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Explore the challenges and procedures in cases of migrant children exposed to exploitation and trafficking within the EU. Discuss the hindrances and potential solutions for determining best interests.
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Case assessment and best interests determination: Special considerations and procedures in transnational cases of children exposed to exploitation, trafficking and children at riskIntra-EU Migration of migrant children at riskStockholm29.01.2013
Focus on Intra-EU child migration Target Group: a) all natural persons under the age of eighteen possessing the citizenship of one EU Member State and being found in another EU Member State in a vulnerable situation and without being accompanied by the titular parental authority or a person exercising other forms or rights of custody. b) all third country natural persons under the age of eighteen holding a lawful residence permit in one EU Member State and being found in another EU Member State in a vulnerable situation and without being accompanied by the titular parental authority or a person exercising other forms or rights of custody. Those include: Child victims of trafficking, juvenile delinquents, unaccompanied and separated children and all other children cases that competent authorities come across.
A question of status hampering protection and BID processes at national level • EU national children are excluded from formal protection avenues existing for third country national children • Decision making is often ad hoc and cumbersome • No formal procedural safeguard has been identified • Judicial review opportunities are limited • Legal grounds for durable solutions (say stay or return) are often distorted to fit individual situations • No experience is drawn form the ‘traditional’ international practice in the asylum field (COI service, platforms for information exchange etc.) • Return procedures for EU children are generally less publicized.
General observations on policy and practice at regional level • At policy and legislative level: • Regional instruments and initiatives are scattered and do not properly address the problem at regional level (Brussels II, Hague 1996). • there is no formal protection avenues existing or used in any country subject to the project Mario scrutiny for EU children on the move apart from the ordinary rules of law which are not adapted or at times, applied. • At the level of practice: • a general lack of collaboration between countries of origin and destination hampers best interests determination processes.
Specific observations • Essential elements, such as information on the socio-economic and family situation of a child back home or risks and security assessments, are not shared between countries because: • the information exchange channels either do not exist or are not fit from a protection perspective: An emphasis is put on criminal law while opportunities to strengthen collaboration from a civil perspective are not used, • no responsible authority is identified which undermines the information exchange process: different channels are used randomly by professionals, • a climate of mistrust between professionals from country of origin and destination, and • professionals operate in a conceptual vacuum and a low capacity of the child protection system further hampers a proper best interests determination process. • Operational return procedures are
Discussion points • A debate on the opportunities to improve the protection of children who exercise their right to freedom of movement should be initiated (on the basis of article 81 of the TFEU?). A debate on how to improve BID processes should include at a very mimimum: • Questions related to the appointment of a responsible authority at national level • Questions related to guardianship issues • Ascertainment of identity of children on the move • The opportunity of a network of guardians at European level • Procedural safeguards in BID processes • Durable solutions and their design • Harmonizing methodologies of socio economic and family assessments, including risks and security assessments: need for common minimum standards