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Privacy & Pervasive Healthcare

Privacy & Pervasive Healthcare. Machines of Loving Grace Spring 2008. Issues in Privacy & Security. Access control: ensuring that people who are authorized to see the information can, and others cannot Create Access Control Policies

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Privacy & Pervasive Healthcare

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  1. Privacy & Pervasive Healthcare Machines of Loving Grace Spring 2008

  2. Issues in Privacy & Security • Access control: ensuring that people who are authorized to see the information can, and others cannot • Create Access Control Policies • User identification: verify that users are who they say they are • Spoofing attack: attacker masquerades as another • Gain access to private data • Data validation: verify that data is from who it says it is from • E.g., spoofer could insert false data • Denial of service attacks • Overwhelm data servers by sheer volume • Attacker prevents legitimate users from accessing data

  3. Security & Privacy Techniques • Formulate clear access policies • Specify classes of subjects, data, users, situations • Rules that state when a class of users can access a class of data about a class of subjects • Implement access policies using cryptographic techniques • Protocols for distributing and using cryptographic keys and data • E.g.: public-key cryptography • Even well-established protocols often turn out to have bugs!

  4. Privacy Issues for Healthcare • Of particular concern for healthcare: • Conformance with HEPA privacy regulations • Volume of sensitive data • Large number of individuals require access to data • Authorized user base can change quickly, e.g. a new doctor is consulted on a case • Interaction with legacy computer systems that have privacy & security loopholes • Perfect privacy & security may not be attainable in a practical system!

  5. Physiological Value Based Security • Krishna Venkatasubramanian and Sandeep K. S. Gupta • Ira A. Fulton School of Engineering • Department of Computer Science and Engineering • Arizona State University • Tempe, Arizona • sandeep.gupta@asu.edu

  6. Biomedical Sensors (Biosensors) Inter-Pulse-Interval (V’1) Inter-Pulse-Interval (V1)  EKG EKG Inter-Pulse-Interval (V2) = = Inter-Pulse-Interval (V’2) PPG  PPG • Physiological Values (PV): Measure Stimuli from bodye.g EKG, PPG(Photoplethysymograph) • PVs are universally collectable, vary with time and can have similar values in one human being • Biomedical Sensor Platforms • In-vivo sensors • Are primarily at experimental stage • Measure one stimuli • Wearable sensors • Groups of sensors packaged together • Products available • Have wireless capability • Generic Sensors • Measure environmental stimuli • Can perform wireless communication • Used in medical monitoring projects, Code Blue @ Harvard • Mica2, MicaZ, TelosB Nano-scale Blood Glucose level detector Developed @ UIUC Mica2 based EKG sensor AMON Wearable Health Monitor • Properties • Small form factor • Limited processor, memory, communication capabilities • Form large networks within body for energy- efficiency Life Shirt Ambulatory Monitoring

  7. PVS: Physiological Value based Security ECG, Heart/Pulse Rate • Principle Idea: Use PVs as security primitives in biomedical sensor networks: • Hide cryptographic keys • Authenticate and secure biosensor communication • Examples: • Blood Pressure, Heart Rate, Glucose level • Temporal variations in different PVs. • Combination of multiple PV • PVs values at two location slightly different • Use Error Correction Codes like Majority Encoding for correction Blood Pressure + Blood Glucose Easier and safe key generation • Cheaper key distribution Sensors

  8. Value Time  Aspects of Physiological Values Required Properties of Physiological Values FOUND: Inter-Pulse-Interval (IPI), Heart Rate Variation (HPV) FUTURE QUEST: Find Others… • Universal • Should be measurable in everyone • Distinctive • Should be able to differentiate 2 individuals • Random • To prevent brute-force attacks • Timevariant • If broken, the next set of values should not be guessable. Physiological Certificate • Cert = MAC (Key, Data), γ Where γ = Key  PV • hides the actual Key used for computing the Message Authentication Code (MAC) over the data for integrity protection.

  9. PV Based Communication Measure Pre-defined PV @ Sender PVs & Receiver PVr Generate Random Key @ sender Randkey Cert = MAC(Randkey, Data) , γ where γ = PVs Randkey Compute Physiological Certificate with Key Rand on Data Send Message <Data, Cert, γ> Receiver message Unhide RandKeyusing PVr and γ from the Cert RandKey’= PVr Cert. γ Correct RandKey, verify certificate by computing MAC RandKey’’ = ECC(RandKey’) Cert == MAC (RandKey’’, Data) ? Error Correction Code used  Majority Encoding [Juels99,CVG03]

  10. Choosing Physiological Values PV1 PV0 • Identified PVs • Inter-Pulse-Interval (IPI) [PZ06]. • Heart Rate Variation (HRV) [BZZ05] • PV Distinctiveness Testing • Performanceevaluation criteria: • False Rejection Rate (FRR) • False Acceptance Rate (FAR) • FAR and FRR increased if two PVs lack synchronicity. • Randomness of PVs verified using Chi-Square Test. • Interference possible: • Drastic difference between PVs of two people will prevent un-wanted communication HRV HRV Encoder Encoder I1 Io 128 bits Hamming Distance 128 bits < 22 bits (same person)  90 bits (different person) Radio-range for Intended communication Interference

  11. Advantage of Using PV Based Security Traditional Secure Biosensor Network Communication S R BS Topology Formation Key Distribution Secure Communication • Unsecured • Cluster • Linear • Use distributed keys • Diffie Hellman (ECC) • Pre-deployed Keys • Random Key Assignment… PV based Secure Biosensor Network Communication S R BS Secure Topology Formation Secure Communication • PV based security • Centralized Cluster Formation • Distributed Cluster Formation • Use PV for sensor-sensor secure communication Key Distribution Completely Eliminated VERY EFFICIENT

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