrence, need to raise the tolerance level for missed messages -- changing one line of computer software code. IFT-13c – December 2004 Launch Aborted

  12. IFT-14 Example One of the last steps in the launch sequence is to open the silo doors and retract the horizontal stabilizers that hold the missile in place. Sensors indicated that one of the three lateral support group mechanisms had not retracted, causing the missile to abort launch Cause: Corrosion and dissimilar metals (galvanic corrosion) caused the failure. One mechanism failed to latch due to wrong crush blocks IFT-14 – February 2005 Launch Aborted These Tests Were Wake-Up Calls These Tests Were Wake-Up Calls

  13. MDA Systems Engineering Improvements • MDA began to take a hard look at its quality practices • Uncovered test and development problems through audits of EKV and OBV • Example: “Functional performance test not consistently conducted during environmental testing” • Commissioned 2005 Independent Review Team (IRT) study • Dr. William Graham, Dr. Bill Ballhaus, MG (R) Bill Nance • Confirmed not enough Ground Testing, Deficiency in performance verification and systems engineering • Recommended: • Strengthen systems engineering • Hold contractors accountable Complete Halt to Flight Tests These Tests Were Wake-Up Calls Complete Halt to Flight Tests

  14. MDA Systems Engineering Improvements • MDA began to use a back-to-basics systems engineering approach • Mission Readiness Task Force (MRTF) • Improved readiness through systematic proven processes • System Verification, Critical Design Reviews, System Function Reviews • Improved test rigor & gained confidence in testing procedures • Restructured Contracts & Award Fee Processes • “Paid for Failures” • Program Management began supporting Quality • Strategic Improvements: Infusing quality in contract, empowering Mission Assurance Organization • Tactical Improvements: Test Like You Fly, Dedicated Ground Test Missiles, End-to-End Testing “Why Should It Fly?” These Tests Were Wake-Up Calls

  15. MDA Cradle-to-Grave Approach TEST LIKE YOU FLY

  16. FTG-02

  17. GM Lessons Learned • Good Quality practices from the beginning will benefit in the long run • It is hard to change once the program has started • Hard to change culture • Costly to change design Intercept NO INTERCEPTOR FAILURES SINCE 2005 These Tests Were Wake-Up Calls 17/17 Successful Intercepts

  18. KEI Launcher KEI Command Center Kinetic Energy Interceptor KEI – Kinetic Energy Interceptor • Mission Assurance Philosophy Built-In • Contracts & Program Culture • In Design and Development Phase • 1st and 2nd stage static fire tests • KEI Fire Control and Communication • First Flight Test – FY09 MDA’s New Program Built with Mission Assurance These Tests Were Wake-Up Calls

  19. Kinetic Energy Interceptor • Contract integrated with high-level of Mission Assurance • Program Integration with Mission Assurance Government Personnel • Matrixed People from MA Organization • KIQ: QS Direct Line • Contractors held fully accountable for mission success • Real-time incorporation of lessons learned • Not sitting in a database • Experience from across BMDS utilized • Early Integration Product Team (IPT) Approach with all suppliers • Contract Structured with Award Fees Government Involvement from the Beginning These Tests Were Wake-Up Calls

  20. KEI Award Fee Boards • Unique Award Fee Criteria – Based on Knowledge Points and Mission Assurance • Schedule comes 2nd • Find problems and identify issues early and often • Increased scrutiny on performance • No longer “paid for failures” • Set of steps to determine accurate award fee • Performance Monitor – Including Mission Assurance Personnel • Award Fee Review Board – Including Mission Assurance Personnel • Award Fee Advisory Board – Including Mission Assurance Management • Fee Determining Official – MDA Director Mission Assurance Actions and Metrics Incentives to “Get It Right the First Time” These Tests Were Wake-Up Calls

  21. Award Fee Criteria – Knowledge Points Kinetic Energy Booster • MDA Director’s Knowledge points • Preplanned event that provides objective evidence for key decision making • Each added commitment hinges on knowledge gained about critical risks • Completed KEI Knowledge Points • Demonstrate ONIR Accuracy for Boost Phase Fire control (April 2006) • Successful 1st and 2nd stage static firings • Future Knowledge Points • Booster Flight Tests (2008)

  22. Award Fee Criteria – MDA Assurance Provisions MAP Rev A MAP Requirements Sections 3.1 Management 3.2 Design and Development 3.3 Software and Firmware 3.4 Technical and Mission Assurance Reviews 3.5 Reliability, Maintainability, Availability 3.6 Parts and Materials Control Program 3.7 Integrated Test and Evaluation Program 3.8 Test, Measuring, and Diagnostic Equipment and Standards 3.9 Interface Management 3.10 Configuration Management 3.11 Control of Nonconforming Items and Materials 3.12 Fabrication and Quality 3.13 Supplier Management 3.14 Safety 160 Pages – Over 1800 “Shall” Statements These Tests Were Wake-Up Calls

  23. Mission Assurance Toolbox Mission Assurance And Safety Audits MDA Assurance Provisions CEO Days Pedigree Reviews Lessons Learned MDA Pedigree Review Certification CEO Supplier Roadmaps Government / Industry Partnerships Industry Stakeholder Initiatives MDA Mission Assurance Representatives MDA Advisories MDA Parts, Materials And Processes Plan Memorandum Of Agreement (MOA) DCMA QA Letter of Delegation QSMAUnfettered Access

  24. FTG-03a

  25. Questions?

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