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PUBLIC HOUSING AND EMPLOYMENT OUTCOMES : A Quasi-Experimental Approach

PUBLIC HOUSING AND EMPLOYMENT OUTCOMES : A Quasi-Experimental Approach. 20 JUNE 2007 GAVIN WOOD*, RACHEL ONG ^ & MIKE DOCKERY # *RMIT UNIVERSITY ^ MURDOCH UNIVERSITY # CURTIN UNIVERSITY NATIONAL RESEARCH VENTURE 1: HOUSING ASSISTANCE AND EMPLOYMENT PARTICIPATION. INTRODUCTION.

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PUBLIC HOUSING AND EMPLOYMENT OUTCOMES : A Quasi-Experimental Approach

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  1. PUBLIC HOUSING AND EMPLOYMENT OUTCOMES: A Quasi-Experimental Approach 20 JUNE 2007 GAVIN WOOD*, RACHEL ONG^ & MIKE DOCKERY# *RMIT UNIVERSITY ^MURDOCH UNIVERSITY #CURTIN UNIVERSITY NATIONAL RESEARCH VENTURE 1: HOUSING ASSISTANCE AND EMPLOYMENT PARTICIPATION

  2. INTRODUCTION • Why is it important to understand how employment outcomes change following entry into public housing? • Welfare Traps • Security of tenure/housing stability • Poverty and unemployment traps

  3. HOW HAVE WE ADDRESSED THESE ISSUES? • Sample of all Western Australians that have joined the waiting list 1999 – 2005 • Constructed their employment profile 1999 – 2005 • At date join waiting list • At date of entry into public housing • At annual review date

  4. QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL METHOD BEFORE AND AFTER TRANSITION INTO PUBLIC HOUSING COMPARISON

  5. QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL METHOD BEFORE AND AFTER TRANSITION INTO PUBLIC HOUSING COMPARISON

  6. ‘SYNCHRONISED’ COMPARISONS OF EMPLOYMENT PROFILES • Wait turn applicants that subsequently enter public housing have an average wait time of over 1 year. • Priority applicants that subsequently enter public housing have an average wait of 7 months. Source: DHW public housing data 1999-2005 * Significantly different from applicants at 1% level + Significantly different from applicants at 5% level # Significantly different from applicants at 10% level Excludes transfer cases.

  7. ‘SYNCHRONISED’ COMPARISONS OF EMPLOYMENT PROFILES: WAIT TURN VS PRIORITY CASES • Source: DHW public housing data 1999-2005 • * Significantly different from applicants at 1% level • + Significantly different from applicants at 5% level • # Significantly different from applicants at 10% level • Excludes transfer cases. • Sample too small.

  8. KEY FINDINGS • Employment Rates remain low after entry into public housing • But there is an average increase in employment rates of 5.3 percentage points among priority applicants (53% increase) • And there is an average increase in employment rates of 6.8 percentage points among wait turn applicants (41% increase)

  9. RESERVATIONS • The evidence does not necessarily justify conclusion that if public housing stock were expanded employment benefits could be spread across a wider pool of applicants • Exits from public housing are a source of ‘attrition’ in sample • The attrition is selective – the employed in low wage jobs are less likely to make an early exit

  10. Policy Implications • Welfare Traps due to income eligibility rules at entry into public housing are more important than income related rents as a cause of inferior employment outcomes • There is some evidence that the housing stability provided by public housing promotes employment outcomes • How do we target public housing, offer housing stability to those who will benefit and address welfare traps? - Apply income eligibility criteria at entry on to waiting lists but not subsequently - Continue to set rents as a proportion of assessable income - But remove the market rent ‘cap’

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