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The Competency Question in an Uncertain, Chaotic, and Sometimes Unlucky World

The Competency Question in an Uncertain, Chaotic, and Sometimes Unlucky World. Competency Puzzle in Delinquency Court. Characteristics of the Juvenile Justice Population

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The Competency Question in an Uncertain, Chaotic, and Sometimes Unlucky World

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  1. The Competency Question in an Uncertain, Chaotic, and Sometimes Unlucky World

  2. Competency Puzzle in Delinquency Court • Characteristics of the Juvenile Justice Population • Mental retardation: 1.61% of the general school age population; 12.6% of the juvenile offender population (Rutherford et al.) • Learning disabilities: 7-12% of the general student population; 36% of the juvenile offender population (Rutherford et al.) • Mental Illness: 10% of the general juvenile population; 50-90% of youth in juvenile justice (Little Hoover 2001); 42% of youth in detention; 59% of youth in placement; 33% of youth in field supervision (NCCD 2003) • One-day California detention snapshot: 4,602 open mental health cases; 1644 receiving psychotropic medication (CSA, Juvenile Detention Profile Survey, 1st Quarter Report 2009) • In 2009, 351 petitions were filed in cases of children under 12 years of age and 16,853 for children 12-14 (Juvenile Justice in California 2009, Table 15)

  3. Competency Puzzle in Delinquency Court • What Are We Actually Dealing With in Juvenile Competence? • Youth Law Center Statewide Survey of Probation in 34 Counties in 2006-2007 • Fewer than 200 judicial determinations of incompetence statewide (in the year before the survey) • Numbers would be higher, but: • Some counties actively divert • Confusion over competence standards means some youth slip though • A few counties have significantly more competency proceedings.

  4. Competency Puzzle in Delinquency Court • Numbers are going up in some counties because of increased awareness of legal standards and increase in children with cognitive damage due to huffing and other drug use. • Other states estimate 1% are referred for evaluation. • Not a big population in numbers, but very challenging and resource intensive.

  5. Competency Puzzle in Delinquency Court • Adjudicative Competency • A legal construction based on a psychological, psychiatric or medical finding. • U.S. Constitutional Standard for Competence — Dusky v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 402 • Whether the defendant/minor “has sufficient present ability to consult with his[/her] lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and whether he[/she] has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him[/her].”

  6. Pre Welfare and Institutions Code section 709 “The question [of incompetency] is cognitive, whether the defendant’s mental condition is such that he lacks that degree of rationality required by law [citation] so as to have ‘the mental acuity to see, hear and digest the evidence, and the ability to communicate with counsel in helping prepare an effective defense.’ [Citation.]” (Emphasis added.) * * * “The dictionary defines the word ‘condition’ variously to mean ‘4: a mode or state of being…state with reference to mental or moral nature, temperament, character, or disposition’ or ‘5: quality, attribute, trait.’ (Webster’s 3rd New Internat. Dict. (1971) p. 473.) Under these definitions, although the term ‘mental condition’ certainly includes mental disorder or mental retardation, which as noted is a developmental disability [citation], we see no difference between a condition that results from a developmental disability and one that results from developmental immaturity.” Timothy J. and Dante H. v. Superior Court (Sacramento) (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 847, 859-860

  7. Moreover, “although [California Rules of Court] rule 5.645(d) provides that the court “may” appoint an expert to evaluate the child, where…the child’s counsel has expressed a doubt as to his client’s competency, it would be an abuse of discretion for the court to refuse to appoint an expert. [Citation.]” (Italics in the original.) * * * Counsel’s recitation of petitioner’s inability to understand the proceedings, as well as his later motion to reconsider based upon new information that petitioner was schizophrenic and bipolar, provides ample justification for he appointment of an expert to examine petitioner before any further proceedings begin requiring his cooperation with counsel. (Emphasis added.) Tyrone B. v. Superior Court (Sacramento) (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 227, 231 The court further concluded that “the question [of competency] is not can the minor become competent in the future with assistance; rather the question is whether he is presently competent.” In re Ricky S. (Sacramento) (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 232, 236

  8. Competency Puzzle in Delinquency Court History That May Impact Where We Go From Here In re Mary T. (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 38 The court held that a juvenile court may initiate proceedings to determine present competence, and where necessary, suspend proceedings and make a referral under Pen. Code, § 4011.6, without a threshold showing of probable cause to believe the offense alleged in the petition has been committed, or that the presumption of incapacity to commit a criminal act (Pen. Code, § 26) can be overcome. In re Michael E. (1975) 15 Cal.3d. 183 The juvenile court may not commit a minor to a state hospital; commitment may be accomplished only the compliance with the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act.

