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Transport Facilitation Working Group – Introduction

The Transport Facilitation Working Group (TFWG) aims to enable efficient global transport of radioactive materials. Through data collection and proposing strategies, the TFWG works towards reducing denials, improving safety and security, and promoting beneficial uses. This report presents findings from a survey conducted among diverse organizations involved in Class 7 shipments, highlighting the overall difficulty in shipping and the need for diverse routes.

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Transport Facilitation Working Group – Introduction

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  1. Transport Facilitation Working Group– Introduction Serge Gorlin, Co-Chair of TFWG Jan 2017

  2. Background (1/2) President’s findings: IAEA TransportConference (Oct 2011) “Denial of shipments continues to be a problem which must be addressed. DOS can adversely affect security – e.g., if a package is left at a facility, it may be misplaced or abandoned. Efforts to reduce denials have both safety and security benefits. DOS is also hindering radioactive source returns as well as beneficial uses involving radioactive material. Information on why carriers deny shipments should be developed.”

  3. Background (2/2) • Transport Facilitation Working Group (TFWG)  set up in April 2014 • An independent, multi-stakeholder group of experts whose role is to propose strategies and activities necessary to enable the efficient global transport of radioactive materials. • TFWG submits reports to the Inter-Agency Group (IAG), composed of representatives of the IAEA, ICAO, and IMO Secretariats as well as UNECE. • It assumes some functions of the International Steering Committee on Denials of Shipment (2008-2013) • Initial focus is on assembling credible data regarding the level of difficulty in shipping radioactive materials worldwide

  4. TFWG Members Co-Chairs: Nat Bruno – Brazil, Former IAEA Transport Safety Unit Serge Gorlin - World Nuclear Association Secretary: Ulric Schwela - Salus Mineralis • Manju Saini - Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, India • Trevor Dixon  - World Nuclear Transport Institute • Iain Davidson - Office for Nuclear Regulation, UK • Terry Soulsby - International Source Suppliers and Producers Association • Nontutuzelo Mmutle - National Nuclear Regulator, South Africa • Mario Mallaupoma - Peruvian Institute of Nuclear Energy • Jack Edlow - Edlow International • Zhengcai Chen - formerly of Ministry of Transport, China  • Bernard Monot – Areva • Roland Chavasse – Tantalum-Niobium International Study Centre

  5. Survey • Conducted in 2015 through online questionnaire • Surveyed 61 organisations relying on Class 7 shipment • Good cross-section representing diverse regions and sectors of nuclear technology • Respondents responsible for over 300,000 package movements / year

  6. Respondents Medical • Mallinckrodt Pharmaceuticals • Mallinckdrodt Medical • International Isotopes Inc • Best Theratronics • Eckert & Ziegler (Brazil) • BRIT • DelfinFarmaco • Shreeji Imaging and Diagnostic • Perkin Elmer (India) • Elekta Medical Systems Governmental • International Atomic Energy Agency (one department) Mining / Minerals • BHP Billiton • Rio Tinto • Ethiopian Minerals Development SC • Advanced Material Japan • Specialty Metals Resources • Trademet • Advanced Metallurgical Group List excludes those respondents who requested anonymity

  7. Respondents Industrial Sources • Nordion • Reviss Services • SQHL • Sievert Lab (Brazil) • JabarraRadioproteção • Arctest • NDT do Brasil • Geecy Industrial Services • Berthold Technologies (India) • Electronic & Engineering Co. Nuclear Industry • Korea Hydro Nuclear Power • Urenco • EPZ • INB • Converdyn • Advanced Nuclear Fuels (Areva) • CEZ Class 7 Logistics • NTP Logistics • Daher-NCS • RSB Logistic • DMS • CMA-CGM • Express Truck (Spain) • AmbientisRadioproteção Users • Vision Systems & Solutions • Schlumberger • HLS Asia • AVX Corporation

  8. Country where respondent based Americas • Brazil • USA • Canada • Peru Asia • India • China • Kazakhstan • South Korea • Singapore • Japan Europe • Germany • Czech Republic • Netherlands • United Kingdom • Spain • France • Belgium • Austria Africa • South Africa • Tanzania • Ethiopia Oceania • Australia

  9. Please rate your organization’s overall degree of difficulty in shipping Class 7 Using a scale of 1 – 7 where 1 is very easy, and 7 very difficult

  10. How many routes are available to your major customer / consignee for Cl. 7? • Overall (mean): 1.86 • Mainly international + transit / transhipment: 1.37 Vulnerable supply chains Lack of diverse routes

  11. Our cargoes travel to the consignee by a direct route – please respond Fully agree Completely disagree 1-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------7 3.66 Overall (mean) 4.98 Mainly international + transit / transhipment (27 respondents)

  12. IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 9 • “The achievement of effective security in transport can be assisted by considering transport schedules, routing, security of passage, information security and procedures. In particular, and as far as is operationally practicable, general recommendations to be regarded as best practice are as follows: • The total time that radioactive material is in transport, the number of intermodal transfers and the waiting times associated with the intermodal transfer are kept to the minimum necessary.”

  13. INFCIRC/225/Rev5 (NSS 13) 6.6. Physical protection against unauthorized removal during transport should encompass, as far as operationally practicable in accordance with the graded approach: (a) Minimizing the total time during which the nuclear material remains in transport. (b) Minimizing the number and duration of nuclear material transfers, i.e. transfer from one conveyance to another, transfer to and from temporary storage and temporary storage while awaiting the arrival of a conveyance, etc.

  14. To what do you attribute the difficulty? Number of respondents Answers provided if respondents had given a negative answer to Q 10 & 11 in the survey

  15. Action plan • Increase the TFWG network • Develop communication materials, including website, that: • Show the impact of denials • Explain the need for Cl. 7 transport • Affirm the good safety record of shipping Cl. 7 • Publicise success stories • Ensure training material relating to transport of radioactive materials includes a module on facilitation • Repeat survey to track progress against initial benchmark. • Use future survey to identify more clearly where difficulty is occurring and obtain further breakdown on sector, region, mode • Understand the root causes of denial hot spots • Obtain the support of the Inter-Agency Group for a strategy and plan for improving facilitation of Class 7.

  16. Thank you for your attention www.tfwg.info

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