Korean war and Sino-Soviet alliance

1. Korean war and Sino-Soviet alliance

2. The course of events • Korea was divided into two zones of occupation –Soviet in the north part with Kim Il – Sung (Ким Ир Сен) and American in the south part with Syngman Rhee (Ли Сын Ман); • Similar to Germany: the occupantsdeveloped the zone on their terms and the both sought to unify the country; • 1947-Truman proposed to Stalin: “Let’s arrange the elections” (There were more population in the south); and Stalin – to withdraw the troops • Since 1949 the clashes between zones were started, and it was clear that the zones would seek the unification on their terms. • AT the same time: February 1950 – Stalin met Mao Zedung in Moscow and they established the alliance; however, • Stalin did not trust Mao;

3. The “surprised” attack (by the North Korean forces in June 1950 >> • Problem in historiography: Did Stalin push Kim-Il Sung or not? • In 1949 Stalin did not want to push, because the risks of such operation outweighed the possible gains; • In 1950 he might have changed his position by letting Kim-Il Sung to prepare the unification by force, because the balance of power in Asia after the victory of Mao and because Stalin had lost Japan which was included in American containment strategy + European problems with Germany, NATO >> • Stalin decided to demonstrate the success of the Soviet communist expansion + he was said to believe that the USA would not interfere, if they had not interfered in Chinese Civic War before to help Chiang Kai-shek; • Document evidence:

4. Documents evidence about Stalin’s position as to the unification of Korea • The meeting with Kim in Moscow, march 1949: Kim was asking for military aid and Stalin was avoided the answer. (1) • and in 1950 Stalin wrote to the Soviet ambassador: “...I understand the dissatisfaction of...Kim..., but he must understand that such a large matter in regard to South Korea....must be organized so that there would not be too great risk.... (2)

5. Documents evidence • He has changed his mind in already in April 1950 he gave four reasons to support “a more active stance on the unification of Korea in a conversation with Kim again: ....the first reason was the strengthening of the socialist camp in the East...., the second – is the obvious weakness of the reactionary camp: the shameful defeat of America’s intervention into Chinese affairs...., the third factor is a contribution to the Soviet Union’s new stance ....the arrogant behavior of the US in Europe, the Balkans, the Middle East, and especially its decision to form NATO.....America was no longer a partner, but an adversary, and the Soviet Union could not bind itself any longer to agreements with an adversary...”, and fourth – the South was determined to launch an attack on the North sooner or later and it was important to forestall this aggression....” (4)

6. The course of events“We can not let the UN down” • Korea was not a priority of the American foreign policy till the loss of China ( • Truman decided to answer by the UN resolution, army, not because the Korean peninsula had strategic importance, but because the concession could influence on the image of the US as the counterbalance of the Soviet Union; • Truman’s diary: “…I had time to think aboard the plane. In my generation, this was not a first occasion when the strong attacked the weak. I recalled some earlier instances: Manchuria, Ethiopia, Austria. I remembered how each time that the democracies failed to act, it had encouraged the aggressors to keep going ahead. Communism was acting in Korea, just Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese had acted ten, fifteen, and twenty years earlier. I felt certain that if South Korea was allowed to fall, Communist leaders would be emboldenedto override nations closer to our shores…

7. The stabilization of war to the spring 1951 after the offensive by D. MacArthur against the North and November attack the UN forces by the the Chinese forces • Removal of MacArthur, some warmer feeling to end the war and consistent position of Stalin to continue it. • After his death it was ended with the status quo result. • The war has warmed the Soviet-Sino alliance till the end of 1950es; • However, Mao was too critical as to Nikita Khrushchev’ s conciliation policy in Eastern Europe and with West as whole >> • The famous China-USSR split was started in 1960.

8. The significance of the Korean War • What was happened in June 1950 was the first hot war of the Cold War; • It was signalized that the East-West tension is deep and permanent; • It has demonstrated to the Soviet Union that the USA was ready to fight against the Soviet expansion in all, even insignificant (strategically) parts of the world; • The both sides were ready to be involved in a war against each other;