  9. In re Patrick H. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1346 • The Court of Appeal set aside that portion of the trial court's order continuing the minor's commitment under Penal Code section 1370. The court held that the juvenile court erred in committing the minor to a mental facility for a 90-day evaluation pursuant to Penal Code section 1370, which is applicable to adults found incompetent to stand trial. Once the juvenile court found that the minor could not cooperate with his counsel, it should have turned to Welfare and Institutions Code section 705, and proceeded under either Welfare and Institutions Code section 6550, or Penal Code section 4011.6, whichever was appropriate. Under Welfare and Institutions Code section 6551, the jurisdiction of the juvenile court is suspended during the time the minor is subject to the jurisdiction of the court in which a Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS) petition for civil commitment is filed. Under Penal Code section 4011.6, however, the juvenile court may retain concurrent jurisdiction over the minor during the LPS proceedings. Thus, rather than issuing a 90-day commitment order, the appropriate step at that time would have been to refer the minor to a facility for 72-hour treatment and evaluation. The juvenile court also erred in continuing the Penal Code section 1370 commitment after the minor was found incompetent. A finding of incompetence in a juvenile proceeding should not result in a confinement order or its equivalent; a juvenile is not committed as incompetent to proceed with Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, proceedings, but on a wholly independent basis and after wholly independent procedures.

  10. James H. v Superior Court (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 169 • Although the juvenile law does not contain provisions for dealing with minors who are incompetent to stand trial, the juvenile court judge has the inherent power to conduct a hearing on the issue of competency because the “constitutional dimensions of the incompetency problem.” If the juvenile court finds that the minor is incapable of understanding the nature of the proceedings or assisting counsel, then Welfare and Institutions Code section 705 empowers the juvenile court to utilize the authority of Penal Code section 4011.6 to initiate civil commitment proceedings against the minor.

  11. W&I Code Section 709 • Codifies Dusky/Drope standard – having sufficient present ability to consult with counsel and assist in preparing the defense; and rational as well as factual understanding of the nature of the charges or proceedings.  Inability to meet either prong results in incompetence. [Broader than P.C 1367, subd.(a)] • Requires suspension of proceedings if the court finds that substantial evidence raises a doubt as to competence. [Same standard as in adult court, e.g., People v. Stankewitz (1982) 32 Cal.3d 80, 92] • Provides that upon suspension of the proceedings, court must order determination of competence at a hearing and appoint an expert. [Codifies Tyrone B. v. Superior Court (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 227, 231.]

  12. W&I Code Section 709 • Requires evaluation whether minor suffers from a mental disorder, developmental disability, developmental immaturity, or other condition and, if so, whether the condition or conditions impair the minor’s competency. [Codifies Timothy J. v. Superior Court (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 847.]  • Requires expert to have expertise in child/adolescent development, training in forensic evaluation of juveniles, be familiar with competency standards/accepted criteria used in evaluating competence. Requires Judicial Council to develop and adopt rules. • Establishes preponderance of the evidence as the standard of proof. [Same standard as in adult competence law; e.g., Penal Code § 1369, subd.(f)., but does not specifically address which party has the burden of proof as established by Penal Code § 1369, subd.(f), which states, “It shall be presumed that the defendant is mentally competent unless it is proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is mentally incompetent.” See also In re Christopher F. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 462, 471-472.]

  13. W&I Code Section 709 • Provides that if there is not a substantial probability that the minor will attain competency in the foreseeable future, the court must dismiss the case. [Codifies Jackson v. Indiana (1972) 406 U.S. 715, 738.] • Gives the court the power to make orders that may assist the minor in attaining competency. [Until now, courts had only James. H. v. Superior Court (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 169, 175-177, recognizing courts’ inherent power to create procedures.] • Allows the court to rule on motions that do not require the participation of the minor, including but not limited to motions to dismiss; motions by the defense regarding a change in the placement of the minor; detention hearings; and demurrers. (Reference Blockton v. Superior Court, S199935, in adult court setting. Right to litigate motion to dismiss base on speedy trial violation.) • Provides that if the minor is found competent, the proceedings shall go forward. Clarifies that the law applies both to 601s and 602s.

