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Laetitia Mulder, University of Groningen Rob Nelissen, Tilburg University

Complying by the rules in absence of surveillance: The impact of a group-interested versus self-interested authority. Laetitia Mulder, University of Groningen Rob Nelissen, Tilburg University. Structural solutions: undoing the dilemma. Privatization Leaders Rules Sanctions.

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Laetitia Mulder, University of Groningen Rob Nelissen, Tilburg University

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  1. Complying by the rules in absence of surveillance: The impact of a group-interested versus self-interested authority Laetitia Mulder, University of Groningen Rob Nelissen, Tilburg University

  2. Structural solutions: undoing the dilemma • Privatization • Leaders • Rules • Sanctions

  3. Compliance? Not always (e.g. Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000; Michael, 2006; Mulder et al., PSPB 2006; Tenbrunsel et al., 1997) • Compliance in absence of surveillance? • Rule should convince people that cooperation is good for all / “awareness” of social dilemma

  4. When does a rule/sanction get “internalized”? • Little research • Sanctions, sanction severity, punishment versus reward (Thogersen 1997; Mulder et al., 2009; Mulder, 2008) • Who installs the rule

  5. Leaders / authorities • Impact leaders in group behavior: Trust, self-sacrificing leadership, legitimacy, procedural justice (Tyler & Lind, 1992; Tyler, 1997; Tyler et al, 2000; Tyler & Degoey, 1995; De Cremer & Van Knippenberg, 2003)  Group versus self interested leader

  6. Leader installs a rule or sanctions Leader perceived as group-interested Leader perceived as self-interested “cooperation is good for all / morally correct” etc. “cooperation is something that the leader wants, nothing more” No compliance, or only compliance when supervised Compliance, even without supervision

  7. Study 1: experimental, real interactions • Bogus leadership style questionnaire: e.g. “If I am a group leader I strive for what is best for everyone”, If I am a group leader I strive for what is best for myself”  “group score” and “self score” • Public good dilemma (groups of 4, each 20 x 20cent coins, coins contributed to group multiplied by 1,5 and divided equally) • Leader: another participant. Either high group score and low self score (group interested leader condition) or the other way around (self interested leader condition). • Leader could fine other group members with €2 (Leader + sanction pre-programmed. Fine was distributed when contribution was lower than 12).

  8. Results

  9. Study 2: 2 (leader) x 2 (rule) fishing vignette experiment

  10. Results: Caught fish in kilos Post-hoc: paired comparisons within columns

  11. Study 3: 2 (leader) x 3 (rule) shop vignette experiment

  12. Results: Intented duration of break in minutes Note: Within columns, cells that do not share a letter in the superscript differ significantly, planned comparison, p < .05.

  13. Study 4: 2 (leader) x 3 (rule) lab experiment • PG dilemma: pts typed in choice and explanation • Resource dilemma (different groups): - 5 persons, one of which the leader (random) and 4 “normal group members” - leader able to impose self-chosen rule - information on leader: choice + explanation in previous PD game. - Group benefitting leader condition: contributed 100 Self-benefitting leader condition: contributed 0. “I just went for the group interest (my own self interest). If I (the group) would earn less by doing that, I don’t mind very much. By donating everything, the group (I) simply earns (earn) the most.”

  14. Study 4: 2 (leader) x 3 (rule) lab experiment • Pool of 40 lottery tickets (“owned by leader”) • Each “normal” group member could take from pool (0-10) • What was left in pool: doubled and equally divided among all 5. • Rule manipulation: No-rule condition: Leader did not install a rule Rule condition: Leader: “I install the rule that you do NOT take any tickets from the pool. So, the rule will be: leave all tickets in the pool.” • Rule condition: some leaders able to supervise, some are not. Rule with supervision: your leader has the opportunity to supervise group members’ decisions Rule without supervision: your leader does not have the opportunity to supervise group members’ decisions • Decision on number of lottery tickets to take (0-10)

  15. Number of lottery tickets taken (n = 90)

  16. Leader installs a rule or sanctions Leader perceived as group-interested Leader perceived as self-interested “cooperation is good for all / morally correct” etc. “cooperation is something that the leader wants, nothing more” No compliance, or only compliance when supervised Compliance, even without supervision

  17. Conclusions • Successfulness of rules/sanctions depends on who installs them. • Let rules or sanctions be imposed by authorities who have built credits, with a pro-social appearance, etc. • Structural solutions may fail to make structural changes

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