Mr. Bob Pond USCG Headquarters (CG-533) Office of Incident Management & Preparedness

1. BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Incident Specific Preparedness Review (ISPR) Major Findings & Recommendations Mr. Bob Pond USCG Headquarters (CG-533) Office of Incident Management & Preparedness

2. Dates: 20 APR 10; Explosion 22 APR 10; NRT Conf Call Start 23 APR 10; RRT VI Conf Call Start 27 APR 10; RRT IV Conf Call Start 28 APR 10; 5,000 bbls per day 29 APR 10; SONS Declaration 30 APR 10; LA EMAC Request 14 MAY 10; Subsea Dispersants 22 MAY 10; POTUS Commission 23 MAY 10; HSIN / ERMA 27 MAY 10; 12,000+ bbls per day 28 MAY 10; WH Triple Forces 14 JUN 10; ISPR Chartered 10 JUN 10; 25,000+ bbls per day 30 JUN 10; Emergency Rule Making 15 JUL 10; Wellhead Secured 2 AUG 10; 62,000 bbls per day* 19 SEP 10; Well Sealed 18 MAR 11; ISPR Complete BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Summary

3. Response Statistics: Total Spilled 4,928,100 bbls Total Responders 48, 200 Total CG 7,000 Total Vessels 345 Total Aircraft 127 Total VOOs 3,200 Total Hard Boom 3.8m Total Soft Boom 9.7m Total Dispersants 1.8m gal Total In Situ Burns 411 Total Command Post 4 Total Branches 17 Total Staging Areas 32 Total waste 93.4 tons BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Summary

4. ISPR Background The Commandant chartered the ISPR Team to conduct an assessment of preparedness and response issues from the Deepwater Horizon incident. Members included Federal and State Government representatives. Advisors to the Team represented the environmental, oil industry, and OSRO communities.

5. ISPR ReportGeneral Findings • The OPA90 response structure under the NCP is fundamentally sound. • The size and duration of the incident magnified shortcomings in dealing with a SONS. • Intersection of the NCP and NRF affected relationships outside the oil spill response community • The intensity of political demands was unprecedented and unanticipated.

6. Spills of National Significance (SONS)Recommendations • Declaration of a SONS should carry more weight and meaning, including designation of a National Incident Commander (NIC) by President • Roles and authorities of the NIC should be enhanced and better defined • Relationship between the NIC & DHS Secretary should be better defined • The integration of SONS Doctrine with the NRF is a major issue

7. AREA COMMITTEE ORGANIZATION & ACTIVITY ACP POLICY & IMPLEMENTATION IDENTIFICATION & PRIORITIZATION OF ESAs INTEGRATION OF OIL SPILL CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR A REGIONAL RESPONSE WCD SCENARIO QUANTIFICATION USE OF DISPERSANTS USE OF IN SITU BURNING COMMON OPERATING PICTURE EXTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS INTERSECTION OF THE NRF & NCP CHARACTERISTICS & QUALIFICATIONS OF AN EFFECTIVE CRISIS LEADER POLITICAL DEMANDS ROLE OF THE SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY UNDER HSPD-5 ROLE OF THE NATIONAL INCIDENT COMMANDER AND THE NATIONAL INCIDENT COMMAND ROLE OF THE NRT & RRTs UAC & ICPs SUSTAINABILITY OF RESPONSE PERSONNEL CONTAINMENT & SUSTAINABILITY OF OIL RECOVERY OPERATIONS CASCADING OF RESPONSE RESOURCES USE OF VESSELS OF OPPORTUNITY APPLICATION OF LESSONS LEARNED FROM PRIOR SPILL RESPONSES & EXERCISES Focus Areas

8. Intersection of the NCP & NRFKey Findings • Coast Guard, BP, & SOSC’s responded to the incident under the NCP’s regulatory authority • Many senior government officials were initially unclear as to the federal government’s role • State & Local EMA’s pointed to the NRF as their system for disaster response • Most affected States’ Governors invoked Disaster Declarations, typically a precursor to Stafford Act declaration

9. Intersection of the NRF & NCPNotable Lessons Learned • Senior officials at the Federal, State, & local levels do not know the NCP – lack of engagement for catastrophic oil spill plans and exercises with • High-level senior & elected official • Local communities outside immediate port areas • State emergency mgmt community • Integrated Federal doctrine (e.g., NCP/NRF) is needed for all significant incidents (including oil spills)

10. Intersection of the NRF & NCPKey Recommendations • USCG, FEMA, & EPA conduct joint review of the NCP and NRF • Incident Mgmt: define and socialize roles of the White House, PFO, National Incident Commander, NIC organization, NRT, and UAC • Funding: OSLTF vs Stafford Act • RRTs and Area Committees should engage state and local Emergency Management Communities as well as environmental communities.

11. Role of the NRT

12. Role of the NRT Key Findings • The NRT was not used in accordance with NCP doctrine. • The program and policy experience of NRT members should be fully integrated with the incident’s response organization • The establishment of the Interagency Solutions group (IASG) showed value of a coordinating group at the national level, a role for which the NRT may be well suited.

13. What is the role of the NRT during a SONS? Platform for Principals’ Information Sharing Support the Response Organization’s Needs NRT

14. Role of the NRT Key Recommendations • The Coast Guard and EPA should ensure that the standing NRT has appropriate representation. • The USCG & EPA should determine the value of embedding an action officer level team (e.g., the IASG) at the NIC to facilitate information sharing and resource identification/allocation at the national level.

15. Role of the RRTs

16. Role of the RRTs Key Findings • The program and policy experience of RRT members are important resources that should be fully integrated with the incident’s response organization, and leveraged during a major oil spill response. • The RRTs involved were not fully prepared manage the surge of alternative response technologies proposals.

17. Role of the RRTs Key Recommendations • USCG and EPA should ensure that standing RRTs have appropriate representation. • Regional type 2 incident management planning • The Coast Guard and EPA should review the authorities of RRTs with regard to their role in alternative response technologies.

18. Integration Of Oil Spill Contingency Plans for a Regional Response

19. Integration Of Oil Spill Contingency Plans for a Regional ResponseKey Findings • Few linkages between State and local contingency plans, industry plans, and the One Gulf Plan • Confusion as to which plan should be the principal response plan for the DWH incident • Regional level planning is necessary for the coastal zone but RCPs for the Coastal Zone may not be appropriate if developed for standard Federal regions

20. Integration Of Oil Spill Contingency Plans for a Regional ResponseKey Recommendations • USCG should work with EPA to develop the concept of RCPs and provide guidance on RCP development • Coast Guard Areas and Districts should be more involved in the contingency planning process to ensure high-quality regional plans that encompass coastal regions.

21. QUESTIONS? Mr. Bob Pond COMDT (CG-533) Office of Incident Management & Preparedness 202-372-2240 Robert.g.pond@uscg.mil