  14. W&I Code Section 709 • 2011 Amendments: • If minor is developmentally disabled, court shall appoint Regional Center (or his/her designee) to evaluate minor for service eligibility (per WI 4500 et seq.). However, this referral shall not delay the court’s proceeding’s for determining competency. • An expert’s determination that the minor is developmentally disabled does not supersede an independent determination by the Regional Center for services qualification. • Section 709 does not give the court the authority to place an incompetent minor in a developmental center or community facility operated by State Dep’t. of Developmental Services without Regional Center approval. • Section 709 does not give the court the authority to appoint the Regional Center to conduct competency evaluations.

  15. California Rules of CourtRule 5.645(d)—January 1, 2012 • W&I Code section 709 (Assem. Bill 2212 [Fuentes]; Stats. 2010, ch 671) requires the Judicial Counsel to develop and adopt rules for the qualification and appointment of experts who evaluate children when the court or minor’s counsel raises the issue of competency to stand trial in any juvenile proceeding.

  16. Rule 5.645(d) • Reiterates WI 709 competency standard. • Must appoint an expert to determine if child’s “condition” impairs incompetency. • Expert must be one of the following: • Licensed psychiatrist • w/4 yrs. of med. school, AND EITHER • 4 yrs. of gen. psychiatry residency, including one yr. of internship and 2 yrs. of child & adolescent fellowship training, OR • 3 yrs. of gen. psychiatry residency, including one yr. of internship, and one yr. of residency that focused on children & adolescents, and one yr. of child & adolescent fellowship training.

  17. Rule 5.645(d) • Expert must be one of the following: • Clinical, counseling, or school psychologist who has received a doctoral degree in psychology from an educational institution accredited by an organization recognized by the Council for Higher Education Accreditation and who is licensed as a psychologist.

  18. Rule 5.645(d) • The expert (psychiatrist or psychologist) must: • Have experience in addressing child and adolescent developmental issues, including emotional, behavioral, and cognitive impairments of children and adolescents; • Have experience in cultural and social characteristics of children and adolescents; • Possess a CV reflecting training and experience in the forensic evaluation of children; • Be familiar w/juvenile competency standards and accepted criteria used in evaluating juvenile competence

  19. Rule 5.645(d) • The expert (psychiatrist or psychologist) must: • Possess a comprehensive understanding of effective intervention as well as treatment, training, and programs for the attainment of competency available to children and adolescents; and • Be proficient in the language preferred by the child, or employ the services of a certified interpreter and use assessment tools that are linguistically and culturally appropriate for the child.

  20. Rule 5.645(d) • Nothing precludes other clinicians with other professional qualifications from participating as consultants or witnesses or in other capacities. • After hearing, court must proceed pursuant to WI 709.

  21. People v. Murdoch(2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 230 The court concluded that the trial court should have suspended the criminal proceeding and instituted competency proceedings pursuant to Penal Code section 1368. Substantial evidence demonstrated a reasonable doubt as to defendant's competence to stand trial. Prior to the taking of evidence at trial, defendant told the trial court his defense to the felony assault charges: the victim was not a human being. According to defendant, the victim lacked shoulder blades, which "are symbolic of angelic beings." Defendant asked the victim one question on cross-examination: "Can you shrug your shoulders like this?" The evidence established a reasonable doubt as to whether defendant could conduct his own defense in a rational matter. It was readily apparent defendant did not feign insanity to delay the proceedings. He opted for self-representation precisely because his appointed counsel sought to continue his trial. Defendant did not want his trial delayed. There was nothing in the record to indicate defendant's defense was the result of sheer temper. The correct procedure for the trial court's error was to reverse the judgment of conviction.

  22. In re Christopher F.(2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 462 The court of appeal held that there was no error in failing to appoint the director of the regional center for the developmentally disabled to evaluate defendant because the competency determination was governed by due process principles and California Rules of Court, rule 5.645(d), not Penal Code section 1369(a). Due process was satisfied by the evaluation of the defense expert, who was skilled in the diagnosis of developmental disabilities, had formerly been employed as a psychologist at the regional center, and had testified in prior cases as an expert on developmental disabilities. The evaluation included an assessment of defendant's potential development disabilities; indeed, the psychologist specifically opined that defendant's learning disabilities were not considered to be developmental or mental retardation because defendant was above average in nonverbal areas. The evaluation provided sufficient evidence to support the competence finding, even though the trial court rejected the psychologist's ultimate opinion that defendant was mentally incompetent based on the psychologist's apparently failure to consider defendant's academic performance.

  23. In re Christopher F., supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at pp. 471-472 [C]iting People v. Ramos (2004) 34 Cal.4th 494, 507 and section 1369, subdivision (f), the People argue Christopher is presumed competent “unless it is proved otherwise by a preponderance of the evidence.” If the People are correct, then Christopher failed to meet his burden of proof on the issue…. Christopher expressly disclaims any challenge to the applicability of the presumption of competence in juvenile proceedings. Yet the statutory presumption of competence set forth in section 1369, subdivision (f), reflects a legislative judgment that does not necessarily transfer to juvenile proceedings, which, despite the increasing convergence of the adult and juvenile justice systems, remain markedly different from adult proceedings because of their general goal of treatment of the juvenile offender, rather than punishment of the adult criminal. (See People v. Smith (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1072, 1080; see also Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537, 593 (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).) No statute or rule of court specifically applicable to juvenile proceedings allocates the burden of proof on this issue. Absent such guidance, it is not immediately obvious the burden of proving a child's competence, as well as the elements of the offense charged, should not rest with the People, rather than requiring the child, like an adult defendant, to prove incompetence. (See Medina v. California, supra, 505 U.S. at p. 446 [“The rule that a criminal defendant who is incompetent should not be required to stand trial has deep roots in our common-law heritage. … [¶] By contrast, there is no settled tradition on the proper allocation of the burden of proof in a proceeding to determine competence.”]; People v. Ary, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 518, 520 [placing the burden of proof on the defendant in mental competence proceedings, whenever conducted during a criminal case, does not violate due process principles]; see generally Evid. Code, § 500 [“[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, a party has the burden of proof as to each fact the existence or nonexistence of which is essential to the claim for relief or defense that he is asserting”].)

  24. In re Alejandro G.(2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 475 “We publish on the issue [of juvenile adjudicative competency] as a reminder of the proper test of a minor’s competency to stand trial. The doctors evaluating Alejandro applied the incorrect test, and, on appeal, Alejandro misconstrues the test as well. A minor’s competency does not hinge on his or her education regarding or knowledge of the juvenile court system. Instead, the correct test of competency of a minor is set forth in Timothy J. v. Superior Court (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 847 [citation]. The court must determine whether the minor has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. [Id., at p. 857.]” Alejandro was evaluated by two psychologists, both administered test designed to evaluate adults rather than children. Both psychologists found Alejandro incompetent to stand trial, although one testified that Alejandro “was able to assist counsel” and “was able to understand the proceedings” Refuses to answer the question raised in Christopher F. regarding who has the burden to prove competency, defense or prosecution.

  25. In re Alejandro G. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 475 “The fact that both doctors opined Alejandro was not competent does not prove a lack of substantial evidence to support the court’s finding. The court is not under any obligation to adopt the doctors’ opinions. Such a requirement would undermine the court’s role in determining a minor’s competency. (See James H., supra, 77 Cal.App.3d 172 [“[T]he juvenile court has the inherent power to determine a minor’s mental competence to understand the nature of the proceedings pending . . . and to assist counsel in a rational [manner] . . . .”].)”

  26. Beware of Penal Code Section 1054.3(b) • (1) Unless otherwise specifically addressed by an existing provision of law, whenever . . . a minor juvenile in a juvenile proceeding . . . Places in issue his or her mental state at any phase of the . . . juvenile proceeding through the proposed testimony of any mental health expert, upon timely request by he prosecution, the court may order that the . . . juvenile submit to examination by a prosecution-retained mental health expert.

  27. Penal Code Section 1054.3(b) • Prosecution has to bear the expense of the expert. • Prosecutor shall submit a list of tests proposed to be administered to the minor. • Minor can have a hearing to consider any objections raised to the proposed tests before any test is administered. • Before ordering minor to submit to exam, court must make a threshold determination that the proposed tests bear some reasonable relation to the mental state placed in issue by the minor • “Tests” include any and all assessment techniques such as a clinical interview or a mental status examination.

  28. Sharp v. Superior Court (Ventura County)(2012) 54 Cal.4th 168 Defendant was charged with several felonies including murder with special circumstances, pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity and proposed to call a mental health expert on the issue of sanity. Pursuant to Penal Code section 1054.3(b)(1), the prosecution moved to have defendant examined by a prosecution-retained expert, and the trial court granted the motion. The Supreme Court held that section 1054.3(b)(1) applied in this case. By its terms, section 1054.3(b)(1) authorizes an order compelling examinations by a prosecution-retained expert whenever at any “phase” of the criminal action the defense has proposed its own expert testimony on mental state, unless otherwise specifically addressed by an existing provision of law. Had the legislature meant to exclude discovery in sanity phase proceedings from the scope of section 1054.3(b)(1), it would not have expressly stated the statute applies “at any phase of the criminal action.” Even if the court agreed with the defendant here, as to the lack of need for the examination, it could not ignore the statute’s broadly inclusive language authorizing a compelled examination whenever the defendant had put his or her mental state at issue at any “phase” of the criminal action, through the proposed testimony of a mental health expert.

  29. Maldonado v. Superior Court (San Mateo County) (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1112 In a first degree murder case, defendant notified the DA that he intended to introduce evidence of neurocognitive deficits. The trial court found that the DA could not be present at a mental health exam by a prosecution-retained expert per. Penal Code section 1054.3(b)(1), but otherwise denied defendant’s request for protective orders. On the ensuing writ the court of appeal granted partial mandate relief. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal. The court held that neither the 5th Amend. right against self-incrimination, nor prophylactic concerns about the protection of that right justify precluding the prosecution from full pretrial access to the results of mental examinations by DA experts conducted pursuant to section 1054.3(b)(1), for the purpose of obtaining evidence to rebut a mental-state defense the defendant has indicated he or she intends to present on the issue of guilt. The Court of Appeal erred in ordering that prosecutors could not observe the exam and could obtain access to the exam materials only under a procedure whereby the trial court would consider defendant’s privilege objections pretrial, and would inspect and redact the exam materials in camera, before allowing the prosecution any access to them. Forcing the trial court to resolve defense claims of privilege prior to trial, without prosecutorial access to the evidence in dispute, imposed procedures that were neither required nor justified by the 5th and 6th Amends., and that were manifestly unfair to the prosecution.

  30. Baqleh v. Superior Court (San Francisco) (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 478 At defendant’s arraignment on a murder charge, counsel informed the trial court that, based on an oral report from a psychiatrist, he had a doubt as to whether defendant was competent to be arraigned. The trial court suspended the proceedings and ordered that defendant be evaluated by a a clinical psychologist. After a clinical examination and reviews of reports by defendant’s experts, who concluded that defendant was incompetent to stand trial, the court-appointed expert found that defendant was competent to stand trial. Thereafter, the trial court ordered defendant be examined by the director of the regional center for the developmentally disabled, and also granted the prosecution’s petition to have defendant examined by the expert of its choosing. The Court of Appeal ordered issuance of a writ of mandate directing the trial court to set aside its order granting the motion to direct defendant to submit to a mental examination and to entertain a new motion. The court held that the trial court had authority to order defendant to be examined by the People’s expert, but that the trial court’s order did not comply with the Civil Discovery Act of 1986 (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 2016, et seq.).

  31. Baqleh v. Superior Court , con’t. The court held that the civil nature of a trial on the issue of competency vests the trial court with authority to utilize appropriate rules set forth in the Code of Civil Procedure, even though the underlying issue relates to the commission of a criminal offense. The court also held that an accused person cannot, on the basis of U.S. Const., 5th Amend., refuse to submit to a mental examination by a prosecution expert when properly ordered to do so in connection with a Penal Code section 1368 hearing, to determine mental competency to stand trial. The 5th Amend. does not come into play in this situation because a judicially declared rule of immunity provides the necessary safeguards. The court further held that the judicially declared rule of immunity that protects a defendant’s 5th Amend. right against self-incrimination concomitantly protects the interest that might otherwise entitle him to a U.S. Const., 6th Amend., right to counsel, at a court-ordered mental examination on the question of competence to stand trial.

  32. Baqleh Examined • Competency trials under PC 1369 are not criminal proceedings. • “Although is arises in the context of a criminal trial, a competency hearing is a special proceeding, governed generally by the rules applicable to civil proceedings.” • “The civil nature of a trial on the issue of competency vests the trial court with authority to utilize appropriate rules set forth in the CCP, even though the underlying issue relates to the commission of a crime.”

  33. Baqleh Examined • Civil Discovery Act, which by its own terms applies to “special proceedings of a civil nature . . . Permits discovery “regarding any matter not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Discovery may relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other party to the action.” (Baqleh at p. 491; see also CCP 2017.010 and 2019.010.)

  34. Baqleh Examined • See CCP 2032.010 et seq. • A party desirous of obtaining discovery by such an examination is obliged to seek leave of the court by a noticed motion that specifies the: • Time • Place • Manner • Conditions • Scope, and nature of the examination • Identity and specialty of the person or persons conducting the examination

  35. Baqleh Examined • The motion must be accompanied by a declaration “stating facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt to arrange for the examination by an agreement. • An accused person cannot on the basis of the 5th Amend. refuse to submit to a mental examination by a prosecution expert when properly ordered to do so in connection with a section 1368 hearing. • The 5th Amend. does not come into play because a judicially declared rule of immunity provides the necessary assurance that an accused will not be convicted of a crime by use of any information obtained at a court-compelled mental examination or the use of information obtained from that examination, or that his sentencing may be affected by such information or the fruits thereof. • By allowing the DA to investigate facts crucial to the determination of competency without prejudice to the defendant, the rule of immunity also enhances the search for truth (justice and the American way!) (Baqleh at p. 502-503.)

  36. Involuntary Medication to Restore Competency • People v. Coleman (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 627 • Penal Code section 1370 authorizes involuntary treatment for the purpose of competency restoration. • Defendant must be charged with a serious crime against the person or property; • Involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication is substantially likely to render the defendant competent to stand trial; • The medication is unlikely to have side effects that interfere with the defendant’s ability to become competent; • Less intrusive treatments are unlikely to have substantially the same results; and • Antipsychotic medication is in the defendant’s best medical interest in light of his or her medical condition.

  37. Great By Choice: Uncertainty, Chaos, and Luck—Why Some Thrive Despite Them All • The best lawyers are not more risk taking, more visionary, or more creative than the comparisons; they were more disciplined, more empirical, and more paranoid. • Innovation by itself turns out not to be the trump card in a chaotic and uncertain world; more important is the ability to scale innovation, to blend creativity with discipline. • Following the belief that litigating in a “fast world” always requires “fast decisions” and “fast action” is a good way to get killed. • Great attorneys changed less in reaction to a radically changing world than the comparison attorneys.

  38. Conclusion: “Where’s The Beef?” • “Substantial Evidence” • Expression of the doubt • At the competency hearing • Burden of Proof—dicta in In re Christopher F. • Qualifications of the “expert” • Local protocols • Motions to dismiss (i.e., what is “a period of time that is no longer than reasonably necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that the minor will attain competency in the foreseeable future or the court no longer retains jurisdiction.) • Other motions…not limited to(?) • To what? • Gladys S. hearings? • Probable cause hearings? • IAC claims • Gettin’ jiggie with it!!!

  39. References Arthur Bowie Sacramento County Public Defender 700 H Street, Suite 0270 Sacramento, CA 95814 (916) 874-5208 (916) 995-5169 bowiea@saccounty.net arthurbowie@surewest.net Sue Burrell, Staff Attorney Youth Law Center 200 Pine Street, Suite 300 San Francisco, CA 94104 (415) 543-3379; sburrell@ylc.org, ckendrick@yld.org www.ylc.org

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